MITRE ATT&CK T1204.002: Malicious File
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1204.002, Malicious File, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1204.002
- Technique name: Malicious File
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002
- Tactics: execution
- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.(Citation: Mandiant Trojanized Windows 10)
Adversaries may employ various forms of Masquerading and Obfuscated Files or Information to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs)
While Malicious File frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
- Execution Prevention
- User Training
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)
- APT-C-36 (intrusion-set)
- APT12 (intrusion-set)
- APT19 (intrusion-set)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT29 (intrusion-set)
- APT30 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- APT33 (intrusion-set)
- APT37 (intrusion-set)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- APT39 (intrusion-set)
- Agent Tesla (malware)
- Ajax Security Team (intrusion-set)
- Andariel (intrusion-set)
- Aoqin Dragon (intrusion-set)
- AppleJeus (malware)
- AppleSeed (malware)
- AshTag (malware)
- Astaroth (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
1---2name: attack-ent-t1204-002-malicious-file3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1204.002 Malicious File in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1204.002, Malicious File, or enterprise ATT&CK. An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1204-002-malicious-file7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1204.00210 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e11 attack_version: "1.6"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:48:31.674Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1204.002: Malicious File1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1204.002, Malicious File, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1204.00225- Technique name: Malicious File26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/00228- Tactics: execution29- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.(Citation: Mandiant Trojanized Windows 10)3738Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) 3940While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).4142## Agent workflow43441. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.452. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.463. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.474. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.485. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.496. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5051## Bundled resources5253- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.54- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.55- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.56- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.57- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.58- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.59- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.60- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.61- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6263To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6465## Detection guidance6667No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6869## Useful telemetry and data sources7071- Not specified in the STIX object.7273## Mitigations to consider7475- Behavior Prevention on Endpoint76- Execution Prevention77- User Training7879## Known threat context8081Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8283- 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)84- APT-C-36 (intrusion-set)85- APT12 (intrusion-set)86- APT19 (intrusion-set)87- APT28 (intrusion-set)88- APT29 (intrusion-set)89- APT30 (intrusion-set)90- APT32 (intrusion-set)91- APT33 (intrusion-set)92- APT37 (intrusion-set)93- APT38 (intrusion-set)94- APT39 (intrusion-set)95- Agent Tesla (malware)96- Ajax Security Team (intrusion-set)97- Andariel (intrusion-set)98- Aoqin Dragon (intrusion-set)99- AppleJeus (malware)100- AppleSeed (malware)101- AshTag (malware)102- Astaroth (malware)103104## Recommended output pattern105106When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:107108- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.109- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.110- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.111- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.112- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.113- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.114115## ATT&CK contributors116117- TruKno