MITRE ATT&CK T1110.004: Credential Stuffing
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1110.004, Credential Stuffing, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1110.004
- Technique name: Credential Stuffing
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004
- Tactics: credential-access
- Platforms: Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.
Credential stuffing is a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies.
Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when stuffing credentials. Commonly targeted services include the following:
- SSH (22/TCP)
- Telnet (23/TCP)
- FTP (21/TCP)
- NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
- LDAP (389/TCP)
- Kerberos (88/TCP)
- RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
- HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
- MSSQL (1433/TCP)
- Oracle (1521/TCP)
- MySQL (3306/TCP)
- VNC (5900/TCP)
In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Account Use Policies
- Multi-factor Authentication
- Password Policies
- User Account Management
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- Chimera (intrusion-set)
- TrickBot (malware)
- VOID MANTICORE (intrusion-set)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Diogo Fernandes
- Anastasios Pingios
1---2name: attack-ent-t1110-004-credential-stuffing3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1110.004 Credential Stuffing in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1110.004, Credential Stuffing, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1110-004-credential-stuffing7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1110.00410 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--b2d03cea-aec1-45ca-9744-9ee583c1e1cc11 attack_version: "1.7"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:49:14.923Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1110.004: Credential Stuffing1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1110.004, Credential Stuffing, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1110.00425- Technique name: Credential Stuffing26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/00428- Tactics: credential-access29- Platforms: Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.3738Credential stuffing is a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies.3940Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when stuffing credentials. Commonly targeted services include the following:4142* SSH (22/TCP)43* Telnet (23/TCP)44* FTP (21/TCP)45* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)46* LDAP (389/TCP)47* Kerberos (88/TCP)48* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)49* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)50* MSSQL (1433/TCP)51* Oracle (1521/TCP)52* MySQL (3306/TCP)53* VNC (5900/TCP)5455In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)5657## Agent workflow58591. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.602. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.613. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.624. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.635. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.646. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.6566## Bundled resources6768- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.69- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.70- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.71- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.72- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.73- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.74- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.75- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.76- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.7778To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.7980## Detection guidance8182No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.8384## Useful telemetry and data sources8586- Not specified in the STIX object.8788## Mitigations to consider8990- Account Use Policies91- Multi-factor Authentication92- Password Policies93- User Account Management9495## Known threat context9697Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:9899- Chimera (intrusion-set)100- TrickBot (malware)101- VOID MANTICORE (intrusion-set)102103## Recommended output pattern104105When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:106107- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.108- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.109- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.110- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.111- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.112- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.113114## ATT&CK contributors115116- Diogo Fernandes117- Anastasios Pingios