Attack Ent T1213 Data From Information Repositories

MITRE ATT&CK T1213: Data from Information Repositories

When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1213, Data from Information Repositories, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.

Technique context

• ATT&CK domain: enterprise
• ATT&CK ID: T1213
• Technique name: Data from Information Repositories
• Type: technique
• ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213
• Tactics: collection
• Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS, SaaS, IaaS, Office Suite
• Required permissions: Not specified
• Effective permissions: Not specified
• Defenses bypassed: Not specified

ATT&CK description

Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., Transfer Data to Cloud Account).

The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:

• Policies, procedures, and standards
• Physical / logical network diagrams
• System architecture diagrams
• Technical system documentation
• Testing / development credentials (i.e., Unsecured Credentials)
• Work / project schedules
• Source code snippets
• Links to network shares and other internal resources
• Contact or other sensitive information about business partners and customers, including personally identifiable information (PII)

Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include the following:

• Storage services such as IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and more specialized platforms such as customer relationship management (CRM) databases
• Collaboration platforms such as SharePoint, Confluence, and code repositories
• Messaging platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams

In some cases, information repositories have been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing for overly-broad access by all users or even public access to unauthenticated users. This is particularly common with cloud-native or cloud-hosted services, such as AWS Relational Database Service (RDS), Redis, or ElasticSearch.(Citation: Mitiga)(Citation: TrendMicro Exposed Redis 2020)(Citation: Cybernews Reuters Leak 2022)

Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

Bundled resources

• references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
• references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
• references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
• templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
• templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
• templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
• templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
• scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
• assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

Useful telemetry and data sources

• Not specified in the STIX object.

Mitigations to consider

• Audit
• Encrypt Sensitive Information
• Multi-factor Authentication
• Out-of-Band Communications Channel
• Software Configuration
• User Account Management
• User Training

Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

• APT28 (intrusion-set)
• Raccoon Stealer (malware)
• SolarWinds Compromise (campaign)
• Troll Stealer (malware)

Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

• Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
• Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
• Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
• Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
• Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
• References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

ATT&CK contributors

• Regina Elwell
• Praetorian
• Milos Stojadinovic
• Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant
• Obsidian Security
• Naveen Vijayaraghavan
• Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)