MITRE ATT&CK T1614.001: System Language Discovery
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1614.001, System Language Discovery, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1614.001
- Technique name: System Language Discovery
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614/001
- Tactics: discovery
- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check)
There are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as Query Registry and calls to Native API functions.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)
For example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList and GetUserDefaultLangID.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation: Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018)
On a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query locale to retrieve the value of the $LANG environment variable.
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- Avaddon (malware)
- Bazar (malware)
- BlackByte (intrusion-set)
- BlackByte Ransomware (malware)
- Clop (malware)
- Cuba (malware)
- Cuckoo Stealer (malware)
- DEATHRANSOM (malware)
- DropBook (malware)
- Flagpro (malware)
- GlassWorm (malware)
- Gootloader (malware)
- GrimAgent (malware)
- IcedID (malware)
- Ke3chang (intrusion-set)
- LODEINFO (malware)
- LockBit 2.0 (malware)
- LockBit 3.0 (malware)
- Malteiro (intrusion-set)
- MarkiRAT (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys
1---2name: attack-ent-t1614-001-system-language-discovery3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1614.001 System Language Discovery in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1614.001, System Language Discovery, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1614.001: System Language Discovery89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1614.001, System Language Discovery, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1614.00117- Technique name: System Language Discovery18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614/00120- Tactics: discovery21- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check)2930There are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) and calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) 3132For example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language</code> or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions <code>GetUserDefaultUILanguage</code>, <code>GetSystemDefaultUILanguage</code>, <code>GetKeyboardLayoutList</code> and <code>GetUserDefaultLangID</code>.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation: Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018)3334On a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query <code>locale</code> to retrieve the value of the <code>$LANG</code> environment variable.3536## Agent workflow37381. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.392. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.403. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.414. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.425. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.436. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4445## Bundled resources4647- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.48- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.49- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.50- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.51- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.52- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.53- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.54- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.55- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5657To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5859## Detection guidance6061No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6263## Useful telemetry and data sources6465- Not specified in the STIX object.6667## Mitigations to consider6869- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.7071## Known threat context7273Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7475- Avaddon (malware)76- Bazar (malware)77- BlackByte (intrusion-set)78- BlackByte Ransomware (malware)79- Clop (malware)80- Cuba (malware)81- Cuckoo Stealer (malware)82- DEATHRANSOM (malware)83- DropBook (malware)84- Flagpro (malware)85- GlassWorm (malware)86- Gootloader (malware)87- GrimAgent (malware)88- IcedID (malware)89- Ke3chang (intrusion-set)90- LODEINFO (malware)91- LockBit 2.0 (malware)92- LockBit 3.0 (malware)93- Malteiro (intrusion-set)94- MarkiRAT (malware)9596## Recommended output pattern9798When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:99100- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.101- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.102- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.103- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.104- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.105- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.106107## ATT&CK contributors108109- Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys