MITRE ATT&CK T1685.006: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1685.006, Clear Linux or Mac System Logs, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1685.006
- Technique name: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/006
- Tactics: defense-impairment
- Platforms: Linux, macOS
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the /var/log/ directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:(Citation: Linux Logs)
/var/log/messages:: General and system-related messages/var/log/secure or /var/log/auth.log: Authentication logs/var/log/utmp or /var/log/wtmp: Login records/var/log/kern.log: Kernel logs/var/log/cron.log: Crond logs/var/log/maillog: Mail server logs/var/log/httpd/: Web server access and error logs
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Encrypt Sensitive Information
- Remote Data Storage
- Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- JumbledPath (malware)
- MacMa (malware)
- Proton (malware)
- Rocke (intrusion-set)
- Salt Typhoon (intrusion-set)
- Sea Turtle (intrusion-set)
- TeamTNT (intrusion-set)
- UPSTYLE (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
1---2name: attack-ent-t1685-006-clear-linux-or-mac-system-logs3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1685.006 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1685.006, Clear Linux or Mac System Logs, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1685.006: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1685.006, Clear Linux or Mac System Logs, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: enterprise16- ATT&CK ID: T1685.00617- Technique name: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/00620- Tactics: defense-impairment21- Platforms: Linux, macOS22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the `/var/log/` directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:(Citation: Linux Logs)2930* `/var/log/messages:`: General and system-related messages31* `/var/log/secure or /var/log/auth.log`: Authentication logs32* `/var/log/utmp or /var/log/wtmp`: Login records33* `/var/log/kern.log`: Kernel logs34* `/var/log/cron.log`: Crond logs35* `/var/log/maillog`: Mail server logs36* `/var/log/httpd/`: Web server access and error logs3738## Agent workflow39401. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.412. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.423. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.434. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.445. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.456. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4647## Bundled resources4849- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.50- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.51- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.52- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.53- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.54- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.55- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.56- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.57- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5859To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.6061## Detection guidance6263No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6465## Useful telemetry and data sources6667- Not specified in the STIX object.6869## Mitigations to consider7071- Encrypt Sensitive Information72- Remote Data Storage73- Restrict File and Directory Permissions7475## Known threat context7677Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7879- JumbledPath (malware)80- MacMa (malware)81- Proton (malware)82- Rocke (intrusion-set)83- Salt Typhoon (intrusion-set)84- Sea Turtle (intrusion-set)85- TeamTNT (intrusion-set)86- UPSTYLE (malware)8788## Recommended output pattern8990When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:9192- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.93- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.94- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.95- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.96- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.97- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
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