MITRE ATT&CK T1560: Archive Collected Data
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1560, Archive Collected Data, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1560
- Technique name: Archive Collected Data
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560
- Tactics: collection
- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- ADVSTORESHELL (malware)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- Agent Tesla (malware)
- AppleSeed (malware)
- Aria-body (malware)
- Axiom (intrusion-set)
- BLUELIGHT (malware)
- Backdoor.Oldrea (malware)
- BlackByte (intrusion-set)
- BloodHound (tool)
- Bumblebee (malware)
- Cadelspy (malware)
- Chrommme (malware)
- Daserf (malware)
- Dragonfly (intrusion-set)
- Dtrack (malware)
- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)
- Empire (tool)
- Epic (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
1---2name: attack-ent-t1560-archive-collected-data3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1560 Archive Collected Data in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1560, Archive Collected Data, or enterprise ATT&CK. An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1560-archive-collected-data7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T156010 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a11 attack_version: "1.0"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:48:48.023Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1560: Archive Collected Data1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1560, Archive Collected Data, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T156025- Technique name: Archive Collected Data26- Type: technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T156028- Tactics: collection29- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.3738Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.3940## Agent workflow41421. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.432. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.443. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.454. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.465. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.476. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4849## Bundled resources5051- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.52- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.53- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.54- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.55- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.56- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.57- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.58- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.59- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6061To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6263## Detection guidance6465No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6667## Useful telemetry and data sources6869- Not specified in the STIX object.7071## Mitigations to consider7273- Audit7475## Known threat context7677Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7879- ADVSTORESHELL (malware)80- APT28 (intrusion-set)81- APT32 (intrusion-set)82- Agent Tesla (malware)83- AppleSeed (malware)84- Aria-body (malware)85- Axiom (intrusion-set)86- BLUELIGHT (malware)87- Backdoor.Oldrea (malware)88- BlackByte (intrusion-set)89- BloodHound (tool)90- Bumblebee (malware)91- Cadelspy (malware)92- Chrommme (malware)93- Daserf (malware)94- Dragonfly (intrusion-set)95- Dtrack (malware)96- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)97- Empire (tool)98- Epic (malware)99100## Recommended output pattern101102When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:103104- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.105- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.106- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.107- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.108- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.109- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.