MITRE ATT&CK T1589.002: Email Addresses
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1589.002, Email Addresses, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1589.002
- Technique name: Email Addresses
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002
- Tactics: reconnaissance
- Platforms: PRE
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.
Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Email addresses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. Active Scanning), such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) For example, adversaries may be able to enumerate email addresses in Office 365 environments by querying a variety of publicly available API endpoints, such as autodiscover and GetCredentialType.(Citation: GitHub Office 365 User Enumeration)(Citation: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance)
Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Email Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Brute Force via External Remote Services).
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- AADInternals (tool)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- EXOTIC LILY (intrusion-set)
- HAFNIUM (intrusion-set)
- HEXANE (intrusion-set)
- Kimsuky (intrusion-set)
- LAPSUS$ (intrusion-set)
- Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)
- Magic Hound (intrusion-set)
- Moonstone Sleet (intrusion-set)
- Quad7 Activity (campaign)
- Saint Bear (intrusion-set)
- Sandworm Team (intrusion-set)
- Silent Librarian (intrusion-set)
- TA551 (intrusion-set)
- Volt Typhoon (intrusion-set)
- Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution (campaign)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
1---2name: attack-ent-t1589-002-email-addresses3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1589.002 Email Addresses in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1589.002, Email Addresses, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1589.002: Email Addresses89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1589.002, Email Addresses, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1589.00217- Technique name: Email Addresses18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/00220- Tactics: reconnaissance21- Platforms: PRE22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.2930Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Email addresses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) For example, adversaries may be able to enumerate email addresses in Office 365 environments by querying a variety of publicly available API endpoints, such as autodiscover and GetCredentialType.(Citation: GitHub Office 365 User Enumeration)(Citation: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance)3132Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) via [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).3334## Agent workflow35361. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.372. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.383. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.394. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.405. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.416. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4243## Bundled resources4445- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.46- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.47- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.48- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.49- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.50- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.51- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.52- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.53- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5455To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5657## Detection guidance5859No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6061## Useful telemetry and data sources6263- Not specified in the STIX object.6465## Mitigations to consider6667- Pre-compromise6869## Known threat context7071Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7273- AADInternals (tool)74- APT32 (intrusion-set)75- EXOTIC LILY (intrusion-set)76- HAFNIUM (intrusion-set)77- HEXANE (intrusion-set)78- Kimsuky (intrusion-set)79- LAPSUS$ (intrusion-set)80- Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)81- Magic Hound (intrusion-set)82- Moonstone Sleet (intrusion-set)83- Quad7 Activity (campaign)84- Saint Bear (intrusion-set)85- Sandworm Team (intrusion-set)86- Silent Librarian (intrusion-set)87- TA551 (intrusion-set)88- Volt Typhoon (intrusion-set)89- Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution (campaign)9091## Recommended output pattern9293When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:9495- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.96- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.97- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.98- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.99- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.100- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.101102## ATT&CK contributors103104- Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)