MITRE ATT&CK T1556.006: Multi-Factor Authentication
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1556.006, Multi-Factor Authentication, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1556.006
- Technique name: Multi-Factor Authentication
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006
- Tactics: credential-access, defense-impairment, persistence
- Platforms: IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.
Once adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, adversaries may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to bypass expected functionality.(Citation: Mandiant APT42)(Citation: Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions)
For example, modifying the Windows hosts file (C:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts) to redirect MFA calls to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If a "fail open" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA. (Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022)
Depending on the scope, goals, and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts in a victim's network environment.(Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Audit
- Multi-factor Authentication
- User Account Management
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)
- AADInternals (tool)
- SLOWPULSE (malware)
- Scattered Spider (intrusion-set)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Arun Seelagan, CISA
- Liran Ravich, CardinalOps
- Muhammad Moiz Arshad, @5T34L7H
1---2name: attack-ent-t1556-006-multi-factor-authentication3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1556.006 Multi-Factor Authentication in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1556.006, Multi-Factor Authentication, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1556.006: Multi-Factor Authentication89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1556.006, Multi-Factor Authentication, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1556.00617- Technique name: Multi-Factor Authentication18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/00620- Tactics: credential-access, defense-impairment, persistence21- Platforms: IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.2930Once adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621), adversaries may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to bypass expected functionality.(Citation: Mandiant APT42)(Citation: Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions)3132For example, modifying the Windows hosts file (`C:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts`) to redirect MFA calls to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If a "fail open" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA. (Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022) 3334Depending on the scope, goals, and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts in a victim's network environment.(Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022)3536## Agent workflow37381. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.392. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.403. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.414. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.425. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.436. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4445## Bundled resources4647- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.48- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.49- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.50- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.51- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.52- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.53- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.54- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.55- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5657To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5859## Detection guidance6061No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6263## Useful telemetry and data sources6465- Not specified in the STIX object.6667## Mitigations to consider6869- Audit70- Multi-factor Authentication71- User Account Management7273## Known threat context7475Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7677- 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)78- AADInternals (tool)79- SLOWPULSE (malware)80- Scattered Spider (intrusion-set)8182## Recommended output pattern8384When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:8586- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.87- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.88- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.89- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.90- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.91- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.9293## ATT&CK contributors9495- Arun Seelagan, CISA96- Liran Ravich, CardinalOps97- Muhammad Moiz Arshad, @5T34L7H