MITRE ATT&CK T1621: Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1621, Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1621
- Technique name: Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621
- Tactics: credential-access
- Platforms: Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS, SaaS, Office Suite, Identity Provider
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.
Adversaries in possession of credentials to Valid Accounts may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023)
In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”(Citation: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu)(Citation: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger)(Citation: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe)
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Account Use Policies
- Multi-factor Authentication
- User Training
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- APT29 (intrusion-set)
- C0027 (campaign)
- LAPSUS$ (intrusion-set)
- Scattered Spider (intrusion-set)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
- Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
- Pawel Partyka, Microsoft 365 Defender
- Shanief Webb
- Obsidian Security
- Arun Seelagan, CISA
1---2name: attack-ent-t1621-multi-factor-authentication-request3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1621, Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1621-multi-factor-authentication-request7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T162110 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--954a1639-f2d6-407d-aef3-4917622ca49311 attack_version: "1.2"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:49:07.399Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1621: Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1621, Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T162125- Technique name: Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation26- Type: technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T162128- Tactics: credential-access29- Platforms: Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS, SaaS, Office Suite, Identity Provider30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.3738Adversaries in possession of credentials to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023)3940In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”(Citation: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu)(Citation: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger)(Citation: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe)4142## Agent workflow43441. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.452. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.463. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.474. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.485. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.496. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5051## Bundled resources5253- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.54- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.55- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.56- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.57- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.58- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.59- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.60- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.61- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6263To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6465## Detection guidance6667No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6869## Useful telemetry and data sources7071- Not specified in the STIX object.7273## Mitigations to consider7475- Account Use Policies76- Multi-factor Authentication77- User Training7879## Known threat context8081Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8283- APT29 (intrusion-set)84- C0027 (campaign)85- LAPSUS$ (intrusion-set)86- Scattered Spider (intrusion-set)8788## Recommended output pattern8990When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:9192- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.93- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.94- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.95- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.96- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.97- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.9899## ATT&CK contributors100101- Jon Sternstein, Stern Security102- Pawel Partyka, Microsoft 365 Defender103- Shanief Webb104- Obsidian Security105- Arun Seelagan, CISA