MITRE ATT&CK T1497.003: Time Based Checks
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1497.003, Time Based Checks, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1497.003
- Technique name: Time Based Checks
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003
- Tactics: discovery, stealth
- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock.
Adversaries may use calls like GetTickCount and GetSystemTimeAsFileTime to discover if they are operating within a virtual machine or sandbox, or may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- AppleJeus (malware)
- BADFLICK (malware)
- Bazar (malware)
- BendyBear (malware)
- Bisonal (malware)
- Brute Ratel C4 (tool)
- Bumblebee (malware)
- Clambling (malware)
- Clop (malware)
- Crimson (malware)
- DRATzarus (malware)
- DarkTortilla (malware)
- Egregor (malware)
- EvilBunny (malware)
- FatDuke (malware)
- GoldMax (malware)
- GoldenSpy (malware)
- Gootloader (malware)
- GrimAgent (malware)
- GuLoader (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Deloitte Threat Library Team
- Jeff Felling, Red Canary
- Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE
- Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101
1---2name: attack-ent-t1497-003-time-based-checks3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1497.003 Time Based Checks in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1497.003, Time Based Checks, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1497.003: Time Based Checks89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1497.003, Time Based Checks, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1497.00317- Technique name: Time Based Checks18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/00320- Tactics: discovery, stealth21- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock. 2930Adversaries may use calls like `GetTickCount` and `GetSystemTimeAsFileTime` to discover if they are operating within a virtual machine or sandbox, or may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)3132## Agent workflow33341. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.352. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.363. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.374. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.385. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.396. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4041## Bundled resources4243- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.44- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.45- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.46- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.47- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.48- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.49- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.50- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.51- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5253To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5455## Detection guidance5657No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.5859## Useful telemetry and data sources6061- Not specified in the STIX object.6263## Mitigations to consider6465- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.6667## Known threat context6869Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7071- AppleJeus (malware)72- BADFLICK (malware)73- Bazar (malware)74- BendyBear (malware)75- Bisonal (malware)76- Brute Ratel C4 (tool)77- Bumblebee (malware)78- Clambling (malware)79- Clop (malware)80- Crimson (malware)81- DRATzarus (malware)82- DarkTortilla (malware)83- Egregor (malware)84- EvilBunny (malware)85- FatDuke (malware)86- GoldMax (malware)87- GoldenSpy (malware)88- Gootloader (malware)89- GrimAgent (malware)90- GuLoader (malware)9192## Recommended output pattern9394When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:9596- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.97- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.98- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.99- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.100- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.101- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.102103## ATT&CK contributors104105- Deloitte Threat Library Team106- Jeff Felling, Red Canary107- Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE108- Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101