Audit Actions

Audit pull_request_target

What this skill catches

The pull_request_target + PR-head checkout combination is the entire bug class behind the public compromises of TanStack (May 2026), Nx (Aug 2025), PostHog (Nov 2025), Trivy (Feb 2026), tj-actions/changed-files (Mar 2025), and the prt-scan campaign (Mar 2026). Permission flags do not prevent it. SLSA provenance does not prevent it. Cache writes bypass permissions: contents: read entirely.

If a workflow uses pull_request_target AND checks out the PR head, attacker-controlled code runs on a runner that holds the base repo's GITHUB_TOKEN, has access to declared secrets, and can mint OIDC tokens for trusted publishing.

Run

1. Find every usage. Locally: grep -rn "pull_request_target" .github/workflows/. Org-wide: gh search code "pull_request_target" --owner $ORG --extension yml.
2. For each match, ask in order. Stop at the first "yes" — that's a finding.
   • Does the workflow check out the PR head (actions/checkout with ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} or similar)? CRITICAL.
   • Does it run any contributor-supplied code (pnpm install, npm test, make build, actions/setup-*, a script committed in the PR)? CRITICAL.
   • Does it write to the Actions cache (no lookup-only: true on actions/cache)? HIGH. Cache writes use a runner-internal token and bypass workflow permissions; a poisoned cache is restored by release.yml later.
   • Does it use third-party actions pinned by tag (@v1, @main) rather than commit SHA? HIGH.
   • Does it set id-token: write? HIGH in combination with any of the above — OIDC tokens are scraped from runner memory, not stolen from secrets.
   • Is the trigger even necessary? Most legitimate uses (labelling, commenting, metadata) work fine with pull_request.

Findings template

For each workflow, produce:

file: .github/workflows/<name>.yml
trigger: pull_request_target
findings:
  - <CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM>: <what>
recommendation: <one of below>

Fixes, in order of preference

1. Switch to pull_request. Default answer. If the workflow doesn't need write access to the base repo or secrets, this closes the entire bug class.
2. Two-workflow pattern (pull_request + workflow_run). Untrusted code runs in a pull_request workflow with no secrets and no write permissions, writes its output as an artifact, and a workflow_run workflow triggered on completion reads the artifact and does the privileged work. The trust boundary becomes the artifact handoff — auditable in YAML.
3. Remove the PR-head checkout. If the workflow legitimately needs pull_request_target (labelling, metadata), do not check out or execute the PR's code at all.
4. Disable cache writes from untrusted contexts. Use actions/cache/restore@v4 only; do not run the save step on fork-triggered builds. Or scope cache keys with attacker-derived prefixes so they cannot collide with release-pipeline keys.
5. Pin every third-party action by full commit SHA, not tag. tj-actions/changed-files' compromise propagated to thousands of repos because they used @v44.
6. Minimize the publish workflow's surface. If id-token: write must exist, the workflow with it should do nothing except verify pre-built artifacts and publish — no third-party actions, no postinstall scripts, no untrusted paths.

What this skill does NOT cover

• npm-side hardening (2FA / FIDO2, fine-grained tokens, minimumReleaseAge). Out of scope.
• Self-hosted runner abuse — different threat model.
• Script injection via ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }} and friends. Related but separate; flag for follow-up.

Source

Based on The pull_request_target Trap — full attack anatomy of the May 2026 TanStack incident and the year of prior cases.