MITRE ATT&CK T1218.014: MMC
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1218.014, MMC, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1218.014
- Technique name: MMC
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014
- Tactics: stealth
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)
For example, mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window.
Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. Inhibit System Recovery) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)
Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a Component Object Model class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Disable or Remove Feature or Program
- Execution Prevention
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- Medusa Group (intrusion-set)
- RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations (campaign)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
1---2name: attack-ent-t1218-014-mmc3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1218.014 MMC in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1218.014, MMC, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1218-014-mmc7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1218.01410 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--ffbcfdb0-de22-4106-9ed3-fc23c8a0140711 attack_version: "3.0"12 attack_modified: "2026-04-15T22:39:47.445Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1218.014: MMC1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1218.014, MMC, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1218.01425- Technique name: MMC26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/01428- Tactics: stealth29- Platforms: Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)3738For example, <code>mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a</code> will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is <code>mmc gpedit.msc</code>, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window. 3940Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, <code>mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet</code> deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: <code>wbadmin.msc</code> may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)4142Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: <code>mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc</code>.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)4344## Agent workflow45461. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.472. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.483. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.494. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.505. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.516. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5253## Bundled resources5455- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.56- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.57- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.58- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.59- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.60- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.61- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.62- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.63- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6465To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6667## Detection guidance6869No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.7071## Useful telemetry and data sources7273- Not specified in the STIX object.7475## Mitigations to consider7677- Disable or Remove Feature or Program78- Execution Prevention7980## Known threat context8182Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8384- Medusa Group (intrusion-set)85- RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations (campaign)8687## Recommended output pattern8889When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:9091- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.92- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.93- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.94- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.95- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.96- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.9798## ATT&CK contributors99100- Wes Hurd