MITRE ATT&CK T1587.001: Malware
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1587.001, Malware, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1587.001
- Technique name: Malware
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001
- Tactics: resource-development
- Platforms: PRE
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB)
During malware development, adversaries may intentionally include indicators aligned with other known actors in order to mislead attribution by defenders.(Citation: Olympic Destroyer)(Citation: Risky Bulletin Threat actor impersonates FSB APT)(Citation: GamaCopy organization)
As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware.
Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of Web Services.(Citation: FireEye APT29)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)
- APT-C-36 (intrusion-set)
- APT29 (intrusion-set)
- Aoqin Dragon (intrusion-set)
- ArcaneDoor (campaign)
- C0010 (campaign)
- Cleaver (intrusion-set)
- Contagious Interview (intrusion-set)
- CostaRicto (campaign)
- FIN13 (intrusion-set)
- FIN7 (intrusion-set)
- Indrik Spider (intrusion-set)
- Juicy Mix (campaign)
- Ke3chang (intrusion-set)
- Kimsuky (intrusion-set)
- Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)
- LuminousMoth (intrusion-set)
- MirrorFace (intrusion-set)
- Moonstone Sleet (intrusion-set)
- Moses Staff (intrusion-set)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
1---2name: attack-ent-t1587-001-malware3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1587.001 Malware in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1587.001, Malware, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1587.001: Malware89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1587.001, Malware, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1587.00117- Technique name: Malware18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/00120- Tactics: resource-development21- Platforms: PRE22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB)2930During malware development, adversaries may intentionally include indicators aligned with other known actors in order to mislead attribution by defenders.(Citation: Olympic Destroyer)(Citation: Risky Bulletin Threat actor impersonates FSB APT)(Citation: GamaCopy organization)3132As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware.3334Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29)3536## Agent workflow37381. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.392. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.403. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.414. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.425. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.436. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4445## Bundled resources4647- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.48- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.49- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.50- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.51- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.52- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.53- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.54- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.55- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5657To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5859## Detection guidance6061No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6263## Useful telemetry and data sources6465- Not specified in the STIX object.6667## Mitigations to consider6869- Pre-compromise7071## Known threat context7273Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7475- 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)76- APT-C-36 (intrusion-set)77- APT29 (intrusion-set)78- Aoqin Dragon (intrusion-set)79- ArcaneDoor (campaign)80- C0010 (campaign)81- Cleaver (intrusion-set)82- Contagious Interview (intrusion-set)83- CostaRicto (campaign)84- FIN13 (intrusion-set)85- FIN7 (intrusion-set)86- Indrik Spider (intrusion-set)87- Juicy Mix (campaign)88- Ke3chang (intrusion-set)89- Kimsuky (intrusion-set)90- Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)91- LuminousMoth (intrusion-set)92- MirrorFace (intrusion-set)93- Moonstone Sleet (intrusion-set)94- Moses Staff (intrusion-set)9596## Recommended output pattern9798When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:99100- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.101- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.102- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.103- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.104- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.105- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.