MITRE ATT&CK T1505.006: vSphere Installation Bundles
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1505.006, vSphere Installation Bundles, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1505.006
- Technique name: vSphere Installation Bundles
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/006
- Tactics: persistence
- Platforms: ESXi
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may abuse vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) to establish persistent access to ESXi hypervisors. VIBs are collections of files used for software distribution and virtual system management in VMware environments. Since ESXi uses an in-memory filesystem where changes made to most files are stored in RAM rather than in persistent storage, these modifications are lost after a reboot. However, VIBs can be used to create startup tasks, apply custom firewall rules, or deploy binaries that persist across reboots. Typically, administrators use VIBs for updates and system maintenance.
VIBs can be broken down into three components:(Citation: VMware VIBs)
- VIB payload: a
.vgz archive containing the directories and files to be created and executed on boot when the VIBs are loaded.
- Signature file: verifies the host acceptance level of a VIB, indicating what testing and validation has been done by VMware or its partners before publication of a VIB. By default, ESXi hosts require a minimum acceptance level of PartnerSupported for VIB installation, meaning the VIB is published by a trusted VMware partner. However, privileged users can change the default acceptance level using the
esxcli command line interface. Additionally, VIBs are able to be installed regardless of acceptance level by using the esxcli software vib install --force command.
- XML descriptor file: a configuration file containing associated VIB metadata, such as the name of the VIB and its dependencies.
Adversaries may leverage malicious VIB packages to maintain persistent access to ESXi hypervisors, allowing system changes to be executed upon each bootup of ESXi – such as using esxcli to enable firewall rules for backdoor traffic, creating listeners on hard coded ports, and executing backdoors.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022) Adversaries may also masquerade their malicious VIB files as PartnerSupported by modifying the XML descriptor file.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Audit
- Boot Integrity
- Code Signing
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- UNC3886 (intrusion-set)
- VIRTUALPIE (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
1---2name: attack-ent-t1505-006-vsphere-installation-bundles3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1505.006 vSphere Installation Bundles in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1505.006, vSphere Installation Bundles, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may abuse vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) to establish persistent access to ESXi hypervisors."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1505-006-vsphere-installation-bundles7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1505.00610 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--f8ba7d61-11c5-4130-bafd-7c3ff5fbf4b511 attack_version: "1.0"12 attack_modified: "2025-04-15T21:24:04.676Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1505.006: vSphere Installation Bundles1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1505.006, vSphere Installation Bundles, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1505.00625- Technique name: vSphere Installation Bundles26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/00628- Tactics: persistence29- Platforms: ESXi30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may abuse vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) to establish persistent access to ESXi hypervisors. VIBs are collections of files used for software distribution and virtual system management in VMware environments. Since ESXi uses an in-memory filesystem where changes made to most files are stored in RAM rather than in persistent storage, these modifications are lost after a reboot. However, VIBs can be used to create startup tasks, apply custom firewall rules, or deploy binaries that persist across reboots. Typically, administrators use VIBs for updates and system maintenance.3738VIBs can be broken down into three components:(Citation: VMware VIBs)3940* VIB payload: a `.vgz` archive containing the directories and files to be created and executed on boot when the VIBs are loaded. 41* Signature file: verifies the host acceptance level of a VIB, indicating what testing and validation has been done by VMware or its partners before publication of a VIB. By default, ESXi hosts require a minimum acceptance level of PartnerSupported for VIB installation, meaning the VIB is published by a trusted VMware partner. However, privileged users can change the default acceptance level using the `esxcli` command line interface. Additionally, VIBs are able to be installed regardless of acceptance level by using the <code> esxcli software vib install --force</code> command. 42* XML descriptor file: a configuration file containing associated VIB metadata, such as the name of the VIB and its dependencies. 4344Adversaries may leverage malicious VIB packages to maintain persistent access to ESXi hypervisors, allowing system changes to be executed upon each bootup of ESXi – such as using `esxcli` to enable firewall rules for backdoor traffic, creating listeners on hard coded ports, and executing backdoors.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022) Adversaries may also masquerade their malicious VIB files as PartnerSupported by modifying the XML descriptor file.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022)4546## Agent workflow47481. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.492. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.503. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.514. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.525. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.536. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5455## Bundled resources5657- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.58- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.59- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.60- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.61- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.62- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.63- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.64- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.65- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6667To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6869## Detection guidance7071No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.7273## Useful telemetry and data sources7475- Not specified in the STIX object.7677## Mitigations to consider7879- Audit80- Boot Integrity81- Code Signing8283## Known threat context8485Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8687- UNC3886 (intrusion-set)88- VIRTUALPIE (malware)8990## Recommended output pattern9192When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:9394- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.95- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.96- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.97- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.98- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.99- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.100101## ATT&CK contributors102103- Janantha Marasinghe