Attack Ent T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

MITRE ATT&CK T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer

When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1105, Ingress Tool Transfer, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.

Technique context

• ATT&CK domain: enterprise
• ATT&CK ID: T1105
• Technique name: Ingress Tool Transfer
• Type: technique
• ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105
• Tactics: command-and-control
• Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
• Required permissions: Not specified
• Effective permissions: Not specified
• Defenses bypassed: Not specified

ATT&CK description

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

On Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such as copy, finger, certutil, and PowerShell commands such as IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString() and Invoke-WebRequest. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as curl, scp, sftp, tftp, rsync, finger, and wget.(Citation: t1105_lolbas) A number of these tools, such as wget, curl, and scp, also exist on ESXi. After downloading a file, a threat actor may attempt to verify its integrity by checking its hash value (e.g., via certutil -hashfile).(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence COSCMICENERGY 2023)

Adversaries may also abuse installers and package managers, such as yum or winget, to download tools to victim hosts. Adversaries have also abused file application features, such as the Windows search-ms protocol handler, to deliver malicious files to victims through remote file searches invoked by User Execution (typically after interacting with Phishing lures).(Citation: T1105: Trellix_search-ms)

Files can also be transferred using various Web Services as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage services that sync between a web-based and an on-premises client, such as Dropbox or OneDrive, to transfer files onto victim systems. For example, by compromising a cloud account and logging into the service's web portal, an adversary may be able to trigger an automatic syncing process that transfers the file onto the victim's machine.(Citation: Dropbox Malware Sync)

Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

Bundled resources

• references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
• references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
• references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
• templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
• templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
• templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
• templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
• scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
• assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

Useful telemetry and data sources

• Not specified in the STIX object.

Mitigations to consider

• Filter Network Traffic
• Network Intrusion Prevention

Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

• 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)
• 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)
• ABK (malware)
• ANDROMEDA (malware)
• APT-C-36 (intrusion-set)
• APT18 (intrusion-set)
• APT28 (intrusion-set)
• APT29 (intrusion-set)
• APT3 (intrusion-set)
• APT32 (intrusion-set)
• APT33 (intrusion-set)
• APT37 (intrusion-set)
• APT38 (intrusion-set)
• APT39 (intrusion-set)
• APT41 (intrusion-set)
• APT41 DUST (campaign)
• Action RAT (malware)
• Agent Tesla (malware)
• Agent.btz (malware)
• Ajax Security Team (intrusion-set)

Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

• Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
• Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
• Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
• Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
• Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
• References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

ATT&CK contributors

• Alain Homewood
• Jeremy Hedges
• Joe Wise
• John Page (aka hyp3rlinx), ApparitionSec
• Mark Wee
• Peter Oakes
• Selena Larson, @selenalarson
• Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
• The DFIR Report
• Don Le, Stifel Financial