MITRE ATT&CK T1137.001: Office Template Macros
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1137.001, Office Template Macros, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1137.001
- Technique name: Office Template Macros
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001
- Tactics: persistence
- Platforms: Office Suite, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)
Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)
Word Normal.dotm location:
C:\Users<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm
Excel Personal.xlsb location:
C:\Users<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB
Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16</code>, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)
An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
- Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- BackConfig (malware)
- Cobalt Strike (malware)
- MuddyWater (intrusion-set)
- Operation AkaiRyū (campaign)
- ROAMINGHOUSE (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
1---2name: attack-ent-t1137-001-office-template-macros3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1137.001 Office Template Macros in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1137.001, Office Template Macros, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1137-001-office-template-macros7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1137.00110 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba2111 attack_version: "1.2"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:48:59.432Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1137.001: Office Template Macros1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1137.001, Office Template Macros, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1137.00125- Technique name: Office Template Macros26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/00128- Tactics: persistence29- Platforms: Office Suite, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)3738Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) 3940Word Normal.dotm location:<br>41<code>C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm</code>4243Excel Personal.xlsb location:<br>44<code>C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB</code>4546Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under <code>C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\</code>, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) 4748An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.4950## Agent workflow51521. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.532. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.543. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.554. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.565. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.576. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5859## Bundled resources6061- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.62- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.63- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.64- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.65- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.66- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.67- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.68- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.69- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.7071To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.7273## Detection guidance7475No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.7677## Useful telemetry and data sources7879- Not specified in the STIX object.8081## Mitigations to consider8283- Behavior Prevention on Endpoint84- Disable or Remove Feature or Program8586## Known threat context8788Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8990- BackConfig (malware)91- Cobalt Strike (malware)92- MuddyWater (intrusion-set)93- Operation AkaiRyū (campaign)94- ROAMINGHOUSE (malware)9596## Recommended output pattern9798When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:99100- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.101- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.102- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.103- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.104- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.105- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.