MITRE ATT&CK T1685.005: Clear Windows Event Logs
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1685.005, Clear Windows Event Logs, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1685.005
- Technique name: Clear Windows Event Logs
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/005
- Tactics: defense-impairment
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.
With administrator privileges, the event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands:
wevtutil cl system
wevtutil cl application
wevtutil cl security
These logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or PowerShell. For example, adversaries may use the PowerShell command Remove-EventLog -LogName Security to delete the Security EventLog and after reboot, disable future logging. Note: events may still be generated and logged in the .evtx file between the time the command is run and the reboot.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
Adversaries may also attempt to clear logs by directly deleting the stored log files within C:\Windows\System32\winevt\logs\.
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Encrypt Sensitive Information
- Remote Data Storage
- Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 (intrusion-set)
- Apostle (malware)
- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)
- BlackCat (malware)
- BlackEnergy (malware)
- Chimera (intrusion-set)
- DUSTTRAP (malware)
- Dragonfly (intrusion-set)
- FIN5 (intrusion-set)
- FIN8 (intrusion-set)
- FinFisher (malware)
- HAFNIUM (intrusion-set)
- HermeticWiper (malware)
- HermeticWizard (malware)
- Hydraq (malware)
- Indrik Spider (intrusion-set)
- KillDisk (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
ATT&CK contributors
1---2name: attack-ent-t1685-005-clear-windows-event-logs3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1685.005, Clear Windows Event Logs, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1685-005-clear-windows-event-logs7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: enterprise9 attack_id: T1685.00510 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--75b9a4d2-d4e2-4ca1-9aab-1badd9e05fd011 attack_version: "1.0"12 attack_modified: "2026-04-22T15:41:59.512Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1685.005: Clear Windows Event Logs1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1685.005, Clear Windows Event Logs, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: enterprise24- ATT&CK ID: T1685.00525- Technique name: Clear Windows Event Logs26- Type: sub-technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/00528- Tactics: defense-impairment29- Platforms: Windows30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.3738With administrator privileges, the event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands:3940* `wevtutil cl system`41* `wevtutil cl application`42* `wevtutil cl security`4344These logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). For example, adversaries may use the PowerShell command `Remove-EventLog -LogName Security` to delete the Security EventLog and after reboot, disable future logging. Note: events may still be generated and logged in the .evtx file between the time the command is run and the reboot.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)4546Adversaries may also attempt to clear logs by directly deleting the stored log files within `C:\Windows\System32\winevt\logs\`.4748## Agent workflow49501. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.512. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.523. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.534. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.545. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.556. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5657## Bundled resources5859- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.60- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.61- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.62- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.63- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.64- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.65- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.66- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.67- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6869To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.7071## Detection guidance7273No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.7475## Useful telemetry and data sources7677- Not specified in the STIX object.7879## Mitigations to consider8081- Encrypt Sensitive Information82- Remote Data Storage83- Restrict File and Directory Permissions8485## Known threat context8687Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8889- APT28 (intrusion-set)90- APT32 (intrusion-set)91- APT38 (intrusion-set)92- APT41 (intrusion-set)93- Apostle (malware)94- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)95- BlackCat (malware)96- BlackEnergy (malware)97- Chimera (intrusion-set)98- DUSTTRAP (malware)99- Dragonfly (intrusion-set)100- FIN5 (intrusion-set)101- FIN8 (intrusion-set)102- FinFisher (malware)103- HAFNIUM (intrusion-set)104- HermeticWiper (malware)105- HermeticWizard (malware)106- Hydraq (malware)107- Indrik Spider (intrusion-set)108- KillDisk (malware)109110## Recommended output pattern111112When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:113114- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.115- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.116- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.117- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.118- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.119- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.120121## ATT&CK contributors122123- Lucas Heiligenstein