MITRE ATT&CK T1552.002: Credentials in Registry
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1552.002, Credentials in Registry, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1552.002
- Technique name: Credentials in Registry
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002
- Tactics: credential-access
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials)
- Local Machine Hive: reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s
- Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Audit
- Password Policies
- Privileged Account Management
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- Agent Tesla (malware)
- IceApple (malware)
- PowerSploit (tool)
- RedCurl (intrusion-set)
- Reg (tool)
- StrelaStealer (malware)
- TrickBot (malware)
- VOID MANTICORE (intrusion-set)
- Valak (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C
1---2name: attack-ent-t1552-002-credentials-in-registry3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1552.002 Credentials in Registry in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1552.002, Credentials in Registry, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1552.002: Credentials in Registry89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1552.002, Credentials in Registry, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1552.00217- Technique name: Credentials in Registry18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/00220- Tactics: credential-access21- Platforms: Windows22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.2930Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials)3132* Local Machine Hive: <code>reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>33* Current User Hive: <code>reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>3435## Agent workflow36371. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.382. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.393. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.404. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.415. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.426. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4344## Bundled resources4546- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.47- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.48- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.49- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.50- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.51- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.52- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.53- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.54- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5556To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5758## Detection guidance5960No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6162## Useful telemetry and data sources6364- Not specified in the STIX object.6566## Mitigations to consider6768- Audit69- Password Policies70- Privileged Account Management7172## Known threat context7374Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7576- APT32 (intrusion-set)77- Agent Tesla (malware)78- IceApple (malware)79- PowerSploit (tool)80- RedCurl (intrusion-set)81- Reg (tool)82- StrelaStealer (malware)83- TrickBot (malware)84- VOID MANTICORE (intrusion-set)85- Valak (malware)8687## Recommended output pattern8889When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:9091- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.92- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.93- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.94- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.95- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.96- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.9798## ATT&CK contributors99100- Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C