MITRE ATT&CK T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1529, System Shutdown/Reboot, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1529
- Technique name: System Shutdown/Reboot
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529
- Tactics: impact
- Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via Network Device CLI (e.g. reload).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtual machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line tools.
Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.
Adversaries may also use Windows API functions, such as InitializeSystemShutdownExW or ExitWindowsEx, to force a system to shut down or reboot.(Citation: CrowdStrike Blog)(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) Alternatively, the NtRaiseHardErroror ZwRaiseHardError Windows API functions with the ResponseOption parameter set to OptionShutdownSystem may deliver a “blue screen of death” (BSOD) to a system.(Citation: SonicWall)(Citation: NtRaiseHardError)(Citation: NotMe-BSOD) In order to leverage these API functions, an adversary may need to acquire SeShutdownPrivilege (e.g., via Access Token Manipulation).(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
In some cases, the system may not be able to boot again.
Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as Disk Structure Wipe or Inhibit System Recovery, to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)
- APT37 (intrusion-set)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- AcidPour (malware)
- AcidRain (malware)
- Apostle (malware)
- AvosLocker (malware)
- BFG Agonizer (malware)
- Black Basta (malware)
- CHIMNEYSWEEP (malware)
- DCSrv (malware)
- DarkGate (malware)
- DynoWiper (malware)
- HermeticWiper (malware)
- KillDisk (malware)
- Latrodectus (malware)
- Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)
- LockerGoga (malware)
- LookBack (malware)
- Maze (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Austin Clark, @c2defense
- Hubert Mank
- Janantha Marasinghe
1---2name: attack-ent-t1529-system-shutdown-reboot3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1529, System Shutdown/Reboot, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1529, System Shutdown/Reboot, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T152917- Technique name: System Shutdown/Reboot18- Type: technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T152920- Tactics: impact21- Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. <code>reload</code>).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtual machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line tools.2930Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.3132Adversaries may also use Windows API functions, such as `InitializeSystemShutdownExW` or `ExitWindowsEx`, to force a system to shut down or reboot.(Citation: CrowdStrike Blog)(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) Alternatively, the `NtRaiseHardError`or `ZwRaiseHardError` Windows API functions with the `ResponseOption` parameter set to `OptionShutdownSystem` may deliver a “blue screen of death” (BSOD) to a system.(Citation: SonicWall)(Citation: NtRaiseHardError)(Citation: NotMe-BSOD) In order to leverage these API functions, an adversary may need to acquire `SeShutdownPrivilege` (e.g., via [Access Token Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134)).(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)33 In some cases, the system may not be able to boot again. 3435Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)3637## Agent workflow38391. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.402. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.413. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.424. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.435. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.446. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4546## Bundled resources4748- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.49- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.50- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.51- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.52- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.53- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.54- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.55- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.56- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5758To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5960## Detection guidance6162No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6364## Useful telemetry and data sources6566- Not specified in the STIX object.6768## Mitigations to consider6970- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.7172## Known threat context7374Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7576- 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)77- APT37 (intrusion-set)78- APT38 (intrusion-set)79- AcidPour (malware)80- AcidRain (malware)81- Apostle (malware)82- AvosLocker (malware)83- BFG Agonizer (malware)84- Black Basta (malware)85- CHIMNEYSWEEP (malware)86- DCSrv (malware)87- DarkGate (malware)88- DynoWiper (malware)89- HermeticWiper (malware)90- KillDisk (malware)91- Latrodectus (malware)92- Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)93- LockerGoga (malware)94- LookBack (malware)95- Maze (malware)9697## Recommended output pattern9899When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:100101- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.102- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.103- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.104- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.105- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.106- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.107108## ATT&CK contributors109110- Austin Clark, @c2defense111- Hubert Mank112- Janantha Marasinghe