MITRE ATT&CK T1213.002: Sharepoint
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1213.002, Sharepoint, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1213.002
- Technique name: Sharepoint
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002
- Tactics: collection
- Platforms: Office Suite, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:
- Policies, procedures, and standards
- Physical / logical network diagrams
- System architecture diagrams
- Technical system documentation
- Testing / development credentials (i.e., Unsecured Credentials)
- Work / project schedules
- Source code snippets
- Links to network shares and other internal resources
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Audit
- User Account Management
- User Training
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- Akira (intrusion-set)
- C0027 (campaign)
- Chimera (intrusion-set)
- HAFNIUM (intrusion-set)
- Ke3chang (intrusion-set)
- LAPSUS$ (intrusion-set)
- TruffleHog (tool)
- VOID MANTICORE (intrusion-set)
- spwebmember (tool)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
1---2name: attack-ent-t1213-002-sharepoint3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1213.002 Sharepoint in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1213.002, Sharepoint, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1213.002: Sharepoint89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1213.002, Sharepoint, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1213.00217- Technique name: Sharepoint18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/00220- Tactics: collection21- Platforms: Office Suite, Windows22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:2930* Policies, procedures, and standards31* Physical / logical network diagrams32* System architecture diagrams33* Technical system documentation34* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552))35* Work / project schedules36* Source code snippets37* Links to network shares and other internal resources3839## Agent workflow40411. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.422. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.433. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.444. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.455. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.466. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4748## Bundled resources4950- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.51- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.52- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.53- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.54- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.55- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.56- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.57- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.58- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5960To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6162## Detection guidance6364No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6566## Useful telemetry and data sources6768- Not specified in the STIX object.6970## Mitigations to consider7172- Audit73- User Account Management74- User Training7576## Known threat context7778Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7980- APT28 (intrusion-set)81- Akira (intrusion-set)82- C0027 (campaign)83- Chimera (intrusion-set)84- HAFNIUM (intrusion-set)85- Ke3chang (intrusion-set)86- LAPSUS$ (intrusion-set)87- TruffleHog (tool)88- VOID MANTICORE (intrusion-set)89- spwebmember (tool)9091## Recommended output pattern9293When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:9495- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.96- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.97- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.98- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.99- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.100- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.101102## ATT&CK contributors103104- Arun Seelagan, CISA