MITRE ATT&CK T1204.003: Malicious Image
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1204.003, Malicious Image, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1204.003
- Technique name: Malicious Image
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003
- Tactics: execution
- Platforms: IaaS, Containers
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via Upload Malware, and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)
Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Audit
- Code Signing
- Network Intrusion Prevention
- User Training
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
- Vishwas Manral, McAfee
1---2name: attack-ent-t1204-003-malicious-image3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1204.003 Malicious Image in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1204.003, Malicious Image, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1204.003: Malicious Image89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1204.003, Malicious Image, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1204.00317- Technique name: Malicious Image18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/00320- Tactics: execution21- Platforms: IaaS, Containers22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)2930Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)3132## Agent workflow33341. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.352. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.363. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.374. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.385. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.396. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4041## Bundled resources4243- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.44- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.45- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.46- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.47- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.48- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.49- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.50- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.51- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5253To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5455## Detection guidance5657No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.5859## Useful telemetry and data sources6061- Not specified in the STIX object.6263## Mitigations to consider6465- Audit66- Code Signing67- Network Intrusion Prevention68- User Training6970## Known threat context7172Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7374- TeamTNT (intrusion-set)7576## Recommended output pattern7778When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:7980- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.81- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.82- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.83- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.84- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.85- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.8687## ATT&CK contributors8889- Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)90- Vishwas Manral, McAfee
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