Governance, risk and compliance (GRC) standards
Criteria verified as of August 2026. Re-verify on the web before committing to anything (§8).
1. Scope and triggers
Applies when designing, implementing, auditing or reviewing:
- ISMS ISO/IEC 27001:2022: scope, clauses 4-10, Annex A, Statement of Applicability (SoA).
- Risk management: methodology, scales, risk register, treatment, formal acceptance
and exceptions with an expiry date.
- Frameworks and regulation: NIST CSF 2.0, CIS Controls v8.1, SOC 2, ENS (RD 311/2022), NIS2, DORA,
CRA, ISO 27701/42001 — scope, obligations and deadlines.
- Evidence and continuous compliance: automatable control→evidence mapping, OSCAL, retention
policy, internal and external audit preparation.
- Third-party risk (TPRM): supplier tiering, SIG/CAIQ/CSA STAR, contractual clauses,
DORA register of information.
- Document hierarchy: policy, standards, procedures, records; owners and cadences.
Not applicable: see vulnerability-management-standards (for CVE/CVSS/EPSS/KEV triage, patching
SLAs and VEX — here only the formal acceptance of residual risk), appsec-standards (for threat
modelling and OWASP/ASVS), sre-practice-standards (for SLOs, on-call and postmortems),
identity-access-management-standards (for technical IAM), cicd-standards, iac-standards,
kubernetes-standards, onprem-standards and the cloud skills (for the concrete controls: the
framework, the risk and the evidence live here, not the implementation). Engineering GDPR (DPIA
as a technical artifact, minimisation in the schema, retention implemented as deletion, data subject
rights as functionality, transfers by design, PII in telemetry) belongs to
privacy-engineering-standards: here only the management part (ISO 27701 as a PIMS, RoPA as a
register, risk acceptance, audit evidence). Continuity: the management system (ISO 22301,
policy, scope, audit) belongs here; the plan and its engineering (BIA, RTO/RPO, recovery order,
DR exercises) belongs to bcdr-standards. Incident handling and the technical investigation belong
to incident-management-standards and incident-response-forensics-standards; the authorised
offensive exercise, to offensive-security-standards. enterprise-architecture-standards (the
control framework, the risk register and the audit evidence belong here; the application
inventory with its owner, criticality and lifecycle is theirs — and it is the source that feeds
the scope of almost every control. A control whose scope cannot be enumerated is not auditable),
opensource-licensing-standards (the corporate regulatory obligation and its evidence belong here;
the licence policy, the gate and the exception process are theirs),
govtech-eidas-standards (reciprocal, already declared from their side: the eIDAS regime —
advanced versus qualified signature, qualified provider and trust lists, timestamping, AdES
and long-term preservation, electronic case file — and the obligations of Spanish administrative
procedure are theirs; the ENS as a management framework — Statement of
Applicability, categorisation, certification audit, risk register and the relationship with the
CCN — belongs here. Rule: if the question is what legal value what you sign has, it is theirs; if it is
which control it evidences and with what evidence, it is ours),
accessibility-standards (boundary with a real legal
obligation: the applicable regulatory framework, the evidence register and the management of
sanction risk belong here; the accessibility statement — its content, its testing and
who signs it — is theirs (§6.1), and this document only requires it as evidence — European Accessibility Act, EN 301 549, Ley 11/2023 and its
implementing rules, ADA Title II —; the technical conformance criteria — which WCAG criterion is met,
how it is tested and what automates it — are theirs. Warning both share: a new version of
WCAG or of EN 301 549 does not by itself change the legal obligation, which is anchored to the standard cited
in the law).
2. Default decisions
Verify the latest version on the web before pinning it in a real project (§8).
| Situation |
Default |
Justifiable alternative / Forbidden |
| Certifiable ISMS |
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 + Annex A (93 controls: 37 organisational, 8 people, 14 physical, 34 technological) with 27002:2022 implementation guidance |
The transition from 27001:2013 closed on 31 Oct 2025: a 2013 certificate is invalid and requires full recertification (Stage 1+2), not transition |
| Governance language and communication with the board |
NIST CSF 2.0 (CSWP 29, Feb 2024): GOVERN/IDENTIFY/PROTECT/DETECT/RESPOND/RECOVER functions, 106 subcategories, current/target Profiles |
Using the Tiers 1-4 as a maturity scale (they measure risk management, not maturity) |
| Prioritised technical baseline |
CIS Controls v8.1 (Jun 2024): 18 controls, 153 safeguards, IG1 = 56 as a non-negotiable minimum |
Starting at IG3 "because we are serious"; there is no v9 published as of Aug 2026 |
| Risk methodology |
ISO/IEC 27005:2022 with a combined approach: event-based (strategic scenarios) for the map, asset-based for the detail |
Assets only (produces inventories, not decisions); events only (does not land controls) |
| Risk in the Spanish public sector |
MAGERIT v3 + the CCN's PILAR tool (free for the public sector and its suppliers) |
The v3 catalogue (2012) does not name cloud/SaaS/containers/AI: reinterpret and document the equivalence |
| Quantification for investment decisions |
Qualitative 5×5 with written criteria by default; FAIR when control cost has to be compared against expected loss |
Colour matrices with no scale definition (made-up numbers with the appearance of rigour) |
| Assurance for customers (US/SaaS market) |
SOC 2 Type II, TSP section 100 (TSC 2017 with 2022 revised points of focus), Security mandatory + categories according to commitments |
Type I as a substitute for Type II; treating the points of focus as auditable requirements (TSP 100.07: they are not) |
| Spanish public sector and its suppliers |
ENS, RD 311/2022: BÁSICA/MEDIA/ALTA category from risk analysis; Perfiles de Cumplimiento Específicos approved by the CCN (art. 30) where one exists for the sector |
Certifying MEDIA/ALTA category without an accredited body (básica allows a declaration; media/alta require certification) |
| Privacy as a management system |
ISO/IEC 27701:2025 (14 Oct 2025): standalone PIMS, no longer an extension of 27001; harmonised structure 4-10; unified Annex A (A.1/A.2/A.3) |
27701:2019 certificates: transition until Oct 2028 |
| AI systems |
ISO/IEC 42001 as an AIMS; integrate it with the ISMS, do not duplicate it |
Handling AI risk outside the corporate risk register |
| Evidence interchange format |
OSCAL (NIST, 1.1.x line) when the consumer supports it — FedRAMP requires machine-readable packages from 30 Sep 2026 |
Requiring OSCAL from tools that only support it in name: test import/export first |
Regulation with dates (status Aug 2026, verify §8):
- DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554): applicable since 17 Jan 2025. The ESAs designated the
first 19 critical ICT providers (CTPPs) on 18 Nov 2025 (hyperscalers and large SaaS),
under direct oversight with periodic penalty payments of up to 1% of average daily worldwide turnover.
As a regulation, it applies directly: it does not depend on transposition.
- NIS2 (Directive (EU) 2022/2555): transposition deadline expired on 17 Oct 2024. Spain
still has not transposed it as of Aug 2026: the draft Ley de Coordinación y Gobernanza de la
Ciberseguridad (Council of Ministers, 14 Jan 2025) is still in progress; the Commission issued a
reasoned opinion on 7 May 2025 and a second request on 19 May 2026 (INFR(2024)0270).
RDL 7/2025 partially transposed it for the electricity sector. Art. 23: early warning 24 h,
notification 72 h, final report 1 month. Art. 34: minimum fines of €10M or 2% of
worldwide turnover (essential) and €7M or 1.4% (important) — these are floors, Member States
may raise them. Art. 20: approval and mandatory training of the management body, with
personal liability and possible temporary disqualification.
- CRA (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847): reporting obligations from 11 Sep 2026 (early warning
24 h, notification 72 h, final report 14 days/1 month, via the Single Reporting Platform); full
application on 11 Dec 2027. It covers a product already on the market if it remains available after Sep 2026.
3. Structure and conventions
Document hierarchy (4 levels, no more):
Security policy (1 document, approved by the board, the "what" and the "who is accountable") →
Standards per domain (the "what must be complied with", measurable) → Procedures (the "how", with an
operational owner) → Records/evidence (the proof). Every document: named owner, version, approval
date, approver and next review date. A document without an owner is dead.
Source of truth = internal control catalogue, not the frameworks. Every control has its own stable
ID; the frameworks are views that point to it. The other way round (one file per standard) duplicates
the work and they contradict each other. Versioned in git, reviewable by PR:
# controls/CTRL-014.yaml — one control, N frameworks, N pieces of evidence
id: CTRL-014
nombre: Review and approval of production changes
dueño: jefatura-plataforma # accountable for it OPERATING
frecuencia: continua
implementacion: "Mandatory PR + 1 approval other than the author + green CI"
mapeos: # one piece of evidence serves several standards
iso27001_2022: [A.8.32]
nist_csf_2_0: [PR.PS-06]
cis_v8_1: ["4.1"]
soc2_tsc: [CC8.1]
ens_rd311: [op.exp.5]
evidencia:
tipo: automatizada # automatizada | manual — the % is measured
fuente: "Forge API: PRs merged without approval in the period"
consulta: "scripts/evidence/prs_sin_aprobacion.py"
periodicidad: mensual
retencion: 24m
prueba_eficacia: "Sample over the full period; 0 unjustified exceptions"
Risk register — mandatory fields (if one is missing, the risk is not managed):
ID · scenario in source → event → consequence format (not "a hack") · affected process/asset ·
risk owner (business, named, with authority to accept; different from the control owner) ·
likelihood and impact on the defined scale · inherent risk · existing controls ·
residual risk · decision (mitigate/transfer/avoid/accept) · plan with an owner and a
date · next review date · link to the evidence.
SoA — the document auditors look at most. The 93 Annex A controls, each with:
applicable yes/no, explicit justification for inclusion and for exclusion, implementation status,
reference to the internal control (CTRL-xxx) and to the evidence. It is updated on every material change
to the scope or to the risks, not once a year before the audit.
Exceptions and risk acceptance: a single form with the associated risk, compensating controls,
mandatory expiry date (max. 12 months), approver according to the risk level (written authority
matrix: who may accept what) and review on expiry. An exception with no date is an undocumented
architecture decision.
4. Quality gates and continuous compliance
In increasing order of cost; the first three are automatic and break the pipeline:
- Policy as code in CI: OPA/Conftest, Kyverno or equivalent over IaC and manifests; IaC and
image scanning, SBOM and secret scanning. A critical finding breaks the build — and the signed,
timestamped output of the gate IS the evidence, not a screenshot taken afterwards.
- Scheduled evidence collection: every control with
evidencia.tipo: automatizada generates
its artifact at its frequency, with a timestamp, traceable origin and verifiable integrity (hash),
in storage with retention and restricted access.
- Coverage dashboard: controls with no evidence within their window = open finding, just like a
broken test. Without a dashboard, "we comply" is an opinion.
- Internal audit (clause 9.3 and annual programme): planned by risk, not by
checklist; findings with root cause, plan, owner and date; follow-up until verified closure.
- External audit / SOC 2 Type II: requires evidence throughout the whole observation
period and auditor sampling. A bulk collection the week before is a finding, not
preparation.
Design vs. operation: proving that the control exists (design effectiveness) does not prove that it
works (operating effectiveness). For each control, define in advance what sample and what
deviation threshold count as a failure.
5. Security of the compliance programme
- Evidence is sensitive data: minimise it (redact secrets, credentials, PII, internal IPs if
they add nothing), control access to the evidence repository, encrypt it and define retention. A
badly protected evidence repository is a map of the organisation for an attacker.
- Segregation of duties: whoever operates a control does not approve their own evidence; internal
audit with real independence from the audited function.
- Third parties (TPRM): tiering by criticality and by data access, with a differentiated cadence
(critical: full annual review + continuous monitoring; low risk: 24-36 months).
CAIQ questionnaires (CSA, aligned with CCM; STAR Level 1 self-assessment, Level 2 attestation)
for SaaS/cloud and SIG (Shared Assessments, ~21 domains; SIG Lite for screening) for the rest.
When you receive a supplier's SOC 2 or ISO: read the scope, the period and the exceptions — a
certificate whose scope you have not read says nothing. Contract with a right to audit, incident
notification with deadlines aligned to yours (if you are held to 24 h, your supplier cannot give you
72), subprocessors and exit/portability. In financial entities, the DORA register of information.
- Regulatory deadlines live in the incident response plan, not in a compliance
document: the NIS2/CRA 24 h clock starts on becoming aware, and if personal data is involved it
runs in parallel with the data protection one.
6. Programme operability
Metrics reported to the board (signal, not vanity):
% of controls with automated evidence · average age of the evidence · open findings
by age and severity · exceptions in force and expired without review · risks above
the declared appetite · % of critical suppliers reviewed on time · mean time to close a
finding. The trend matters more than the absolute value.
Minimum cadence: risk register review quarterly (critical) / annual (the rest) ·
management review annually with the clause 9.3 inputs and outputs · internal audit annually ·
SoA on every material change · quarterly regulatory radar (§8).
Translation between frameworks — the real saving is here. A single well-defined piece of evidence covers N
standards: the change approval record serves ISO A.8.32, SOC 2 CC8.1, CIS 4.x, ENS op.exp.5 and
CSF PR.PS-06 simultaneously. Keep the mappings in the control catalogue (§3) and use the official
informative references (NIST CPRT for CSF 2.0, mappings published by CIS, Annex B of
27002:2022) instead of inventing them. When a mapping is partial, note it as partial: an
optimistic mapping is discovered in the audit, not before.
7. Sustainability and prohibitions
Lifecycle: put dated standards transitions in the calendar of the year they are announced
(ISO 27001:2013 → 2022 closed on 31 Oct 2025; 27701:2019 → 2025 closes in Oct 2028). Amd 1:2024 to
27001 requires the determination on climate change in the context to be recorded, even if
the conclusion is "not relevant": the auditor asks for it directly.
FORBIDDEN
- ❌ Compliance theatre: template policies never adapted, procedures nobody
executes, described controls that do not exist. It is document fraud with pretty formatting.
- ❌ An SoA with everything marked "applicable", or exclusions with no written justification.
- ❌ Risks with no named owner, or with the control owner as the risk owner.
- ❌ Verbal risk acceptance, by stray email, or signed by someone without authority under
the matrix. Without a signature with name, date and expiry, the risk is not accepted: it is ignored.
- ❌ Perpetual exceptions, or ones renewed automatically without re-assessing the risk.
- ❌ Fabricated, backdated evidence, or evidence collected only before the audit; a screenshot as the only
evidence of a control the tool can export via API.
- ❌ Certifying an artificially trimmed scope so it comes out cheap and selling it as full
coverage of the organisation.
- ❌ Confusing the CSF 2.0 Tiers with maturity levels, or the SOC 2 points of focus with
mandatory requirements.
- ❌ Delegating the NIS2 management body responsibility (art. 20) to a supplier: it is non-delegable.
- ❌ Assuming that "since Spain has not transposed NIS2, there is nothing to do": DORA and the CRA are
directly applicable regulations, contracts and customers already require NIS2, and the law will arrive with
short registration deadlines.
- ❌ Sending questionnaires to suppliers and reading neither the answers nor the attached evidence.
- ❌ One control file per framework (guaranteed duplication and contradictions within a year).
- ❌ Closing a finding without verifying the fix or recording the root cause.
8. Mandatory web verification
Before pinning any concrete fact, search for it — do not recall it. European regulation
moves by quarters:
- NIS2 in Spain: whether the Ley de Coordinación y Gobernanza de la Ciberseguridad has been published
in the BOE, its registration deadlines, the split of competent authorities and the final penalties
(BOE + status of file INFR(2024)0270).
- DORA: RTS/ITS adopted and in force, and the updated list of CTPPs designated by the ESAs.
- ENS: whether RD 311/2022 is still in force unamended, and the Perfil de Cumplimiento Específico
and the CCN-STIC guides applicable to the exact sector before sizing measures.
- CRA: Commission guidance and the status of the Single Reporting Platform before 11 Sep 2026.
- ISO: current edition and transition period of 27001/27002/27005/27701/42001, and whether there is a
revision under way (ISO Online Browsing Platform / committee website).
- CIS Controls: current version (v8.1 as of Aug 2026; check whether v9 has been released) and its mappings.
- NIST: CSF 2.0, Quick Start Guides and CPRT for updated informative references; current
OSCAL line and its actual support in the target tools.
- SOC 2: whether the AICPA has published new TSC or revision drafts.
If you cannot verify, say so explicitly instead of assuming.
If the web contradicts this document, the web wins — flag the discrepancy.
1---2name: grc-compliance-standards3description: Governance, risk and compliance standards. Use when working with ISO 27001/27002/27005/27701, NIST CSF 2.0, CIS Controls v8.1, SOC 2, NIS2, DORA, ENS/CCN-STIC, Statement of Applicability, risk registers, control-to-evidence mapping, OSCAL, audit preparation, vendor questionnaires (SIG, CAIQ), or the regulatory notification clock after a breach — who must be told, within how many hours, and what evidence the filing needs.4metadata:5 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/serialexperimentslainnnn/grc-compliance-standards6---78# Governance, risk and compliance (GRC) standards910Criteria verified as of **August 2026**. Re-verify on the web before committing to anything (§8).1112## 1. Scope and triggers1314Applies when designing, implementing, auditing or reviewing:15- **ISMS** ISO/IEC 27001:2022: scope, clauses 4-10, Annex A, **Statement of Applicability (SoA)**.16- **Risk management**: methodology, scales, risk register, treatment, **formal acceptance**17 and exceptions with an expiry date.18- **Frameworks and regulation**: NIST CSF 2.0, CIS Controls v8.1, SOC 2, ENS (RD 311/2022), NIS2, DORA,19 CRA, ISO 27701/42001 — scope, obligations and deadlines.20- **Evidence and continuous compliance**: automatable control→evidence mapping, OSCAL, retention21 policy, internal and external audit preparation.22- **Third-party risk (TPRM)**: supplier tiering, SIG/CAIQ/CSA STAR, contractual clauses,23 DORA register of information.24- **Document hierarchy**: policy, standards, procedures, records; owners and cadences.2526**Not applicable**: see vulnerability-management-standards (for CVE/CVSS/EPSS/KEV triage, patching27SLAs and VEX — here only the **formal acceptance** of residual risk), appsec-standards (for threat28modelling and OWASP/ASVS), sre-practice-standards (for SLOs, on-call and postmortems),29identity-access-management-standards (for technical IAM), cicd-standards, iac-standards,30kubernetes-standards, onprem-standards and the cloud skills (for the **concrete controls**: the31framework, the risk and the evidence live here, not the implementation). **Engineering** GDPR (DPIA32as a technical artifact, minimisation in the schema, retention implemented as deletion, data subject33rights as functionality, transfers by design, PII in telemetry) belongs to34`privacy-engineering-standards`: here only the **management** part (ISO 27701 as a PIMS, RoPA as a35register, risk acceptance, audit evidence). Continuity: the **management system** (ISO 22301,36policy, scope, audit) belongs here; the **plan and its engineering** (BIA, RTO/RPO, recovery order,37DR exercises) belongs to `bcdr-standards`. Incident handling and the technical investigation belong38to `incident-management-standards` and `incident-response-forensics-standards`; the authorised39offensive exercise, to `offensive-security-standards`. `enterprise-architecture-standards` (**the40control framework, the risk register and the audit evidence belong here**; **the application41inventory with its owner, criticality and lifecycle is theirs** — and it is the source that feeds42the scope of almost every control. A control whose scope cannot be enumerated is not auditable),43`opensource-licensing-standards` (the corporate regulatory obligation and its evidence belong here;44**the licence policy, the gate and the exception process are theirs**),45`govtech-eidas-standards` (**reciprocal, already declared from their side**: the **eIDAS regime** —46advanced versus qualified signature, qualified provider and trust lists, timestamping, AdES47and long-term preservation, electronic case file — and the obligations of Spanish administrative48procedure are **theirs**; **the ENS as a management framework** — Statement of49Applicability, categorisation, certification audit, risk register and the relationship with the50CCN — belongs here. Rule: *if the question is what legal value what you sign has, it is theirs; if it is51which control it evidences and with what evidence, it is ours*),52`accessibility-standards` (boundary with a real legal53obligation: **the applicable regulatory framework, the evidence register and the management of54sanction risk belong here**; **the accessibility statement — its content, its testing and55who signs it — is theirs** (§6.1), and this document only requires it as evidence — European Accessibility Act, EN 301 549, Ley 11/2023 and its56implementing rules, ADA Title II —; **the technical conformance criteria** — which WCAG criterion is met,57how it is tested and what automates it — **are theirs**. Warning both share: **a new version of58WCAG or of EN 301 549 does not by itself change the legal obligation**, which is anchored to the standard cited59in the law).6061## 2. Default decisions6263> Verify the latest version on the web before pinning it in a real project (§8).6465| Situation | Default | Justifiable alternative / Forbidden |66|---|---|---|67| Certifiable ISMS | **ISO/IEC 27001:2022** + Annex A (93 controls: 37 organisational, 8 people, 14 physical, 34 technological) with **27002:2022** implementation guidance | The transition from 27001:2013 closed on **31 Oct 2025**: a 2013 certificate is invalid and requires full recertification (Stage 1+2), not transition |68| Governance language and communication with the board | **NIST CSF 2.0** (CSWP 29, Feb 2024): GOVERN/IDENTIFY/PROTECT/DETECT/RESPOND/RECOVER functions, 106 subcategories, current/target Profiles | Using the **Tiers 1-4** as a maturity scale (they measure risk management, not maturity) |69| Prioritised technical baseline | **CIS Controls v8.1** (Jun 2024): 18 controls, 153 safeguards, **IG1 = 56** as a non-negotiable minimum | Starting at IG3 "because we are serious"; there is no v9 published as of Aug 2026 |70| Risk methodology | **ISO/IEC 27005:2022** with a **combined** approach: event-based (strategic scenarios) for the map, asset-based for the detail | Assets only (produces inventories, not decisions); events only (does not land controls) |71| Risk in the Spanish public sector | **MAGERIT v3** + the CCN's **PILAR** tool (free for the public sector and its suppliers) | The v3 catalogue (2012) does not name cloud/SaaS/containers/AI: reinterpret and document the equivalence |72| Quantification for investment decisions | Qualitative 5×5 with written criteria by default; **FAIR** when control cost has to be compared against expected loss | Colour matrices with no scale definition (made-up numbers with the appearance of rigour) |73| Assurance for customers (US/SaaS market) | **SOC 2 Type II**, TSP section 100 (TSC 2017 with 2022 *revised points of focus*), Security mandatory + categories according to commitments | Type I as a substitute for Type II; treating the *points of focus* as auditable requirements (TSP 100.07: they are not) |74| Spanish public sector and its suppliers | **ENS, RD 311/2022**: BÁSICA/MEDIA/ALTA category from risk analysis; **Perfiles de Cumplimiento Específicos** approved by the CCN (art. 30) where one exists for the sector | Certifying MEDIA/ALTA category without an accredited body (básica allows a declaration; media/alta require certification) |75| Privacy as a management system | **ISO/IEC 27701:2025** (14 Oct 2025): **standalone** PIMS, no longer an extension of 27001; harmonised structure 4-10; unified Annex A (A.1/A.2/A.3) | 27701:2019 certificates: transition until **Oct 2028** |76| AI systems | **ISO/IEC 42001** as an AIMS; integrate it with the ISMS, do not duplicate it | Handling AI risk outside the corporate risk register |77| Evidence interchange format | **OSCAL** (NIST, 1.1.x line) when the consumer supports it — FedRAMP requires machine-readable packages from **30 Sep 2026** | Requiring OSCAL from tools that only support it in name: test import/export first |7879**Regulation with dates (status Aug 2026, verify §8):**80- **DORA** (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554): applicable since **17 Jan 2025**. The ESAs designated the81 first **19 critical ICT providers (CTPPs)** on **18 Nov 2025** (hyperscalers and large SaaS),82 under direct oversight with periodic penalty payments of up to 1% of average daily worldwide turnover.83 As a regulation, it **applies directly**: it does not depend on transposition.84- **NIS2** (Directive (EU) 2022/2555): transposition deadline expired on **17 Oct 2024**. Spain85 **still has not transposed** it as of Aug 2026: the draft *Ley de Coordinación y Gobernanza de la86 Ciberseguridad* (Council of Ministers, 14 Jan 2025) is still in progress; the Commission issued a87 reasoned opinion on 7 May 2025 and a second request on **19 May 2026** (INFR(2024)0270).88 RDL 7/2025 partially transposed it for the electricity sector. Art. 23: early warning **24 h**,89 notification **72 h**, final report **1 month**. Art. 34: minimum fines of **€10M or 2%** of90 worldwide turnover (essential) and **€7M or 1.4%** (important) — these are **floors**, Member States91 may raise them. Art. 20: approval and **mandatory training of the management body**, with92 personal liability and possible temporary disqualification.93- **CRA** (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847): reporting obligations from **11 Sep 2026** (early warning94 24 h, notification 72 h, final report 14 days/1 month, via the *Single Reporting Platform*); full95 application on **11 Dec 2027**. It covers a product already on the market if it remains available after Sep 2026.9697## 3. Structure and conventions9899**Document hierarchy (4 levels, no more):**100`Security policy` (1 document, approved by the board, the "what" and the "who is accountable") →101`Standards` per domain (the "what must be complied with", measurable) → `Procedures` (the "how", with an102operational owner) → `Records/evidence` (the proof). Every document: named owner, version, approval103date, approver and **next review date**. A document without an owner is dead.104105**Source of truth = internal control catalogue, not the frameworks.** Every control has its own stable106`ID`; the frameworks are **views** that point to it. The other way round (one file per standard) duplicates107the work and they contradict each other. Versioned in git, reviewable by PR:108109```yaml110# controls/CTRL-014.yaml — one control, N frameworks, N pieces of evidence111id: CTRL-014112nombre: Review and approval of production changes113dueño: jefatura-plataforma # accountable for it OPERATING114frecuencia: continua115implementacion: "Mandatory PR + 1 approval other than the author + green CI"116mapeos: # one piece of evidence serves several standards117 iso27001_2022: [A.8.32]118 nist_csf_2_0: [PR.PS-06]119 cis_v8_1: ["4.1"]120 soc2_tsc: [CC8.1]121 ens_rd311: [op.exp.5]122evidencia:123 tipo: automatizada # automatizada | manual — the % is measured124 fuente: "Forge API: PRs merged without approval in the period"125 consulta: "scripts/evidence/prs_sin_aprobacion.py"126 periodicidad: mensual127 retencion: 24m128prueba_eficacia: "Sample over the full period; 0 unjustified exceptions"129```130131**Risk register — mandatory fields** (if one is missing, the risk is not managed):132ID · scenario in *source → event → consequence* format (not "a hack") · affected process/asset ·133**risk owner** (business, named, with authority to accept; different from the control owner) ·134likelihood and impact on the defined scale · **inherent** risk · existing controls ·135**residual** risk · decision (mitigate/transfer/avoid/**accept**) · plan with an owner and a136date · next review date · link to the evidence.137138**SoA — the document auditors look at most.** The 93 Annex A controls, each with:139applicable yes/no, **explicit justification** for inclusion *and* for exclusion, implementation status,140reference to the internal control (`CTRL-xxx`) and to the evidence. It is updated on **every material change**141to the scope or to the risks, not once a year before the audit.142143**Exceptions and risk acceptance:** a single form with the associated risk, compensating controls,144**mandatory expiry date (max. 12 months)**, approver according to the risk level (written authority145matrix: who may accept what) and review on expiry. An exception with no date is an undocumented146architecture decision.147148## 4. Quality gates and continuous compliance149150In increasing order of cost; the first three are automatic and break the pipeline:1511. **Policy as code in CI**: OPA/Conftest, Kyverno or equivalent over IaC and manifests; IaC and152 image scanning, SBOM and **secret scanning**. A critical finding breaks the build — and **the signed,153 timestamped output of the gate IS the evidence**, not a screenshot taken afterwards.1542. **Scheduled evidence collection**: every control with `evidencia.tipo: automatizada` generates155 its artifact at its frequency, with a timestamp, traceable origin and verifiable integrity (hash),156 in storage with retention and **restricted access**.1573. **Coverage dashboard**: controls with no evidence within their window = open finding, just like a158 broken test. Without a dashboard, "we comply" is an opinion.1594. **Internal audit** (clause 9.3 and annual programme): planned **by risk**, not by160 checklist; findings with root cause, plan, owner and date; follow-up until verified closure.1615. **External audit / SOC 2 Type II**: requires evidence **throughout the whole observation162 period** and auditor sampling. A bulk collection the week before is a finding, not163 preparation.164165**Design vs. operation**: proving that the control *exists* (design effectiveness) does not prove that it166*works* (operating effectiveness). For each control, define in advance what sample and what167deviation threshold count as a failure.168169## 5. Security of the compliance programme170171- **Evidence is sensitive data**: minimise it (redact secrets, credentials, PII, internal IPs if172 they add nothing), control access to the evidence repository, encrypt it and define retention. A173 badly protected evidence repository is a map of the organisation for an attacker.174- **Segregation of duties**: whoever operates a control does not approve their own evidence; internal175 audit with real independence from the audited function.176- **Third parties (TPRM)**: tiering by criticality and by data access, with a differentiated cadence177 (critical: full annual review + continuous monitoring; low risk: 24-36 months).178 **CAIQ** questionnaires (CSA, aligned with CCM; STAR Level 1 self-assessment, Level 2 attestation)179 for SaaS/cloud and **SIG** (Shared Assessments, ~21 domains; SIG Lite for screening) for the rest.180 When you receive a supplier's SOC 2 or ISO: **read the scope, the period and the exceptions** — a181 certificate whose scope you have not read says nothing. Contract with a right to audit, incident182 notification with deadlines **aligned to yours** (if you are held to 24 h, your supplier cannot give you183 72), subprocessors and exit/portability. In financial entities, the DORA **register of information**.184- **Regulatory deadlines live in the incident response plan**, not in a compliance185 document: the NIS2/CRA 24 h clock starts on *becoming aware*, and if personal data is involved it186 runs in parallel with the data protection one.187188## 6. Programme operability189190**Metrics reported to the board** (signal, not vanity):191% of controls with automated evidence · average age of the evidence · open findings192by age and severity · **exceptions in force and expired without review** · risks above193the declared appetite · % of critical suppliers reviewed on time · mean time to close a194finding. The trend matters more than the absolute value.195196**Minimum cadence**: risk register review quarterly (critical) / annual (the rest) ·197management review annually with the clause 9.3 inputs and outputs · internal audit annually ·198SoA on every material change · **quarterly regulatory radar** (§8).199200**Translation between frameworks — the real saving is here.** A single well-defined piece of evidence covers N201standards: the change approval record serves ISO A.8.32, SOC 2 CC8.1, CIS 4.x, ENS op.exp.5 and202CSF PR.PS-06 simultaneously. Keep the mappings in the control catalogue (§3) and use the official203informative references (NIST **CPRT** for CSF 2.0, mappings published by CIS, Annex B of20427002:2022) instead of inventing them. When a mapping is partial, **note it as partial**: an205optimistic mapping is discovered in the audit, not before.206207## 7. Sustainability and prohibitions208209**Lifecycle**: put dated standards transitions in the calendar of the year they are announced210(ISO 27001:2013 → 2022 closed on 31 Oct 2025; 27701:2019 → 2025 closes in Oct 2028). Amd 1:2024 to21127001 requires the determination on climate change in the context to be **recorded**, even if212the conclusion is "not relevant": the auditor asks for it directly.213214**FORBIDDEN**215- ❌ **Compliance theatre**: template policies never adapted, procedures nobody216 executes, described controls that do not exist. It is document fraud with pretty formatting.217- ❌ An SoA with everything marked "applicable", or exclusions with no written justification.218- ❌ Risks with no named owner, or with the control owner as the risk owner.219- ❌ **Verbal risk acceptance**, by stray email, or signed by someone without authority under220 the matrix. Without a signature with name, date and expiry, the risk is not accepted: it is ignored.221- ❌ Perpetual exceptions, or ones renewed automatically without re-assessing the risk.222- ❌ Fabricated, backdated evidence, or evidence collected only before the audit; a screenshot as the only223 evidence of a control the tool can export via API.224- ❌ Certifying an artificially trimmed scope so it comes out cheap and selling it as full225 coverage of the organisation.226- ❌ Confusing the CSF 2.0 **Tiers** with maturity levels, or the SOC 2 *points of focus* with227 mandatory requirements.228- ❌ Delegating the NIS2 **management body responsibility** (art. 20) to a supplier: it is non-delegable.229- ❌ Assuming that "since Spain has not transposed NIS2, there is nothing to do": DORA and the CRA are230 directly applicable regulations, contracts and customers already require NIS2, and the law will arrive with231 short registration deadlines.232- ❌ Sending questionnaires to suppliers and reading neither the answers nor the attached evidence.233- ❌ One control file per framework (guaranteed duplication and contradictions within a year).234- ❌ Closing a finding without verifying the fix or recording the root cause.235236## 8. Mandatory web verification237238Before pinning any concrete fact, **search for it — do not recall it**. European regulation239moves by quarters:240- **NIS2 in Spain**: whether the *Ley de Coordinación y Gobernanza de la Ciberseguridad* has been published241 in the BOE, its registration deadlines, the split of competent authorities and the final penalties242 (BOE + status of file INFR(2024)0270).243- **DORA**: RTS/ITS adopted and in force, and the updated list of **CTPPs** designated by the ESAs.244- **ENS**: whether RD 311/2022 is still in force unamended, and the **Perfil de Cumplimiento Específico**245 and the **CCN-STIC** guides applicable to the exact sector before sizing measures.246- **CRA**: Commission guidance and the status of the *Single Reporting Platform* before 11 Sep 2026.247- **ISO**: current edition and transition period of 27001/27002/27005/27701/42001, and whether there is a248 revision under way (ISO Online Browsing Platform / committee website).249- **CIS Controls**: current version (v8.1 as of Aug 2026; check whether v9 has been released) and its mappings.250- **NIST**: CSF 2.0, Quick Start Guides and **CPRT** for updated informative references; current251 **OSCAL** line and its actual support in the target tools.252- **SOC 2**: whether the AICPA has published new TSC or revision drafts.253254If you cannot verify, say so explicitly instead of assuming.255If the web contradicts this document, **the web wins** — flag the discrepancy.