MITRE ATT&CK T1110: Brute Force
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1110, Brute Force, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1110
- Technique name: Brute Force
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110
- Tactics: credential-access
- Platforms: Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.
Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to Valid Accounts within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as OS Credential Dumping, Account Discovery, or Password Policy Discovery. Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as External Remote Services as part of Initial Access.
If an adversary guesses the correct password but fails to login to a compromised account due to location-based conditional access policies, they may change their infrastructure until they match the victim’s location and therefore bypass those policies.(Citation: ReliaQuest Health Care Social Engineering Campaign 2024)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Account Use Policies
- Multi-factor Authentication
- Password Policies
- User Account Management
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- APT39 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 (intrusion-set)
- Agrius (intrusion-set)
- Caterpillar WebShell (malware)
- Chaos (malware)
- CrackMapExec (tool)
- DarkVishnya (intrusion-set)
- Dragonfly (intrusion-set)
- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)
- FIN5 (intrusion-set)
- Fox Kitten (intrusion-set)
- HEXANE (intrusion-set)
- Kinsing (malware)
- OilRig (intrusion-set)
- Operation Dream Job (campaign)
- PoshC2 (tool)
- Pysa (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
- Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
- Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
- Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
- Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
- Mohamed Kmal
- ReliaQuest
1---2name: attack-ent-t1110-brute-force3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1110 Brute Force in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1110, Brute Force, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Without knowledge of the password for an a…"4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1110-brute-force7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T111010 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd11 attack_version: "2.8"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:49:12.218Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1110: Brute Force1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1110, Brute Force, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T111025- Technique name: Brute Force26- Type: technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T111028- Tactics: credential-access29- Platforms: Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.3738Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. 3940If an adversary guesses the correct password but fails to login to a compromised account due to location-based conditional access policies, they may change their infrastructure until they match the victim’s location and therefore bypass those policies.(Citation: ReliaQuest Health Care Social Engineering Campaign 2024)4142## Agent workflow43441. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.452. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.463. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.474. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.485. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.496. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5051## Bundled resources5253- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.54- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.55- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.56- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.57- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.58- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.59- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.60- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.61- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6263To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6465## Detection guidance6667No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6869## Useful telemetry and data sources7071- Not specified in the STIX object.7273## Mitigations to consider7475- Account Use Policies76- Multi-factor Authentication77- Password Policies78- User Account Management7980## Known threat context8182Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8384- 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)85- APT28 (intrusion-set)86- APT38 (intrusion-set)87- APT39 (intrusion-set)88- APT41 (intrusion-set)89- Agrius (intrusion-set)90- Caterpillar WebShell (malware)91- Chaos (malware)92- CrackMapExec (tool)93- DarkVishnya (intrusion-set)94- Dragonfly (intrusion-set)95- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)96- FIN5 (intrusion-set)97- Fox Kitten (intrusion-set)98- HEXANE (intrusion-set)99- Kinsing (malware)100- OilRig (intrusion-set)101- Operation Dream Job (campaign)102- PoshC2 (tool)103- Pysa (malware)104105## Recommended output pattern106107When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:108109- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.110- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.111- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.112- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.113- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.114- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.115116## ATT&CK contributors117118- David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro119- Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro120- Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro121- Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team122- Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs123- Mohamed Kmal124- ReliaQuest