MITRE ATT&CK T1195: Supply Chain Compromise
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1195, Supply Chain Compromise, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1195
- Technique name: Supply Chain Compromise
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195
- Tactics: initial-access
- Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS, SaaS
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:
- Manipulation of development tools
- Manipulation of a development environment
- Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)
- Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies
- Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms
- Compromised/infected system images (removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware)
- Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions
- Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors
- Shipment interdiction
While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Adversaries may limit targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious software to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)
In some cases, adversaries may conduct “second-order” supply chain compromises by leveraging the access gained from an initial supply chain compromise to further compromise a software component.(Citation: Krebs 3cx overview 2023) This may allow the threat actor to spread to even more victims.
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Application Developer Guidance
- Boot Integrity
- Limit Software Installation
- Update Software
- User Account Management
- Vulnerability Scanning
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)
- Lumma Stealer (malware)
- OilRig (intrusion-set)
- Raccoon Stealer (malware)
- Sandworm Team (intrusion-set)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Veeral Patel
- Menachem Goldstein
- Damien Miller-McAndrews
1---2name: attack-ent-t1195-supply-chain-compromise3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1195 Supply Chain Compromise in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1195, Supply Chain Compromise, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1195-supply-chain-compromise7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T119510 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f711 attack_version: "1.7"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:48:41.675Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1195: Supply Chain Compromise1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1195, Supply Chain Compromise, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T119525- Technique name: Supply Chain Compromise26- Type: technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T119528- Tactics: initial-access29- Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS, SaaS30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.3738Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:3940* Manipulation of development tools41* Manipulation of a development environment42* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)43* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies44* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms45* Compromised/infected system images (removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) 46* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions47* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors48* Shipment interdiction4950While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Adversaries may limit targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious software to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)5152In some cases, adversaries may conduct “second-order” supply chain compromises by leveraging the access gained from an initial supply chain compromise to further compromise a software component.(Citation: Krebs 3cx overview 2023) This may allow the threat actor to spread to even more victims.5354## Agent workflow55561. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.572. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.583. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.594. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.605. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.616. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.6263## Bundled resources6465- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.66- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.67- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.68- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.69- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.70- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.71- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.72- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.73- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.7475To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.7677## Detection guidance7879No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.8081## Useful telemetry and data sources8283- Not specified in the STIX object.8485## Mitigations to consider8687- Application Developer Guidance88- Boot Integrity89- Limit Software Installation90- Update Software91- User Account Management92- Vulnerability Scanning9394## Known threat context9596Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:9798- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)99- Lumma Stealer (malware)100- OilRig (intrusion-set)101- Raccoon Stealer (malware)102- Sandworm Team (intrusion-set)103104## Recommended output pattern105106When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:107108- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.109- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.110- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.111- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.112- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.113- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.114115## ATT&CK contributors116117- Veeral Patel118- Menachem Goldstein119- Damien Miller-McAndrews