MITRE ATT&CK T1553.006: Code Signing Policy Modification
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1553.006, Code Signing Policy Modification, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1553.006
- Technique name: Code Signing Policy Modification
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006
- Tactics: defense-impairment
- Platforms: macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system.
Some of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)
Adversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, Modify Registry, rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON on Windows and csrutil disable on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)
To gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct Exploitation for Privilege Escalation using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Boot Integrity
- Privileged Account Management
- Restrict Registry Permissions
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- APT39 (intrusion-set)
- BlackEnergy (malware)
- Hikit (malware)
- Pandora (malware)
- Turla (intrusion-set)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
1---2name: attack-ent-t1553-006-code-signing-policy-modification3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1553.006 Code Signing Policy Modification in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1553.006, Code Signing Policy Modification, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1553-006-code-signing-policy-modification7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1553.00610 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c11 attack_version: "2.0"12 attack_modified: "2026-04-16T20:07:53.034Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1553.006: Code Signing Policy Modification1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1553.006, Code Signing Policy Modification, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1553.00625- Technique name: Code Signing Policy Modification26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/00628- Tactics: defense-impairment29- Platforms: macOS, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system. 3738Some of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)3940Adversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include <code>bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON</code> on Windows and <code>csrutil disable</code> on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)4142To gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying <code>g_CiOptions</code> to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)4344## Agent workflow45461. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.472. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.483. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.494. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.505. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.516. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5253## Bundled resources5455- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.56- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.57- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.58- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.59- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.60- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.61- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.62- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.63- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6465To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6667## Detection guidance6869No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.7071## Useful telemetry and data sources7273- Not specified in the STIX object.7475## Mitigations to consider7677- Boot Integrity78- Privileged Account Management79- Restrict Registry Permissions8081## Known threat context8283Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8485- APT39 (intrusion-set)86- BlackEnergy (malware)87- Hikit (malware)88- Pandora (malware)89- Turla (intrusion-set)9091## Recommended output pattern9293When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:9495- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.96- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.97- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.98- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.99- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.100- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.101102## ATT&CK contributors103104- Abel Morales, Exabeam