MITRE ATT&CK T1550.002: Pass the Hash
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1550.002, Pass the Hash, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1550.002
- Technique name: Pass the Hash
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002
- Tactics: lateral-movement
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.
When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.
Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform Pass the Ticket attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Privileged Account Management
- Update Software
- User Account Control
- User Account Management
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)
- APT1 (intrusion-set)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 (intrusion-set)
- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)
- BADHATCH (malware)
- Chimera (intrusion-set)
- Cobalt Strike (malware)
- CrackMapExec (tool)
- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)
- Empire (tool)
- FIN13 (intrusion-set)
- GALLIUM (intrusion-set)
- HOPLIGHT (malware)
- Kimsuky (intrusion-set)
- Mimikatz (tool)
- Night Dragon (campaign)
- Operation Digital Eye (campaign)
- Pass-The-Hash Toolkit (tool)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
- Travis Smith, Tripwire
1---2name: attack-ent-t1550-002-pass-the-hash3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1550.002 Pass the Hash in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1550.002, Pass the Hash, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1550-002-pass-the-hash7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1550.00210 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e11 attack_version: "2.0"12 attack_modified: "2026-04-15T22:48:07.235Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1550.002: Pass the Hash1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1550.002, Pass the Hash, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1550.00225- Technique name: Pass the Hash26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/00228- Tactics: lateral-movement29- Platforms: Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.3738When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.3940Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)4142## Agent workflow43441. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.452. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.463. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.474. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.485. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.496. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5051## Bundled resources5253- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.54- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.55- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.56- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.57- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.58- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.59- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.60- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.61- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6263To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6465## Detection guidance6667No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6869## Useful telemetry and data sources7071- Not specified in the STIX object.7273## Mitigations to consider7475- Privileged Account Management76- Update Software77- User Account Control78- User Account Management7980## Known threat context8182Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8384- 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)85- APT1 (intrusion-set)86- APT28 (intrusion-set)87- APT32 (intrusion-set)88- APT41 (intrusion-set)89- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)90- BADHATCH (malware)91- Chimera (intrusion-set)92- Cobalt Strike (malware)93- CrackMapExec (tool)94- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)95- Empire (tool)96- FIN13 (intrusion-set)97- GALLIUM (intrusion-set)98- HOPLIGHT (malware)99- Kimsuky (intrusion-set)100- Mimikatz (tool)101- Night Dragon (campaign)102- Operation Digital Eye (campaign)103- Pass-The-Hash Toolkit (tool)104105## Recommended output pattern106107When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:108109- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.110- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.111- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.112- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.113- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.114- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.115116## ATT&CK contributors117118- Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender119- Travis Smith, Tripwire