MITRE ATT&CK T1630.001: Uninstall Malicious Application
When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1630.001, Uninstall Malicious Application, mobile ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.
Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: mobile
- ATT&CK ID: T1630.001
- Technique name: Uninstall Malicious Application
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1630/001
- Tactics: defense-evasion
- Platforms: Android
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
ATT&CK description
Adversaries may include functionality in malware that uninstalls the malicious application from the device. This can be achieved by:
- Abusing device owner permissions to perform silent uninstallation using device owner API calls.
- Abusing root permissions to delete files from the filesystem.
- Abusing the accessibility service. This requires sending an intent to the system to request uninstallation, and then abusing the accessibility service to click the proper places on the screen to confirm uninstallation.
Agent workflow
- Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
- Load bundled resources as needed: use
references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
- Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
- Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
- Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
- Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
Bundled resources
references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
Mitigations to consider
- Attestation
- Security Updates
- User Guidance
Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- BRATA (malware)
- Cerberus (malware)
- Crocodilus (malware)
- Escobar (malware)
- S.O.V.A. (malware)
- SharkBot (malware)
- TrickMo (malware)
Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
1---2name: attack-mob-t1630-001-uninstall-malicious-application3description: Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1630.001 Uninstall Malicious Application in the mobile matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1630.001, Uninstall Malicious Application, or mobile ATT&CK. Adversaries may include functionality in malware that uninstalls the malicious application from the device.4license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h5---67# MITRE ATT&CK T1630.001: Uninstall Malicious Application89## When to use this skill1011Use this skill when the task involves T1630.001, Uninstall Malicious Application, mobile ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.1213## Technique context1415- ATT&CK domain: mobile16- ATT&CK ID: T1630.00117- Technique name: Uninstall Malicious Application18- Type: sub-technique19- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1630/00120- Tactics: defense-evasion21- Platforms: Android22- Required permissions: Not specified23- Effective permissions: Not specified24- Defenses bypassed: Not specified2526## ATT&CK description2728Adversaries may include functionality in malware that uninstalls the malicious application from the device. This can be achieved by: 29 30* Abusing device owner permissions to perform silent uninstallation using device owner API calls. 31* Abusing root permissions to delete files from the filesystem. 32* Abusing the accessibility service. This requires sending an intent to the system to request uninstallation, and then abusing the accessibility service to click the proper places on the screen to confirm uninstallation.3334## Agent workflow35361. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.372. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.383. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.394. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.405. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.416. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.4243## Bundled resources4445- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.46- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.47- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.48- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.49- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.50- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.51- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.52- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.53- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.5455To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.5657## Detection guidance5859No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.6061## Useful telemetry and data sources6263- Not specified in the STIX object.6465## Mitigations to consider6667- Attestation68- Security Updates69- User Guidance7071## Known threat context7273Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:7475- BRATA (malware)76- Cerberus (malware)77- Crocodilus (malware)78- Escobar (malware)79- S.O.V.A. (malware)80- SharkBot (malware)81- TrickMo (malware)8283## Recommended output pattern8485When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:8687- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.88- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.89- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.90- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.91- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.92- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.