MITRE ATT&CK T1222.002: Linux and Mac Permissions
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1222.002, Linux and Mac Permissions, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1222.002
- Technique name: Linux and Mac Permissions
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002
- Tactics: defense-impairment
- Platforms: Linux, macOS
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode).
Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Unix Shell Configuration Modification or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Privileged Account Management
- Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- Black Basta (malware)
- Bundlore (malware)
- COATHANGER (malware)
- DRYHOOK (malware)
- Dok (malware)
- KV Botnet Activity (campaign)
- Kinsing (malware)
- OSX/Shlayer (malware)
- OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D (malware)
- P.A.S. Webshell (malware)
- Penquin (malware)
- Rocke (intrusion-set)
- TeamTNT (intrusion-set)
- XCSSET (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
1---2name: attack-ent-t1222-002-linux-and-mac-permissions3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1222.002 Linux and Mac Permissions in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1222.002, Linux and Mac Permissions, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) F…"4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1222-002-linux-and-mac-permissions7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1222.00210 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad134511 attack_version: "2.0"12 attack_modified: "2026-04-22T15:51:53.173Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1222.002: Linux and Mac Permissions1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1222.002, Linux and Mac Permissions, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1222.00225- Technique name: Linux and Mac Permissions26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/00228- Tactics: defense-impairment29- Platforms: Linux, macOS30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).3738Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: <code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod</code> (short for change mode).3940Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)4142## Agent workflow43441. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.452. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.463. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.474. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.485. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.496. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5051## Bundled resources5253- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.54- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.55- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.56- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.57- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.58- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.59- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.60- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.61- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6263To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6465## Detection guidance6667No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6869## Useful telemetry and data sources7071- Not specified in the STIX object.7273## Mitigations to consider7475- Privileged Account Management76- Restrict File and Directory Permissions7778## Known threat context7980Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8182- APT32 (intrusion-set)83- Black Basta (malware)84- Bundlore (malware)85- COATHANGER (malware)86- DRYHOOK (malware)87- Dok (malware)88- KV Botnet Activity (campaign)89- Kinsing (malware)90- OSX/Shlayer (malware)91- OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D (malware)92- P.A.S. Webshell (malware)93- Penquin (malware)94- Rocke (intrusion-set)95- TeamTNT (intrusion-set)96- XCSSET (malware)9798## Recommended output pattern99100When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:101102- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.103- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.104- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.105- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.106- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.107- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.