European e-government standards (eIDAS)
Criteria verified as of August 2026. Re-verify on the web before committing to anything (§8).
1. Scope and triggers
Applies when the software produces, consumes or holds custody of an administrative act or a
document with legal effect: identifying a citizen before an administration, signing
electronically, registering an application, giving legally effective notice, time-stamping, and
preserving all of that for decades in a way that remains verifiable.
Domain thesis: signing is the easy problem; the real problem is preservation. Signing is a
thirty-line operation. The hard part is that in twenty years someone can prove that the document
was signed, with which certificate, that the certificate was valid at that moment, that the CA
existed and was on the trusted list, and that the algorithm has not been broken along the way.
Almost every e-government project is designed around the act of signing and discovers the longevity
problem when the first certificate expires (§6). Corollary that changes the design from day one:
a signature without a qualified time stamp and without embedded validation material expires with
the certificate, and the proof expires with it.
Second thesis, and it is an engineering constraint even if it does not look like one: in the public
sector, the architecture is set by the tender specification. What is not in the tender specification is
not built, not invoiced and not maintained. A non-functional requirement that does not appear in the award
criteria —observability, testing, data migration, exit plan— does not exist for the project (§7.1).
Covers: electronic identity and assurance levels; the European wallet; trust services and trusted
lists; signature types and their evidential value; formats and longevity levels; long-term
preservation; the concrete Spanish infrastructure; and the procurement, accessibility and
interoperability constraints of the public sector.
Not applicable:
identity-access-management-standards (main boundary): OAuth 2.1/OIDC, SAML, the IdP
as a product, passkeys/WebAuthn, SCIM, RBAC/ABAC/ReBAC, session and technical federation are
theirs. From here: which identity has legal value before an administration and with which
assurance level —the eIDAS low/substantial/high levels are not an MFA scale, they are a
regulatory qualification of a notified scheme—, the eIDAS node and the European wallet. Arbitration
rule: "how do I authenticate the user in my application?" is theirs; "does this means of
identification make the act valid and get it recognised by another Member State?" is
from here.
cryptography-pki-standards (main boundary): algorithms, curves, key sizes,
TLS, CA hierarchy, ACME, HSM/KMS and the certificate lifecycle as cryptography are
theirs. From here: what makes a PKI qualified under eIDAS and which legal obligations
that brings —QTSP, QSCD, trusted lists, evidential value—, which is not a cryptographic property
but a supervisory one. Reciprocal warning: the post-quantum migration of these signatures
belongs to post-quantum-crypto-standards, and it directly affects long-term preservation
(§6.3).
grc-compliance-standards (boundary declared on both sides): the ENS as a management
framework, its Statement of Applicability, the certification audit, the risk register and
the relationship with the CCN are theirs —it already cites RD 311/2022—. From here: what the
ENS forces on the architecture of a specific electronic service (§2.5) and its relationship with
the rest of this document.
accessibility-standards: all the technical conformance criteria are theirs —WCAG 2.x, EN 301
549, RD 1112/2018, the accessibility statement, how it is tested and who signs it—. From here only
the fact that decides priority: in the public sector it is a legal obligation, not an improvement (§7.2).
privacy-engineering-standards (personal data, minimisation, DPIA, rights, retention — and the
real clash with the obligation to preserve the case file, §6.1),
api-design-standards (service contracts), data-governance-quality-standards (data ownership and
quality), ai-governance-standards (AI Act — an administration that automates
decisions is a high-risk deployer, and that is theirs),
appsec-standards and vulnerability-management-standards,
web-app-servers-standards and frontend-web-platform-standards (the electronic office as a web
application), bcdr-standards and backup-recovery-standards,
enterprise-architecture-standards and project-management-standards (programme portfolio and
governance; here only procurement insofar as it constrains the architecture),
opensource-licensing-standards (reuse of public software and its licence),
healthtech-fhir-standards (sister: the cross-border ePrescription and patient summary
are theirs as clinical data; the signature, the seal and the identity with which they
travel, from here), offensive-security-standards (this skill is defensive).
2. Default decisions
Verify the consolidated text and the dates on the web before pinning them in a real project (§8).
2.1 Regulatory framework
| Piece |
What it is |
Verified as of Aug 2026 |
| Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 (eIDAS) |
Electronic identification and trust services in the internal market |
In force; amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 |
| Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 ("eIDAS 2") |
Introduces the European digital identity framework and the wallet (EUDI Wallet) |
Published in the OJEU on 30-04-2024; entry into force cited as 20-05-2024 — secondary sources disagree (one gives 30-05-2024): verify it in the final article of the official text (§8) |
| Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1505 |
Technical specifications for the trusted lists (art. 22.5) |
Title verified verbatim (§2.4) |
| Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1506 |
Advanced signature and seal formats that public sector bodies must recognise |
Title and arts. 1-2 verified verbatim (§2.3) |
| Ley 39/2015 (common administrative procedure) |
Identification (art. 9) and signature (art. 10) of the interested party, register, notification |
Consolidated in the BOE |
| Ley 40/2015 (legal regime of the public sector) |
Electronic office, body seal, automated administrative action, archive |
Consolidated in the BOE |
| Real Decreto 311/2022 (ENS) |
"Real Decreto 311/2022, de 3 de mayo, por el que se regula el Esquema Nacional de Seguridad" (verbatim title, BOE) |
BÁSICA / MEDIA / ALTA categories (art. 40 and annex I). The consolidated BOE text shows a later amendment: verify it (§8) |
| Ley 6/2020 (electronic trust services) |
Spanish implementation of eIDAS |
Verify whether it is in force and any amendments (§8) |
2.2 Electronic signature: the three levels and their evidential value
The three levels are not "more or less secure": they are different legal categories.
| Level |
What it is |
Value |
| Simple |
Data in electronic form used by the signatory to sign (a click, a name at the bottom) |
Legal effect cannot be denied solely because it is electronic |
| Advanced (AdES) |
Uniquely linked to the signatory, allows identifying them, created with data under their sole control and detects any subsequent change |
It is the level administrations normally require; its cross-border recognition goes through 2015/1506 (§2.3) |
| Qualified (QES) |
Advanced + qualified signature creation device (QSCD) + qualified certificate from a supervised QTSP |
Equivalence with the handwritten signature, §2.2.1 |
2.2.1 — The text that decides, verbatim (Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, art. 25, verified in
EUR-Lex):
"1. An electronic signature shall not be denied legal effect and admissibility as evidence in
legal proceedings solely on the grounds that it is in an electronic form or that it does not meet
the requirements for qualified electronic signatures.
2. A qualified electronic signature shall have the equivalent legal effect of a handwritten
signature.
3. A qualified electronic signature based on a qualified certificate issued in one Member State
shall be recognised as a qualified electronic signature in all other Member States."
What this decides in engineering terms:
- Art. 25.1 does not say that a simple signature is worth the same: it says that effect cannot
be denied for the sole reason of being electronic. Its evidential weight in litigation has to
be proven with evidence — and that evidence has to have been kept (§4.3).
- Art. 25.3 is what makes the internal market possible: a Spanish QES is valid in Germany
with no bilateral agreement. What holds it up technically are the trusted lists (§2.4).
- QES is not "a signature with a certificate": it requires a QSCD. A qualified certificate in
software, in a
.p12 file on disk, does not produce a QES. Confusing this is the costliest
mistake in this domain, and it is inherited by the tender specifications.
- Electronic seal (organisation, not person) and qualified time stamp have their
own articles with specific presumptions — not verified verbatim here: declared gap
(§8). Do not cite them from memory in a legal report.
- The signature does not evidence intent, it evidences integrity and the signatory. What was signed,
what the signatory saw on screen and under which legal text, is a design decision of the procedure (§3.2).
2.3 Formats and longevity levels — the verbatim text
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1506, verified title: "Commission Implementing Decision (EU)
2015/1506 of 8 September 2015 laying down specifications relating to formats of advanced electronic
signatures and advanced seals to be recognised by public sector bodies pursuant to Articles 27(5)
and 37(5) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014". Article 1, verbatim:
"Member States requiring an advanced electronic signature or an advanced electronic signature
based on a qualified certificate as provided for in Article 27(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) No
910/2014, shall recognise XML, CMS or PDF advanced electronic signature at conformance level B, T
or LT level or using an associated signature container, where those signatures comply with the
technical specifications listed in the Annex."
And the annex specifications, exactly as they appear: XAdES → ETSI TS 103171 v.2.1.1, CAdES →
ETSI TS 103173 v.2.2.1, PAdES → ETSI TS 103172 v.2.2.2, ASiC (container) → ETSI TS 103174
v.2.2.1.
| Format |
Wraps |
Use it when |
| XAdES |
XML |
The document is XML (electronic invoice, register entry, structured exchange) |
| CAdES |
CMS/binary |
Any binary file; detached signature (detached) |
| PAdES |
PDF |
The document is read as a PDF and the signature must travel inside it and be verifiable by a standard reader |
| ASiC |
Container (ZIP) |
Several files + their signatures as a unit. The default choice for a case file |
Longevity levels — the axis of this whole document:
| Level |
What it adds |
Consequence |
| B (baseline) |
The signature and its minimum attributes |
Expires with the certificate. Good for the moment, not for the archive |
| T |
Time stamp over the signature |
Proves when it was signed. Without this you cannot prove the certificate was valid |
| LT |
Embeds the validation material (certificate chain, CRL/OCSP of the moment) |
The signature validates without depending on the CA still being alive or publishing revocation |
| LTA |
Archive time stamps chained and renewable |
The only level that survives algorithm obsolescence (§6.3) |
A fact that surprises people and has to be said: the recognition obligation of art. 1 of 2015/1506
covers levels B, T and LT — LTA does not appear in that enumeration. That is: the level you
really need for preservation is not the one the Decision obliges recognition of. Operational
consequence: you sign at least at T to produce, at LT to deliver, and you preserve at LTA (§6), and
do not confuse "what has to be recognised" with "what has to be archived".
2.4 Trusted lists (TSL) — the mechanism that makes all of this work
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1505, title and articles verified verbatim in EUR-Lex.
Article 1:
"Member States shall establish, publish and maintain trusted lists including information on the
qualified trust service providers which they supervise, as well as information on the qualified
trust services provided by them. Those lists shall comply with the technical specifications set
out in Annex I."
Article 2: Member States "may include in the trusted lists information on non-qualified
trust service providers", and the list "shall clearly indicate which trust service providers and the
trust services provided by them are not qualified."
Article 3: Member States "shall sign or seal electronically the form suitable for
automated processing of their trusted list", and the human-readable version, if published, "contains
the same data as the form suitable for automated processing" and is also signed or sealed.
Why this is the heart of the system, and not a footnote:
- Trust is not cryptographic, it is supervisory. A signature is valid not because the
maths works out, but because the issuer of the certificate was on the trusted list of the
State supervising it, at the moment of signing.
- Above the national lists there is a list of lists (LOTL) signed by the Commission. Your
validator has to start from there, not from a root CA store copied by hand.
- The list has history and states: a provider may be
granted, withdrawn or may have
ceased. Validating an eight-year-old signature "as of today" is a validation error: it is
validated against the state of the list at the date of the time stamp.
- FORBIDDEN to keep your own trusted certificate store for this (§7.3): the
moment a provider is withdrawn from the list, your store lies.
2.5 Spain — the concrete infrastructure
| Piece |
What it is |
Criteria |
| Cl@ve |
Unified identification system of the AGE and of the regions that have joined |
It has been reorganised around the Cl@ve app and Cl@ve Móvil (authentication by QR or confirmation in the app), with PIN by SMS as an alternative; Cl@ve Permanente and registration by video identification coexist. Verify the exact state and which method is still alive at clave.gob.es: it changes, and here there are only secondary sources — declared gap (§8) |
| FNMT certificate |
Natural/legal person certificate from the FNMT-RCM |
The most widespread; software by default → does not produce QES except on a card/qualified device (§2.2) |
| DNIe |
Certificate on the DNI chip |
It is the clear case of a qualified device; its real friction is the reader and the drivers |
| @firma |
Signature and certificate validation platform of the AGE |
Use it instead of writing your own validator (§4.1) |
| AutoFirma |
Desktop signing client |
It is what the citizen has installed; its friction (Java, browser, afirma:// protocol) is a real cause of procedure abandonment |
| VALIDe |
Public service for signature validation and viewing |
Manual and support checking |
| European Digital Wallet |
The EUDI Wallet applied in Spain |
It does not replace Cl@ve/FNMT/DNIe: it adds to them. Design for coexistence, not for migration |
| ENS (RD 311/2022) |
BÁSICA / MEDIA / ALTA categories according to the impact on availability, authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and traceability |
The category is determined before designing, because it changes mandatory measures. The CCN-STIC guides are the technical landing. The management framework and certification belong to grc-compliance-standards |
The European wallet (EUDI Wallet) — the fact most often stated wrongly. What is verified: art. 5a
of Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 establishes that "each Member State shall provide at least one European
Digital Identity Wallet within 24 months of the date of entry into force of the implementing acts",
and that "By 21 November 2024, the Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, establish a list
of reference standards". That is where the deadline everybody quotes as "end of 2026" comes from — and
it is a derived date, not a date written in the Regulation. Do not put it in a bid without
checking the text and the real date of entry into force of the implementing acts (§8). What you can
pin today: if you build a public service, you have to be able to accept the wallet in addition
to what already exists, and that is an identity architecture decision, not an if.
3. Structure of an electronic procedure
3.1 The full chain, and where it breaks
Identification (assurance level required by the procedure)
→ Presentation of the content to be signed (what the citizen actually sees)
→ Signature (required level: advanced or qualified)
→ Qualified time stamp
→ Inbound register (entry with authoritative number, date and time)
→ Receipt for the citizen (with the same evidential value)
→ Processing (with body seal on automated actions)
→ Legally effective notification (with acknowledgement and deadline computation)
→ Electronic archive (LTA, with a preservation plan) ← almost everything dies here
Hard rules:
- The required assurance level is set by the procedure, not by the developer's convenience, and it
must be justifiable. Requiring a qualified certificate to check the status of a case file is
an access barrier; accepting low identification for a waiver of rights is a defect.
- The submission receipt is the product, not a courtesy email: it is what the
citizen will use to prove they filed on time. It carries the administration's signature or seal and
a time stamp.
- Administrative deadlines are critical business logic: working days, national, regional and
local holidays, and the criterion for computing the notification. It is the most frequent source of
errors and the one that produces defencelessness.
- The electronic office has its own requirements (identification of the office, seal, publication
of services, accessibility) which are not those of a corporate website.
- Automated administrative action: if the act is produced by the system without human
intervention, it has to have been provided for and sealed with a body seal, with the responsible
body defined and published. An automatic process that issues decisions without that cover produces
voidable acts.
3.2 What is signed, exactly
- You sign the document, not the form. A stable, viewable representation of the content is
generated (normally PDF/A), shown, and that is what is signed. Signing a JSON that
the citizen never saw evidences nothing useful.
- WYSIWYS (what you see is what you sign): if the document contains dynamic elements
—JavaScript in the PDF, remote content, non-embedded fonts— what is seen may not be what
was signed. PDF/A and everything embedded, without exception.
- What was displayed is preserved, together with the signature and its evidence.
- Multiple signature: decide explicitly whether it is parallel (several sign the same thing,
independently) or cascaded/countersignature (each one signs the previous signature). Changing
criteria halfway breaks validation.
3.3 Evidence — what is kept besides the signed document
The signed document is not enough as proof. Kept alongside it and inseparably from it:
qualified time stamp, full certificate chain, OCSP or CRL responses from the moment of
signing, the state of the applicable trusted list, the signature policy if one was declared, and
the validation report generated at the moment of acceptance. This is exactly what the LT level
incorporates inside the signature itself — which is why LT is not a luxury, it is what avoids having to
reconstruct the proof by hand ten years from now.
4. Validation and testing
4.1 Validating
- Do not write your own validator. Use DSS (the Commission's reference library),
the administration's validation service (@firma / VALIDe in Spain) or a qualified
validation service. A homegrown validator is where false "valid" results hide.
- Validation starts from the LOTL, not from your own root store (§2.4).
- You validate against the instant of the time stamp, not against "now".
- The validation result is stored with the case file: in the future it may not be
reproducible.
- A result is not a boolean. Distinguish
TOTAL-PASSED, INDETERMINATE and TOTAL-FAILED, and
decide what the procedure does with INDETERMINATE (which is what a signature whose revocation
material cannot be obtained returns). Treating indeterminate as valid is the most common failure.
4.2 Testing — the negative catalogue, which here is the main catalogue
Every one of these cases has to exist as an automated test:
expired certificate; certificate revoked before signing; certificate revoked after
signing (it must remain valid if there is a prior time stamp); CA withdrawn from the trusted
list; document modified by one byte after signing; signature with an obsolete algorithm; incomplete
chain; OCSP unavailable; time stamp missing; foreign signature from another Member
State (art. 25.3); PDF with dynamic content; ASiC with more files than were signed; and
archive stamp renewal in an LTA. Without this catalogue, the system "works" and proves
nothing.
4.3 Longevity test
Rehearse the ten-years-from-now scenario, today: take a signed document, move the clock of the
test environment past the expiry of the certificate and of the CA, and validate. If it fails,
your electronic archive is not an archive, it is a folder. It is the test nobody runs and the one that
shows whether the design of §6 really exists.
5. Security
- The administration's signing keys (body seal, office seal, time stamping) in an
HSM, never in a file. Their lifecycle, custody and rotation belong to
cryptography-pki-standards; from here the requirement that the signing operation be
authorised, logged and attributable to a specific procedure.
- Server-side (remote) signing concentrates the risk: a badly authorised signing API signs
anything on behalf of anyone. Per-transaction authorisation, with the content to be signed
bound to the authorisation (not "permission to sign", but "permission to sign this").
- Identity enrolment and video identification: the most attacked point of the system is not
the cryptography, it is enrolment. Impersonation with a forged document, video deepfake
and presentation attacks. The assurance level of the scheme depends on this, not on the
authentication protocol.
- The electronic office is a target: spoofing the office to capture credentials and
signatures is a direct attack on the citizen. Office certificate, domain under control with DNSSEC
where possible, HSTS, and clear communication to the citizen of which is the legitimate office.
- ENS: the category determines mandatory measures; it is decided at the start of the design,
because it affects architecture (segregation, traceability, encryption, continuity) and it cannot
be added at the end. The CCN-STIC guides are the concrete landing.
- Traceability as an ENS requirement: who accessed which case file and when, with integrity
protected and retention defined. It is a functional requirement with its tests, not logging.
6. Long-term preservation — the real problem
6.1 The conflict that has to be named
The administrative case file has a legal preservation obligation for long periods, and the
GDPR right to erasure does not automatically override it. That conflict is resolved by design
(what is preserved, on what legal basis, what can be dissociated), and the decision belongs to
privacy-engineering-standards and the DPO. What this skill requires: that the system can
distinguish "preserved by legal obligation" from "preserved because nobody deleted it" and be able to
enumerate where each copy lives.
6.2 How preservation really works
- Signature at LTA from the archive onwards, with chained archive time stamps.
- Scheduled renewal of the archive stamp before the algorithm or the stamper's certificate
weaken. This is an operational process with a schedule and an owner, not a
property of the format: an LTA that nobody renews degrades just the same.
- Stable document format: PDF/A with everything embedded; XML with its schema preserved
alongside the document (an XML whose XSD disappeared is text).
- Container and case file metadata: ASiC or another container, with archival metadata
(identifier, body, date, document type, preservation policy) according to the Esquema
Nacional de Interoperabilidad and its technical standards.
- Planned media and format migration, with the evidence that the migration preserved
integrity — the migration is itself an act that has to be provable.
- Periodic restore and validation testing of the archive (§4.3). An archive that has not been
validated is not known to exist.
6.3 Cryptographic obsolescence, and post-quantum
Every signature ages because the algorithm ages. The only mechanism that solves it is
re-stamping the whole set (document + signatures + evidence) with a current algorithm before the
previous one breaks — which is exactly what LTA exists for. And here comes the warning that has to
be put in writing today: the post-quantum transition affects already-signed archives, not only
new ones. A document signed with RSA/ECDSA and preserved for thirty years will need an archive
stamp with a resistant algorithm before the previous one stops being valid. The schedule and the
choice of algorithm belong to post-quantum-crypto-standards; the obligation to have a re-stamping
plan is from here, and it has to be budgeted now.
7. Public sector context and prohibitions
7.1 Public procurement as an architectural constraint
- What is not in the tender specification is not done. If observability, automated testing, data
migration, architecture documentation, training and an exit plan are not requirements with their
own scoring criterion, they will not be delivered. The place where the quality of a public
system is decided is the tender specification, not the sprint.
- Fixed scope clashes with incremental development. A fixed-price, fixed-scope contract
over two years turns any learning into a contract amendment. When you can choose:
service- and capacity-based contracts, with small lots and verifiable deliverables.
- Vendor lock-in — the endemic pathology. Antidotes that are written into
the tender specification, not afterwards: ownership of the source code and of the data by the
administration, open formats and protocols, delivery of the architecture and deployment
documentation as a deliverable, environment reproducible from the repository, and exit test executed during
the contract, not described in an annex.
- Reuse: check before building whether a solution already exists in the catalogue of
reusable public administration solutions. And publish yours; its licence is decided with
opensource-licensing-standards.
- Knowledge continuity is a requirement: the contractor's team changes with each
tender. Whatever is not in the repository and in the documentation is lost at every succession.
7.2 Accessibility and interoperability
- Accessibility is a legal obligation in the public sector, and therefore a functional requirement with
an acceptance criterion. All the technical criteria —which WCAG criterion, how it is tested, the
accessibility statement and its review— belong to
accessibility-standards. From here only the
procurement consequence: if it is not in the tender specification with a scoring criterion, what will be
delivered is a statement that does not match the site. And the concrete warning from this domain: the
critical step of a procedure —the signature— is usually the least accessible (applets, pop-up windows,
timers, untagged PDFs).
- Interoperability: the ENI and its technical standards set the electronic document and case file,
the signature policy, the standards catalogue and the data model for exchange. The
common identifiers (DIR3 for organisational units, SIA for procedures) are not bureaucracy:
they are the foreign keys of the public sector and without them exchange between administrations does
not close.
- Open data and reuse: published data goes out in open and documented formats,
with a clear licence and a stable API; and anonymisation prior to publication
is analysed seriously (
privacy-engineering-standards) — a badly anonymised public dataset
cannot be withdrawn from the internet.
7.3 Prohibitions
- ❌ FORBIDDEN to call a signature with a software-file certificate a QES: without a QSCD there is no
qualified signature (§2.2).
- ❌ FORBIDDEN to keep your own store of trusted CAs instead of the corresponding LOTL / trusted
list (§2.4).
- ❌ Validating an old signature against today's trust state instead of that of the date of the
time stamp (§4.1).
- ❌ Treating an
INDETERMINATE validation result as valid (§4.1).
- ❌ Writing your own signature validator (§4.1).
- ❌ Signing at level B something that has to be preserved; archiving in anything other than LTA (§2.3, §6).
- ❌ An LTA with no operational stamp renewal process, with an owner and a schedule (§6.2).
- ❌ Signing content the citizen has not seen, or a PDF with dynamic content or non-embedded
fonts (§3.2).
- ❌ Discarding the validation evidence after accepting the document (§3.3).
- ❌ Requiring an assurance or signature level higher than the procedure needs: it is an access
barrier, and in the public sector that is exclusion.
- ❌ Issuing acts by automated procedure without the cover of automated administrative
action and without a body seal (§3.1).
- ❌ Computing administrative deadlines with calendar days or without a complete holiday calendar (§3.1).
- ❌ Putting European wallet dates in a tender specification, a bid or a press release without
having verified them in the official text and in the implementing acts (§2.5, §8).
- ❌ Claiming that the European wallet replaces Cl@ve, the FNMT certificate or the DNIe (§2.5).
- ❌ Delivering a public system without ownership of the code and the data, without a reproducible environment and
without a tested exit plan (§7.1).
- ❌ Treating accessibility as a final phase or as a statement without a test (§7.2).
- ❌ Publishing open data without a re-identification analysis (§7.2).
- ❌ Citing an article of eIDAS, of Ley 39/2015 or of the ENS from memory in a document with legal
effect. It is cited from the consolidated text (§8).
8. Mandatory web verification
Before pinning anything in a real project, check on the web:
- Consolidated text of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 with the amendments of Regulation (EU)
2024/1183, in EUR-Lex. Verified verbatim here: full art. 25 (legal effects of the
signature) and art. 8.1 and 8.2 (low, substantial and high assurance levels). Declared gap: the
articles on the legal effects of the electronic seal and of the qualified time stamp could NOT
be extracted verbatim —EUR-Lex truncates the consolidated document by size— so they are
not cited here. Read them before using them.
- European wallet (EUDI Wallet) dates: entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2024/1183
—published in the OJEU on 30-04-2024; secondary sources give 20-05-2024 and some 30-05-2024,
and it has not been resolved verbatim: declared gap— and, above all, the real date of entry into
force of the implementing acts of art. 5a, which is what triggers the 24-month deadline. What is
verified from art. 5a: "within 24 months of the date of entry into force of the implementing
acts" and "By 21 November 2024, the Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, establish a
list of reference standards". The "end of 2026" everybody repeats is a derived date.
Check it. Also check the state of the wallet's Architecture and Reference Framework
and of the large-scale pilots.
- Implementing decisions 2015/1505 (trusted lists) and 2015/1506 (formats): verified
verbatim here in their original version. Check whether a consolidated version with
amendments exists —in particular whether the ETSI references in the annex of 2015/1506 (TS 103171
v.2.1.1, TS 103172 v.2.2.2, TS 103173 v.2.2.1, TS 103174 v.2.2.1) have been updated to the
EN 319 122 / 319 132 / 319 142 / 319 162 standards. The ENs have not been verified here:
etsi.org returned 403 to automated access — declared gap.
- List of lists (LOTL) and the trusted list of your country, and the specific provider you are
going to accept: its state (
granted / withdrawn) and the qualified services it provides. It is checked
in the list, never on the provider's commercial website.
- Spain: consolidated text in the BOE of Ley 39/2015 (arts. 9 and 10, admitted
identification and signature systems), Ley 40/2015, Ley 6/2020 and Real Decreto
311/2022 ("Real Decreto 311/2022, de 3 de mayo, por el que se regula el Esquema Nacional de
Seguridad", title verified). Warning: the consolidated ENS text shows an amendment subsequent to
its publication; the detail of that amendment has NOT been verified — declared gap. And the
CCN-STIC guide applicable to your category.
- State of Cl@ve: which methods are still alive (Cl@ve app, Cl@ve Móvil, PIN by SMS, Cl@ve
Permanente, video identification) and their notified assurance level, at
clave.gob.es and on the
Administración Electrónica portal. Here there are only secondary sources: declared gap.
Also check the state of @firma, AutoFirma, VALIDe and their supported
versions — AutoFirma is a desktop dependency of the citizen and its compatibility with
browsers and with Java changes.
- State of the DSS library and of your validation service: version, supported algorithms and
security advisories.
- Post-quantum: migration schedule and algorithms, with
post-quantum-crypto-standards, and
their impact on the archive re-stamping plan (§6.3).
- CVEs of the signing platform, of the electronic office server, of the document manager and of the
desktop client, with
vulnerability-management-standards.
- ENI technical interoperability standards in force (electronic document, electronic
case file, signature policy, standards catalogue) and the DIR3 and SIA catalogues.
If the web contradicts this document, the web wins — flag the discrepancy.
1---2name: govtech-eidas-standards3description: European e-government engineering — electronic identity, trust services and administrative procedure. Use when working with eIDAS Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and its amendment Regulation (EU) 2024/1183, the European Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI Wallet) and its Architecture and Reference Framework, eID assurance levels low/substantial/high and the eIDAS node, qualified trust service providers and EU/national trusted lists (TSL, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1505, the LOTL), advanced versus qualified electronic signatures (QES) and their legal effect, electronic seals, qualified electronic time stamps, qualified electronic registered delivery, QSCD and remote signing, signature formats XAdES, CAdES, PAdES and ASiC with baseline levels B, T, LT and LTA (Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1506, ETSI TS 103171/103172/103173/103174), signature validation with DSS or a validation service, long-term preservation and evidence renewal, Spanish e-government infrastructure (Cl@ve and the Cl@ve app, certificado FNMT, DNIe, @firma, AutoFirma, VALIDe, Notific@, Cl@ve Firma, SIA, DIR3), Ley 39/2015 and Ley 40/2015 identification and signature systems, the Esquema Nacional de Seguridad (Real Decreto 311/2022) and its básica/media/alta categories and CCN-STIC guidance, the Esquema Nacional de Interoperabilidad and public sector open data reuse, or a public procurement pliego that constrains the architecture of a public-sector system.4metadata:5 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/serialexperimentslainnnn/govtech-eidas-standards6---78# European e-government standards (eIDAS)910Criteria verified as of **August 2026**. Re-verify on the web before committing to anything (§8).1112## 1. Scope and triggers1314Applies when the software **produces, consumes or holds custody of an administrative act or a15document with legal effect**: identifying a citizen before an administration, signing16electronically, registering an application, giving legally effective notice, time-stamping, and17**preserving all of that for decades in a way that remains verifiable**.1819**Domain thesis: signing is the easy problem; the real problem is preservation.** Signing is a20thirty-line operation. The hard part is that in **twenty years** someone can prove that the document21was signed, with which certificate, that the certificate was valid **at that moment**, that the CA22existed and was on the trusted list, and that the algorithm has not been broken along the way.23Almost every e-government project is designed around the act of signing and discovers the longevity24problem when the first certificate expires (§6). Corollary that changes the design from day one:25**a signature without a qualified time stamp and without embedded validation material expires with26the certificate**, and the proof expires with it.2728**Second thesis, and it is an engineering constraint even if it does not look like one: in the public29sector, the architecture is set by the tender specification.** What is not in the tender specification is30not built, not invoiced and not maintained. A non-functional requirement that does not appear in the award31criteria —observability, testing, data migration, exit plan— does not exist for the project (§7.1).3233Covers: electronic identity and assurance levels; the European wallet; trust services and trusted34lists; signature types and their evidential value; formats and longevity levels; long-term35preservation; the concrete Spanish infrastructure; and the procurement, accessibility and36interoperability constraints of the public sector.3738**Not applicable**:39- `identity-access-management-standards` (**main boundary**): **OAuth 2.1/OIDC, SAML, the IdP40 as a product, passkeys/WebAuthn, SCIM, RBAC/ABAC/ReBAC, session and technical federation are41 theirs**. **From here: which identity has legal value before an administration and with which42 assurance level** —the eIDAS low/substantial/high levels are not an MFA scale, they are a43 regulatory qualification of a notified scheme—, the eIDAS node and the European wallet. Arbitration44 rule: *"how do I authenticate the user in my application?" is theirs; "does this means of45 identification make the act valid and get it recognised by another Member State?" is46 from here*.47- `cryptography-pki-standards` (**main boundary**): **algorithms, curves, key sizes,48 TLS, CA hierarchy, ACME, HSM/KMS and the certificate lifecycle as cryptography are49 theirs**. **From here: what makes a PKI *qualified* under eIDAS and which legal obligations50 that brings** —QTSP, QSCD, trusted lists, evidential value—, which is not a cryptographic property51 but a supervisory one. Reciprocal warning: the **post-quantum migration** of these signatures52 belongs to `post-quantum-crypto-standards`, **and it directly affects long-term preservation**53 (§6.3).54- `grc-compliance-standards` (**boundary declared on both sides**): **the ENS as a management55 framework, its Statement of Applicability, the certification audit, the risk register and56 the relationship with the CCN are theirs** —it already cites RD 311/2022—. **From here: what the57 ENS forces on the architecture of a specific electronic service** (§2.5) and its relationship with58 the rest of this document.59- `accessibility-standards`: **all the technical conformance criteria are theirs** —WCAG 2.x, EN 30160 549, RD 1112/2018, the accessibility statement, how it is tested and who signs it—. **From here only61 the fact that decides priority: in the public sector it is a legal obligation, not an improvement** (§7.2).62- `privacy-engineering-standards` (personal data, minimisation, DPIA, rights, retention — **and the63 real clash with the obligation to preserve the case file**, §6.1),64 `api-design-standards` (service contracts), `data-governance-quality-standards` (data ownership and65 quality), `ai-governance-standards` (AI Act — **an administration that automates66 decisions is a high-risk deployer, and that is theirs**),67 `appsec-standards` and `vulnerability-management-standards`,68 `web-app-servers-standards` and `frontend-web-platform-standards` (the electronic office as a web69 application), `bcdr-standards` and `backup-recovery-standards`,70 `enterprise-architecture-standards` and `project-management-standards` (**programme portfolio and71 governance**; here only procurement insofar as it constrains the architecture),72 `opensource-licensing-standards` (reuse of public software and its licence),73 `healthtech-fhir-standards` (**sister**: the cross-border ePrescription and patient summary74 are theirs as clinical data; **the signature, the seal and the identity with which they75 travel, from here**), `offensive-security-standards` (**this skill is defensive**).7677## 2. Default decisions7879> Verify the consolidated text and the dates on the web before pinning them in a real project (§8).8081### 2.1 Regulatory framework8283| Piece | What it is | Verified as of Aug 2026 |84|---|---|---|85| **Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 (eIDAS)** | Electronic identification and trust services in the internal market | In force; **amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1183** |86| **Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 ("eIDAS 2")** | Introduces the **European digital identity framework** and the **wallet (EUDI Wallet)** | Published in the OJEU on **30-04-2024**; entry into force cited as **20-05-2024** — *secondary sources disagree (one gives 30-05-2024)*: **verify it in the final article of the official text** (§8) |87| **Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1505** | Technical specifications for the **trusted lists** (art. 22.5) | Title verified verbatim (§2.4) |88| **Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1506** | Advanced signature and seal formats **that public sector bodies must recognise** | Title and arts. 1-2 verified verbatim (§2.3) |89| **Ley 39/2015** (common administrative procedure) | Identification (art. 9) and signature (art. 10) of the interested party, register, notification | Consolidated in the BOE |90| **Ley 40/2015** (legal regime of the public sector) | Electronic office, body seal, automated administrative action, archive | Consolidated in the BOE |91| **Real Decreto 311/2022 (ENS)** | *"Real Decreto 311/2022, de 3 de mayo, por el que se regula el Esquema Nacional de Seguridad"* (verbatim title, BOE) | **BÁSICA / MEDIA / ALTA categories** (art. 40 and annex I). The consolidated BOE text shows a **later amendment**: verify it (§8) |92| **Ley 6/2020** (electronic trust services) | Spanish implementation of eIDAS | Verify whether it is in force and any amendments (§8) |9394### 2.2 Electronic signature: the three levels and their evidential value9596The three levels are not "more or less secure": **they are different legal categories**.9798| Level | What it is | Value |99|---|---|---|100| **Simple** | Data in electronic form used by the signatory to sign (a click, a name at the bottom) | Legal effect cannot be denied **solely** because it is electronic |101| **Advanced (AdES)** | Uniquely linked to the signatory, allows identifying them, created with data under their sole control and detects any subsequent change | It is the level administrations normally **require**; its cross-border recognition goes through 2015/1506 (§2.3) |102| **Qualified (QES)** | Advanced **+ qualified signature creation device (QSCD) + qualified certificate** from a supervised QTSP | **Equivalence with the handwritten signature**, §2.2.1 |103104**2.2.1 — The text that decides, verbatim** (Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, **art. 25**, verified in105EUR-Lex):106107> *"1. An electronic signature shall not be denied legal effect and admissibility as evidence in108> legal proceedings solely on the grounds that it is in an electronic form or that it does not meet109> the requirements for qualified electronic signatures.*110> *2. A qualified electronic signature shall have the equivalent legal effect of a handwritten111> signature.*112> *3. A qualified electronic signature based on a qualified certificate issued in one Member State113> shall be recognised as a qualified electronic signature in all other Member States."*114115What this decides in engineering terms:116- **Art. 25.1 does not say that a simple signature is worth the same**: it says that effect cannot117 be denied **for the sole reason** of being electronic. Its evidential weight in litigation has to118 be proven with evidence — and that evidence has to have been kept (§4.3).119- **Art. 25.3 is what makes the internal market possible**: a Spanish QES is valid in Germany120 **with no bilateral agreement**. What holds it up technically are the trusted lists (§2.4).121- **QES is not "a signature with a certificate"**: it requires a **QSCD**. A qualified certificate in122 software, in a `.p12` file on disk, **does not produce a QES**. Confusing this is the costliest123 mistake in this domain, and it is inherited by the tender specifications.124- **Electronic seal** (organisation, not person) and **qualified time stamp** have their125 own articles with specific presumptions — **not verified verbatim here: declared gap**126 (§8). Do not cite them from memory in a legal report.127- **The signature does not evidence intent, it evidences integrity and the signatory.** What was signed,128 what the signatory saw on screen and under which legal text, is a design decision of the procedure (§3.2).129130### 2.3 Formats and longevity levels — the verbatim text131132**Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1506**, verified title: *"Commission Implementing Decision (EU)1332015/1506 of 8 September 2015 laying down specifications relating to formats of advanced electronic134signatures and advanced seals to be recognised by public sector bodies pursuant to Articles 27(5)135and 37(5) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014"*. **Article 1, verbatim:**136137> *"Member States requiring an advanced electronic signature or an advanced electronic signature138> based on a qualified certificate as provided for in Article 27(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) No139> 910/2014, shall recognise XML, CMS or PDF advanced electronic signature at conformance level B, T140> or LT level or using an associated signature container, where those signatures comply with the141> technical specifications listed in the Annex."*142143And the annex specifications, exactly as they appear: **XAdES → ETSI TS 103171 v.2.1.1**, **CAdES →144ETSI TS 103173 v.2.2.1**, **PAdES → ETSI TS 103172 v.2.2.2**, **ASiC (container) → ETSI TS 103174145v.2.2.1**.146147| Format | Wraps | Use it when |148|---|---|---|149| **XAdES** | XML | The document **is** XML (electronic invoice, register entry, structured exchange) |150| **CAdES** | CMS/binary | Any binary file; detached signature (*detached*) |151| **PAdES** | PDF | The document is read as a PDF and the signature must travel inside it and be verifiable by a standard reader |152| **ASiC** | Container (ZIP) | Several files + their signatures as a unit. **The default choice for a case file** |153154**Longevity levels — the axis of this whole document:**155156| Level | What it adds | Consequence |157|---|---|---|158| **B** (*baseline*) | The signature and its minimum attributes | **Expires with the certificate.** Good for the moment, not for the archive |159| **T** | **Time stamp** over the signature | Proves **when** it was signed. Without this you cannot prove the certificate was valid |160| **LT** | Embeds the **validation material** (certificate chain, CRL/OCSP of the moment) | The signature validates **without depending on the CA still being alive or publishing revocation** |161| **LTA** | Archive time stamps **chained and renewable** | The only level that survives **algorithm obsolescence** (§6.3) |162163**A fact that surprises people and has to be said: the recognition obligation of art. 1 of 2015/1506164covers levels B, T and LT — LTA does not appear in that enumeration.** That is: **the level you165really need for preservation is not the one the Decision obliges recognition of.** Operational166consequence: **you sign at least at T to produce, at LT to deliver, and you preserve at LTA** (§6), and167do not confuse "what has to be recognised" with "what has to be archived".168169### 2.4 Trusted lists (TSL) — the mechanism that makes all of this work170171**Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1505**, title and articles verified verbatim in EUR-Lex.172**Article 1:**173174> *"Member States shall establish, publish and maintain trusted lists including information on the175> qualified trust service providers which they supervise, as well as information on the qualified176> trust services provided by them. Those lists shall comply with the technical specifications set177> out in Annex I."*178179**Article 2:** Member States *"may include in the trusted lists information on non-qualified180trust service providers"*, and the list *"shall clearly indicate which trust service providers and the181trust services provided by them are not qualified."*182**Article 3:** Member States *"shall sign or seal electronically the form suitable for183automated processing of their trusted list"*, and the human-readable version, if published, *"contains184the same data as the form suitable for automated processing"* and is also signed or sealed.185186**Why this is the heart of the system, and not a footnote:**187- **Trust is not cryptographic, it is supervisory.** A signature is valid not because the188 maths works out, but because the issuer of the certificate was **on the trusted list of the189 State supervising it, at the moment of signing**.190- Above the national lists there is a **list of lists (LOTL)** signed by the Commission. Your191 validator has to start from there, not from a root CA store copied by hand.192- **The list has history and states**: a provider may be `granted`, `withdrawn` or may have193 ceased. **Validating an eight-year-old signature "as of today" is a validation error**: it is194 validated against the state of the list **at the date of the time stamp**.195- **FORBIDDEN** to keep your own trusted certificate store for this (§7.3): the196 moment a provider is withdrawn from the list, your store lies.197198### 2.5 Spain — the concrete infrastructure199200| Piece | What it is | Criteria |201|---|---|---|202| **Cl@ve** | Unified identification system of the AGE and of the regions that have joined | It has been reorganised around the **Cl@ve app** and **Cl@ve Móvil** (authentication by QR or confirmation in the app), with **PIN by SMS** as an alternative; **Cl@ve Permanente** and registration by **video identification** coexist. **Verify the exact state and which method is still alive at `clave.gob.es`: it changes, and here there are only secondary sources — declared gap** (§8) |203| **FNMT certificate** | Natural/legal person certificate from the FNMT-RCM | The most widespread; **software by default → does not produce QES** except on a card/qualified device (§2.2) |204| **DNIe** | Certificate on the DNI chip | It is the clear case of a **qualified device**; its real friction is the reader and the *drivers* |205| **@firma** | Signature and certificate validation platform of the AGE | **Use it instead of writing your own validator** (§4.1) |206| **AutoFirma** | Desktop signing client | It is what the citizen has installed; its friction (Java, browser, `afirma://` protocol) is a real cause of procedure abandonment |207| **VALIDe** | Public service for signature validation and viewing | Manual and support checking |208| **European Digital Wallet** | The EUDI Wallet applied in Spain | **It does not replace Cl@ve/FNMT/DNIe: it adds to them.** Design for coexistence, not for migration |209| **ENS (RD 311/2022)** | **BÁSICA / MEDIA / ALTA** categories according to the impact on availability, authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and traceability | **The category is determined before designing**, because it changes mandatory measures. The **CCN-STIC** guides are the technical landing. The management framework and certification belong to `grc-compliance-standards` |210211**The European wallet (EUDI Wallet) — the fact most often stated wrongly.** What is verified: art. 5a212of Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 establishes that *"each Member State shall provide at least one European213Digital Identity Wallet within 24 months of the date of entry into force of the implementing acts"*,214and that *"By 21 November 2024, the Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, establish a list215of reference standards"*. **That is where the deadline everybody quotes as "end of 2026" comes from — and216it is a derived date, not a date written in the Regulation.** Do not put it in a bid without217checking the text and the real date of entry into force of the implementing acts (§8). What you can218pin today: **if you build a public service, you have to be able to accept the wallet in addition219to what already exists**, and that is an identity architecture decision, not an `if`.220221## 3. Structure of an electronic procedure222223### 3.1 The full chain, and where it breaks224225```226Identification (assurance level required by the procedure)227 → Presentation of the content to be signed (what the citizen actually sees)228 → Signature (required level: advanced or qualified)229 → Qualified time stamp230 → Inbound register (entry with authoritative number, date and time)231 → Receipt for the citizen (with the same evidential value)232 → Processing (with body seal on automated actions)233 → Legally effective notification (with acknowledgement and deadline computation)234 → Electronic archive (LTA, with a preservation plan) ← almost everything dies here235```236237Hard rules:2381. **The required assurance level is set by the procedure**, not by the developer's convenience, and it239 must be justifiable. Requiring a qualified certificate to check the status of a case file is240 an access barrier; accepting low identification for a waiver of rights is a defect.2412. **The submission receipt is the product**, not a courtesy email: it is what the242 citizen will use to prove they filed on time. It carries the administration's signature or seal and243 a time stamp.2443. **Administrative deadlines are critical business logic**: working days, national, regional and245 local holidays, and the criterion for computing the notification. It is the most frequent source of246 errors and the one that produces defencelessness.2474. **The electronic office has its own requirements** (identification of the office, seal, publication248 of services, accessibility) which are not those of a corporate website.2495. **Automated administrative action**: if the act is produced by the system without human250 intervention, it has to have been provided for and sealed with a **body seal**, with the responsible251 body defined and published. An automatic process that issues decisions without that cover produces252 voidable acts.253254### 3.2 What is signed, exactly255256- **You sign the document, not the form.** A stable, viewable representation of the content is257 generated (normally PDF/A), shown, and **that** is what is signed. Signing a JSON that258 the citizen never saw evidences nothing useful.259- **WYSIWYS** (*what you see is what you sign*): if the document contains dynamic elements260 —JavaScript in the PDF, remote content, non-embedded fonts— what is seen may not be what261 was signed. **PDF/A and everything embedded**, without exception.262- **What was displayed is preserved**, together with the signature and its evidence.263- **Multiple signature**: decide explicitly whether it is **parallel** (several sign the same thing,264 independently) or **cascaded/countersignature** (each one signs the previous signature). Changing265 criteria halfway breaks validation.266267### 3.3 Evidence — what is kept besides the signed document268269The signed document **is not enough** as proof. Kept alongside it and inseparably from it:270qualified time stamp, full certificate chain, **OCSP or CRL responses from the moment of271signing**, the state of the applicable trusted list, the signature policy if one was declared, and272the validation report generated at the moment of acceptance. **This is exactly what the LT level273incorporates inside the signature itself** — which is why LT is not a luxury, it is what avoids having to274reconstruct the proof by hand ten years from now.275276## 4. Validation and testing277278### 4.1 Validating279280- **Do not write your own validator.** Use **DSS** (the Commission's reference library),281 the administration's validation service (**@firma** / **VALIDe** in Spain) or a qualified282 validation service. A homegrown validator is where false "valid" results hide.283- **Validation starts from the LOTL**, not from your own root store (§2.4).284- **You validate against the instant of the time stamp**, not against "now".285- **The validation result is stored** with the case file: in the future it may not be286 reproducible.287- **A result is not a boolean.** Distinguish `TOTAL-PASSED`, `INDETERMINATE` and `TOTAL-FAILED`, and288 **decide what the procedure does with `INDETERMINATE`** (which is what a signature whose revocation289 material cannot be obtained returns). Treating indeterminate as valid is the most common failure.290291### 4.2 Testing — the negative catalogue, which here is the main catalogue292293Every one of these cases has to exist as an automated test:294**expired** certificate; certificate **revoked before** signing; certificate revoked **after**295signing (it must remain valid if there is a prior time stamp); **CA withdrawn** from the trusted296list; document **modified by one byte** after signing; signature with an obsolete algorithm; **incomplete297chain**; **OCSP unavailable**; time stamp missing; **foreign signature** from another Member298State (art. 25.3); PDF with dynamic content; ASiC with more files than were signed; and299**archive stamp renewal** in an LTA. Without this catalogue, the system "works" and proves300nothing.301302### 4.3 Longevity test303304**Rehearse the ten-years-from-now scenario, today**: take a signed document, move the clock of the305test environment past the expiry of the certificate and of the CA, and **validate**. If it fails,306your electronic archive is not an archive, it is a folder. It is the test nobody runs and the one that307shows whether the design of §6 really exists.308309## 5. Security310311- **The administration's signing keys (body seal, office seal, time stamping) in an312 HSM**, never in a file. Their lifecycle, custody and rotation belong to313 `cryptography-pki-standards`; **from here the requirement that the signing operation be314 authorised, logged and attributable to a specific procedure**.315- **Server-side (remote) signing concentrates the risk**: a badly authorised signing API signs316 anything on behalf of anyone. Per-transaction authorisation, with the content to be signed317 bound to the authorisation (not "permission to sign", but "permission to sign *this*").318- **Identity enrolment and video identification**: the most attacked point of the system is not319 the cryptography, it is **enrolment**. Impersonation with a forged document, video *deepfake*320 and presentation attacks. The assurance level of the scheme depends on this, not on the321 authentication protocol.322- **The electronic office is a target**: spoofing the office to capture credentials and323 signatures is a direct attack on the citizen. Office certificate, domain under control with DNSSEC324 where possible, HSTS, and **clear communication to the citizen of which is the legitimate office**.325- **ENS**: the category determines mandatory measures; **it is decided at the start of the design**,326 because it affects architecture (segregation, traceability, encryption, continuity) and it cannot327 be added at the end. The **CCN-STIC** guides are the concrete landing.328- **Traceability as an ENS requirement**: who accessed which case file and when, with integrity329 protected and retention defined. It is a functional requirement with its tests, not *logging*.330331## 6. Long-term preservation — the real problem332333### 6.1 The conflict that has to be named334335The administrative case file has a **legal preservation obligation** for long periods, and the336GDPR right to erasure **does not automatically override it**. That conflict is resolved by design337(what is preserved, on what legal basis, what can be dissociated), and **the decision belongs to338`privacy-engineering-standards` and the DPO**. What this skill requires: **that the system can339distinguish "preserved by legal obligation" from "preserved because nobody deleted it"** and be able to340enumerate where each copy lives.341342### 6.2 How preservation really works3433441. **Signature at LTA** from the archive onwards, with **chained** archive time stamps.3452. **Scheduled renewal** of the archive stamp **before** the algorithm or the stamper's certificate346 weaken. This is an **operational process with a schedule and an owner**, not a347 property of the format: an LTA that nobody renews degrades just the same.3483. **Stable document format**: **PDF/A** with everything embedded; XML with its schema preserved349 alongside the document (an XML whose XSD disappeared is text).3504. **Container and case file metadata**: ASiC or another container, with archival metadata351 (identifier, body, date, document type, preservation policy) according to the **Esquema352 Nacional de Interoperabilidad** and its technical standards.3535. **Planned media and format migration**, with the evidence that the migration preserved354 integrity — the migration is itself an act that has to be provable.3556. **Periodic restore and validation testing** of the archive (§4.3). An archive that has not been356 validated is not known to exist.357358### 6.3 Cryptographic obsolescence, and post-quantum359360**Every signature ages because the algorithm ages.** The only mechanism that solves it is361**re-stamping the whole set (document + signatures + evidence) with a current algorithm before the362previous one breaks** — which is exactly what LTA exists for. And here comes the warning that has to363be put in writing today: **the post-quantum transition affects already-signed archives, not only364new ones**. A document signed with RSA/ECDSA and preserved for thirty years will need an archive365stamp with a resistant algorithm **before** the previous one stops being valid. **The schedule and the366choice of algorithm belong to `post-quantum-crypto-standards`; the obligation to have a re-stamping367plan is from here, and it has to be budgeted now.**368369## 7. Public sector context and prohibitions370371### 7.1 Public procurement as an architectural constraint372373- **What is not in the tender specification is not done.** If observability, automated testing, data374 migration, architecture documentation, training and an **exit plan** are not requirements with their375 own scoring criterion, they will not be delivered. **The place where the quality of a public376 system is decided is the tender specification, not the sprint.**377- **Fixed scope clashes with incremental development.** A fixed-price, fixed-scope contract378 over two years turns any learning into a contract amendment. When you can choose:379 service- and capacity-based contracts, with small lots and verifiable deliverables.380- **Vendor lock-in** — the endemic pathology. Antidotes that are written into381 the tender specification, not afterwards: **ownership of the source code and of the data by the382 administration**, open formats and protocols, delivery of the architecture and deployment383 documentation as a deliverable, **environment reproducible from the repository**, and **exit test executed during384 the contract**, not described in an annex.385- **Reuse**: check before building whether a solution already exists in the catalogue of386 reusable public administration solutions. And publish yours; its licence is decided with387 `opensource-licensing-standards`.388- **Knowledge continuity is a requirement**: the contractor's team changes with each389 tender. Whatever is not in the repository and in the documentation is lost at every succession.390391### 7.2 Accessibility and interoperability392393- **Accessibility is a legal obligation in the public sector, and therefore a functional requirement with394 an acceptance criterion.** All the technical criteria —which WCAG criterion, how it is tested, the395 accessibility statement and its review— belong to **`accessibility-standards`**. **From here only the396 procurement consequence: if it is not in the tender specification with a scoring criterion, what will be397 delivered is a statement that does not match the site.** And the concrete warning from this domain: **the398 critical step of a procedure —the signature— is usually the least accessible** (applets, pop-up windows,399 timers, untagged PDFs).400- **Interoperability**: the **ENI** and its technical standards set the electronic document and case file,401 the signature policy, the standards catalogue and the data model for exchange. **The402 common identifiers (DIR3 for organisational units, SIA for procedures) are not bureaucracy:403 they are the foreign keys of the public sector** and without them exchange between administrations does404 not close.405- **Open data and reuse**: published data goes out in open and documented formats,406 with a clear licence and a **stable API**; and **anonymisation prior to publication407 is analysed seriously** (`privacy-engineering-standards`) — a badly anonymised public dataset408 cannot be withdrawn from the internet.409410### 7.3 Prohibitions411412- ❌ **FORBIDDEN** to call a signature with a software-file certificate a QES: without a **QSCD** there is no413 qualified signature (§2.2).414- ❌ **FORBIDDEN** to keep your own store of trusted CAs instead of the corresponding **LOTL / trusted415 list** (§2.4).416- ❌ Validating an old signature against **today's** trust state instead of that of the date of the417 time stamp (§4.1).418- ❌ Treating an `INDETERMINATE` validation result as valid (§4.1).419- ❌ Writing your own signature validator (§4.1).420- ❌ Signing at level **B** something that has to be preserved; archiving in anything other than **LTA** (§2.3, §6).421- ❌ An LTA **with no operational stamp renewal process**, with an owner and a schedule (§6.2).422- ❌ Signing content the citizen has not seen, or a PDF with dynamic content or non-embedded423 fonts (§3.2).424- ❌ Discarding the validation evidence after accepting the document (§3.3).425- ❌ Requiring an assurance or signature level higher than the procedure needs: it is an access426 barrier, and in the public sector that is exclusion.427- ❌ Issuing acts by automated procedure without the cover of **automated administrative428 action** and without a body seal (§3.1).429- ❌ Computing administrative deadlines with calendar days or without a complete holiday calendar (§3.1).430- ❌ Putting **European wallet dates** in a tender specification, a bid or a press release without431 having verified them in the official text and in the implementing acts (§2.5, §8).432- ❌ Claiming that the European wallet replaces Cl@ve, the FNMT certificate or the DNIe (§2.5).433- ❌ Delivering a public system without ownership of the code and the data, without a reproducible environment and434 without a tested exit plan (§7.1).435- ❌ Treating accessibility as a final phase or as a statement without a test (§7.2).436- ❌ Publishing open data without a re-identification analysis (§7.2).437- ❌ Citing an article of eIDAS, of Ley 39/2015 or of the ENS from memory in a document with legal438 effect. It is cited from the consolidated text (§8).439440## 8. Mandatory web verification441442Before pinning anything in a real project, check on the web:4434441. **Consolidated text of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 with the amendments of Regulation (EU)445 2024/1183**, in EUR-Lex. Verified verbatim here: full **art. 25** (legal effects of the446 signature) and **art. 8.1 and 8.2** (low, substantial and high assurance levels). **Declared gap: the447 articles on the legal effects of the electronic seal and of the qualified time stamp could NOT448 be extracted verbatim** —EUR-Lex truncates the consolidated document by size— **so they are449 not cited here. Read them before using them.**4502. **European wallet (EUDI Wallet) dates**: entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2024/1183451 —**published in the OJEU on 30-04-2024; secondary sources give 20-05-2024 and some 30-05-2024,452 and it has not been resolved verbatim: declared gap**— and, above all, **the real date of entry into453 force of the implementing acts of art. 5a**, which is what triggers the 24-month deadline. What is454 verified from art. 5a: *"within 24 months of the date of entry into force of the implementing455 acts"* and *"By 21 November 2024, the Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, establish a456 list of reference standards"*. **The "end of 2026" everybody repeats is a derived date.457 Check it.** Also check the state of the wallet's **Architecture and Reference Framework**458 and of the large-scale pilots.4593. **Implementing decisions 2015/1505 (trusted lists) and 2015/1506 (formats)**: verified460 verbatim here in their original version. **Check whether a consolidated version with461 amendments exists** —in particular whether the ETSI references in the annex of 2015/1506 (TS 103171462 v.2.1.1, TS 103172 v.2.2.2, TS 103173 v.2.2.1, TS 103174 v.2.2.1) have been updated to the463 **EN 319 122 / 319 132 / 319 142 / 319 162** standards. **The ENs have not been verified here:464 `etsi.org` returned 403 to automated access — declared gap.**4654. **List of lists (LOTL) and the trusted list of your country**, and **the specific provider** you are466 going to accept: its state (`granted` / `withdrawn`) and the qualified services it provides. It is checked467 in the list, never on the provider's commercial website.4685. **Spain**: consolidated text in the **BOE** of **Ley 39/2015** (arts. 9 and 10, admitted469 identification and signature systems), **Ley 40/2015**, **Ley 6/2020** and **Real Decreto470 311/2022** (*"Real Decreto 311/2022, de 3 de mayo, por el que se regula el Esquema Nacional de471 Seguridad"*, title verified). **Warning: the consolidated ENS text shows an amendment subsequent to472 its publication; the detail of that amendment has NOT been verified — declared gap.** And the473 **CCN-STIC guide** applicable to your category.4746. **State of Cl@ve**: which methods are still alive (Cl@ve app, Cl@ve Móvil, PIN by SMS, Cl@ve475 Permanente, video identification) and their notified assurance level, **at `clave.gob.es` and on the476 Administración Electrónica portal**. **Here there are only secondary sources: declared gap.**477 Also check the state of **@firma**, **AutoFirma**, **VALIDe** and their supported478 versions — **AutoFirma is a desktop dependency of the citizen and its compatibility with479 browsers and with Java changes**.4807. **State of the DSS library** and of your validation service: version, supported algorithms and481 security advisories.4828. **Post-quantum**: migration schedule and algorithms, with `post-quantum-crypto-standards`, and483 **their impact on the archive re-stamping plan** (§6.3).4849. **CVEs** of the signing platform, of the electronic office server, of the document manager and of the485 desktop client, with `vulnerability-management-standards`.48610. **ENI technical interoperability standards** in force (electronic document, electronic487 case file, signature policy, standards catalogue) and the **DIR3** and **SIA** catalogues.488489If the web contradicts this document, **the web wins** — flag the discrepancy.