MITRE ATT&CK T1547.008: LSASS Driver
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1547.008, LSASS Driver, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1547.008
- Technique name: LSASS Driver
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008
- Tactics: persistence, privilege-escalation
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)
Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., Hijack Execution Flow), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Credential Access Protection
- Privileged Process Integrity
- Restrict Library Loading
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- Pasam (malware)
- Wingbird (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
1---2name: attack-ent-t1547-008-lsass-driver3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1547.008 LSASS Driver in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1547.008, LSASS Driver, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1547.008: LSASS Driver89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1547.008, LSASS Driver, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1547.00817- Technique name: LSASS Driver18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/00820- Tactics: persistence, privilege-escalation21- Platforms: Windows22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)2930Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.3132## Agent workflow33341. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.352. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.363. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.374. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.385. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.396. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4041## Bundled resources4243- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.44- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.45- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.46- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.47- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.48- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.49- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.50- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.51- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5253To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5455## Detection guidance5657No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.5859## Useful telemetry and data sources6061- Not specified in the STIX object.6263## Mitigations to consider6465- Credential Access Protection66- Privileged Process Integrity67- Restrict Library Loading6869## Known threat context7071Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7273- Pasam (malware)74- Wingbird (malware)7576## Recommended output pattern7778When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:7980- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.81- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.82- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.83- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.84- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.85- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.8687## ATT&CK contributors8889- Vincent Le Toux