MITRE ATT&CK T1112: Modify Registry
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1112, Modify Registry, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1112
- Technique name: Modify Registry
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112
- Tactics: defense-impairment, persistence
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.
Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, with some keys requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification.(Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools, such as remote access tools, may also contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API.
The Registry may be modified in order to hide configuration information or malicious payloads via Obfuscated Files or Information.(Citation: Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019)(Citation: Avaddon Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Microsoft BlackCat Jun 2022)(Citation: CISA Russian Gov Critical Infra 2018) The Registry may also be modified to impair defenses, such as by enabling macros for all Microsoft Office products, allowing privilege escalation without alerting the user, increasing the maximum number of allowed outbound requests, and/or modifying systems to store plaintext credentials in memory.(Citation: CISA LockBit 2023)(Citation: Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019)
The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system.(Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's SMB/Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.
Finally, Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via Reg or other utilities using the Win32 API.(Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence.(Citation: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014)(Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Restrict Registry Permissions
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)
- AADInternals (tool)
- ADVSTORESHELL (malware)
- APT19 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 (intrusion-set)
- APT42 (intrusion-set)
- Agent Tesla (malware)
- Amadey (malware)
- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)
- Attor (malware)
- Avaddon (malware)
- BACKSPACE (malware)
- BADCALL (malware)
- BOOKWORM (malware)
- Bankshot (malware)
- Bisonal (malware)
- BitPaymer (malware)
- Black Basta (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Bartosz Jerzman
- David Lu, Tripwire
- Gerardo Santos
- Travis Smith, Tripwire
1---2name: attack-ent-t1112-modify-registry3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1112 Modify Registry in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1112, Modify Registry, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1112-modify-registry7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T111210 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae411 attack_version: "3.0"12 attack_modified: "2026-04-16T20:07:53.021Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1112: Modify Registry1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1112, Modify Registry, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T111225- Technique name: Modify Registry26- Type: technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T111228- Tactics: defense-impairment, persistence29- Platforms: Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.3738Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, with some keys requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) may be used for local or remote Registry modification.(Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools, such as remote access tools, may also contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API.3940The Registry may be modified in order to hide configuration information or malicious payloads via [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).(Citation: Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019)(Citation: Avaddon Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Microsoft BlackCat Jun 2022)(Citation: CISA Russian Gov Critical Infra 2018) The Registry may also be modified to impair defenses, such as by enabling macros for all Microsoft Office products, allowing privilege escalation without alerting the user, increasing the maximum number of allowed outbound requests, and/or modifying systems to store plaintext credentials in memory.(Citation: CISA LockBit 2023)(Citation: Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019)4142The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system.(Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are required, along with access to the remote system's [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) for RPC communication.4344Finally, Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other utilities using the Win32 API.(Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence.(Citation: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014)(Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017)4546## Agent workflow47481. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.492. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.503. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.514. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.525. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.536. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5455## Bundled resources5657- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.58- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.59- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.60- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.61- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.62- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.63- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.64- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.65- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6667To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6869## Detection guidance7071No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.7273## Useful telemetry and data sources7475- Not specified in the STIX object.7677## Mitigations to consider7879- Restrict Registry Permissions8081## Known threat context8283Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8485- 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)86- AADInternals (tool)87- ADVSTORESHELL (malware)88- APT19 (intrusion-set)89- APT32 (intrusion-set)90- APT38 (intrusion-set)91- APT41 (intrusion-set)92- APT42 (intrusion-set)93- Agent Tesla (malware)94- Amadey (malware)95- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)96- Attor (malware)97- Avaddon (malware)98- BACKSPACE (malware)99- BADCALL (malware)100- BOOKWORM (malware)101- Bankshot (malware)102- Bisonal (malware)103- BitPaymer (malware)104- Black Basta (malware)105106## Recommended output pattern107108When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:109110- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.111- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.112- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.113- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.114- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.115- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.116117## ATT&CK contributors118119- Bartosz Jerzman120- David Lu, Tripwire121- Gerardo Santos122- Travis Smith, Tripwire