MITRE ATT&CK T1204: User Execution
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1204, User Execution, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1204
- Technique name: User Execution
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204
- Tactics: execution
- Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS, IaaS, Containers
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.
While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.
Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as:
- Enabling Remote Access Tools, allowing direct control of the system to the adversary
- Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to Steal Web Session Cookies(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)
- Downloading and executing malware for User Execution
- Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually(Citation: Reliaquest-execution)(Citation: proofpoint-selfpwn)
For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through Phishing, vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or Remote Access Tools.(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
- Execution Prevention
- Limit Software Installation
- Network Intrusion Prevention
- Restrict Web-Based Content
- User Training
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- LAPSUS$ (intrusion-set)
- Lumma Stealer (malware)
- Raspberry Robin (malware)
- Scattered Spider (intrusion-set)
- Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution (campaign)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB
- Menachem Goldstein
- Harikrishnan Muthu, Cyble
- ReliaQuest
- Ale Houspanossian
- Fernando Bacchin
1---2name: attack-ent-t1204-user-execution3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1204 User Execution in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1204, User Execution, or enterprise ATT&CK. An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1204-user-execution7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T120410 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b511 attack_version: "1.8"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:49:04.940Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1204: User Execution1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1204, User Execution, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T120425- Technique name: User Execution26- Type: technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T120428- Tactics: execution29- Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS, IaaS, Containers30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).3738While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).3940Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as:4142* Enabling [Remote Access Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary43* Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)s(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)44* Downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)45* Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually(Citation: Reliaquest-execution)(Citation: proofpoint-selfpwn)4647For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)4849## Agent workflow50511. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.522. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.533. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.544. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.555. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.566. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5758## Bundled resources5960- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.61- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.62- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.63- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.64- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.65- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.66- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.67- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.68- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6970To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.7172## Detection guidance7374No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.7576## Useful telemetry and data sources7778- Not specified in the STIX object.7980## Mitigations to consider8182- Behavior Prevention on Endpoint83- Execution Prevention84- Limit Software Installation85- Network Intrusion Prevention86- Restrict Web-Based Content87- User Training8889## Known threat context9091Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:9293- LAPSUS$ (intrusion-set)94- Lumma Stealer (malware)95- Raspberry Robin (malware)96- Scattered Spider (intrusion-set)97- Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution (campaign)9899## Recommended output pattern100101When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:102103- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.104- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.105- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.106- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.107- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.108- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.109110## ATT&CK contributors111112- Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB113- Menachem Goldstein114- Harikrishnan Muthu, Cyble115- ReliaQuest116- Ale Houspanossian117- Fernando Bacchin