MITRE ATT&CK T1560.003: Archive via Custom Method
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1560.003, Archive via Custom Method, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1560.003
- Technique name: Archive via Custom Method
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003
- Tactics: collection
- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- ADVSTORESHELL (malware)
- Agent.btz (malware)
- Attor (malware)
- BLUELIGHT (malware)
- C0017 (campaign)
- CopyKittens (intrusion-set)
- Duqu (malware)
- FIN6 (intrusion-set)
- FLASHFLOOD (malware)
- FoggyWeb (malware)
- FrameworkPOS (malware)
- FunnyDream (malware)
- HAWKBALL (malware)
- InvisiMole (malware)
- Kimsuky (intrusion-set)
- Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)
- Lotus Blossom (intrusion-set)
- MESSAGETAP (malware)
- Machete (malware)
- Mustang Panda (intrusion-set)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
1---2name: attack-ent-t1560-003-archive-via-custom-method3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1560.003, Archive via Custom Method, or enterprise ATT&CK. An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1560-003-archive-via-custom-method7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1560.00310 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--143c0cbb-a297-4142-9624-87ffc778980b11 attack_version: "1.0"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:48:26.190Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1560.003: Archive via Custom Method1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1560.003, Archive via Custom Method, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1560.00325- Technique name: Archive via Custom Method26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/00328- Tactics: collection29- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)3738## Agent workflow39401. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.412. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.423. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.434. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.445. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.456. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4647## Bundled resources4849- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.50- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.51- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.52- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.53- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.54- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.55- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.56- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.57- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5859To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6061## Detection guidance6263No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6465## Useful telemetry and data sources6667- Not specified in the STIX object.6869## Mitigations to consider7071- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.7273## Known threat context7475Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7677- ADVSTORESHELL (malware)78- Agent.btz (malware)79- Attor (malware)80- BLUELIGHT (malware)81- C0017 (campaign)82- CopyKittens (intrusion-set)83- Duqu (malware)84- FIN6 (intrusion-set)85- FLASHFLOOD (malware)86- FoggyWeb (malware)87- FrameworkPOS (malware)88- FunnyDream (malware)89- HAWKBALL (malware)90- InvisiMole (malware)91- Kimsuky (intrusion-set)92- Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)93- Lotus Blossom (intrusion-set)94- MESSAGETAP (malware)95- Machete (malware)96- Mustang Panda (intrusion-set)9798## Recommended output pattern99100When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:101102- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.103- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.104- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.105- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.106- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.107- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.