MITRE ATT&CK T1409: Stored Application Data
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1409, Stored Application Data, mobile ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: mobile
- ATT&CK ID: T1409
- Technique name: Stored Application Data
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409
- Tactics: collection
- Platforms: Android, iOS
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019)
Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios:
- An application stores files in unprotected external storage
- An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777)
- The adversary gains root permissions on the device
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- BOULDSPY (malware)
- BusyGasper (malware)
- CarbonSteal (malware)
- DCHSpy (malware)
- Desert Scorpion (malware)
- DoubleAgent (malware)
- Escobar (malware)
- Exodus (malware)
- FakeSpy (malware)
- FlexiSpy (tool)
- FlixOnline (malware)
- FluBot (malware)
- FlyTrap (malware)
- FrozenCell (malware)
- GoldenEagle (malware)
- HilalRAT (malware)
- Hornbill (malware)
- LightSpy (malware)
- Mandrake (malware)
- Operation Triangulation (campaign)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
1---2name: attack-mob-t1409-stored-application-data3description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1409 Stored Application Data in the mobile matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1409, Stored Application Data, or mobile ATT&CK. Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device."4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-mob-t1409-stored-application-data7 upstream: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data8 domain: mobile9 attack_id: T140910 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b16011 attack_version: "3.1"12 attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:48:56.509Z"13---1415# MITRE ATT&CK T1409: Stored Application Data1617## When to use this skill1819Use this skill when the task involves T1409, Stored Application Data, mobile ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.2021## Technique context2223- ATT&CK domain: mobile24- ATT&CK ID: T140925- Technique name: Stored Application Data26- Type: technique27- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T140928- Tactics: collection29- Platforms: Android, iOS30- Required permissions: Not specified31- Effective permissions: Not specified32- Defenses bypassed: Not specified3334## ATT&CK description3536Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019) 3738 3940Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios: 4142 4344* An application stores files in unprotected external storage 45* An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) 46* The adversary gains root permissions on the device4748## Agent workflow49501. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.512. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.523. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.534. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.545. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.556. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.5657## Bundled resources5859- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.60- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.61- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.62- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.63- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.64- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.65- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.66- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.67- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.6869To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.7071## Detection guidance7273No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.7475## Useful telemetry and data sources7677- Not specified in the STIX object.7879## Mitigations to consider8081- Use Recent OS Version8283## Known threat context8485Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:8687- BOULDSPY (malware)88- BusyGasper (malware)89- CarbonSteal (malware)90- DCHSpy (malware)91- Desert Scorpion (malware)92- DoubleAgent (malware)93- Escobar (malware)94- Exodus (malware)95- FakeSpy (malware)96- FlexiSpy (tool)97- FlixOnline (malware)98- FluBot (malware)99- FlyTrap (malware)100- FrozenCell (malware)101- GoldenEagle (malware)102- HilalRAT (malware)103- Hornbill (malware)104- LightSpy (malware)105- Mandrake (malware)106- Operation Triangulation (campaign)107108## Recommended output pattern109110When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:111112- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.113- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.114- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.115- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.116- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.117- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.