Mail server standards — the decision weighs more than the configuration
Criteria verified as of August 2026. Re-verify on the web before committing to anything (§8).
1. Scope and triggers
Applies to deciding, building and operating your own mail: the prior choice between a managed
relay and a full server, MTA, MDA/store, filtering, protocols and ports, TLS, storage and quotas,
high availability, outbound reputation and mailbox migration.
Triggers: main.cf, master.cf, postconf, postqueue/mailq, exim.conf, dovecot.conf,
doveadm, dsync, rspamd.conf, local.d, sieve, imapsync, mailcow, Mailu, iRedMail,
Stalwart, "open relay", "port 25 blocked", "587", "465", "Maildir", "mdbox", "mailbox
quota", "deferred queue", "backscatter", "secondary MX", "listed on a blocklist".
The premise that overrides everything else: running your own mail in 2026 almost never ends
well, and the reason is not technical but deliverability reputation. Postfix and Dovecot can be
configured in an afternoon; what cannot be solved in an afternoon is getting your mail into someone
else's inbox. The three parts of the wall, verified: (1) the cloud provider blocks your outbound
port 25 —Azure blocks it except on Enterprise Agreement/MCA-E subscriptions and recommends an
authenticated relay on 587; Google Cloud blocks it "due to the risk of abuse" and its Workspace
relay only accepts 465 or 587—, so your IP range is born suspicious; (2) the large receivers set
hard requirements for anyone sending volume: since 1 Feb 2024 Gmail requires anyone sending
more than 5,000 messages/day to have DMARC, valid forward and reverse DNS (PTR), TLS in
transport, a spam rate below 0.30 % and one-click unsubscribe (RFC 8058) in marketing mail
—Yahoo aligned on almost identical requirements and the one-click deadline was 1 Jun 2024—;
Microsoft announced theirs on 2 Apr 2025 and started enforcing on 5 May 2025 on
Outlook.com/Hotmail/Live for domains sending more than 5,000 messages/day, initially diverting to
Junk; (3) building reputation takes months and is destroyed in hours. With that on the table,
the right question is not "which MTA do I use?" but "why not a managed relay?".
Not applicable: the catalogue split: email-security-standards owns SPF, DKIM,
DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, antiphishing filtering, BEC and mail policy; here only
the server that implements them (where the key lives, what it signs and what it verifies), and not
a single record is duplicated; dns-standards owns the records —MX, PTR, TXT and their operation—,
cryptography-pki-standards the algorithm choice and the certificate, identity-access-management-standards
the account, MFA and session revocation, and firewall-policy-standards with networking-standards
filtering and egress. Towards operation: backup-recovery-standards owns mailbox backup and
restore, bcdr-standards the RTO/RPO, ha-clustering-standards the cluster,
observability-standards metrics and dashboards, incident-management-standards and
incident-response-forensics-standards the incident and the forensics of a compromised mailbox,
vulnerability-management-standards the CVE, privacy-engineering-standards personal data in
logs and mailboxes, and grc-compliance-standards legal retention. The system underneath belongs to
linux-administration-standards, rhel-fedora-standards and linux-hardening-standards;
kubernetes-standards if it runs in a container, iac-standards/cicd-standards how the
configuration gets there, and onprem-standards is the umbrella (homelab-standards for the lab). Its
sisters in this batch: web-app-servers-standards owns webmail and the panels (SOGo, Roundcube,
iRedAdmin are web applications, not mail) and file-servers-standards is another service.
2. The prior decision, and only then the components
| Situation |
Decision |
| General corporate mail, no sovereignty requirement |
Managed mailboxes (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, a European provider). This is not surrender: it is not spending the budget on reputation |
| Application sending notifications, invoices or alerts |
Managed outbound SMTP relay (authenticated on 587). Your application does not need its own MTA, it needs to deliver |
| Legal or contractual requirement that the data must not leave, or volume that makes the relay unaffordable |
Full self-hosted server, with an explicit budget for operation, reputation monitoring and on-call |
| Own mailboxes but unreliable delivery |
Hybrid: own reception and store, outbound via a managed relay. The most underrated option in this domain |
| Lab, learning, a domain with no traffic |
Self-hosted server, accepting that delivery to the big receivers will be erratic |
Honest criteria: data sovereignty, cost at high volume and a legal requirement justify the
self-hosted server. "Saving money", "control" and "I do not trust the cloud" do not on their own justify the
real cost: on-call, patching, blocklist monitoring and responding to a compromised account.
3. Components, versions and licences
Verify the latest version on the web before pinning it in a real project (§8).
| Component |
Recommended |
Verified data |
| MTA |
Postfix |
3.11.5 (6 Jul 2026); legacy branches maintained (3.10.x, 3.9.x, 3.8.x) and occasional patches even for 3.5–3.7. Dual licence: LICENSE literally says "dual-licensed under both the Eclipse Public License version 2.0 and the IBM Public License version 1.0" — it is neither GPL nor BSD |
| Alternative MTA |
Exim only if you already know it well or your distro ships it (Debian) |
4.99.5, security release. LICENCE (British spelling, not LICENSE) is GPL-2; the tarball's NOTICE declares SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later with an explicit exception for linking with OpenSSL. The GitHub repository is ARCHIVED (last push Dec 2025): the project lives at exim.org and on its own Forgejo, and numbers its advisories as GCVE, not CVE. A 404 on GitHub is not abandonment |
| MDA / store |
Dovecot CE 2.4.x (latest published tarball: 2.4.4) |
2.4.0 was the first major in ~7 years. Official lifecycle, verbatim: "All Dovecot versions before 2.3 are now fully EOL", for 2.3 "we will provide critical security bug fixes" and "Dovecot CE 2.4.x is the current main release". It is not a hot upgrade: the 2.3 configuration is not valid, dovecot_config_version becomes mandatory and there is an official converter at dovecot.org/upgrader/. Mixed licence: MIT in src/lib, src/auth and src/lib-sql; LGPL-2.1 for the rest. The commercial version OX Dovecot Pro is numbered 3.x and has its own end-of-life policy: do not compare numbers |
| Antispam filtering |
Rspamd |
4.1.4 (29 Jul 2026), high tempo. LICENSE.md in raw: Apache-2.0 |
| Alternative filtering |
SpamAssassin only for legacy integration |
Apache-2.0, active repository but latest release 4.0.2 of 27 Aug 2025: slow cadence compared with Rspamd |
| Integrated suite |
mailcow-dockerized if you want a ready-made stack |
GPL-3.0 (LICENSE in raw); date-based versioning (2026-07a); commercial model = optional paid "Stay Awesome License" (support/backing), the product is not cut down |
| Integrated suite |
Mailu for a minimal deployment |
MIT (LICENSE.md in raw); the stable line is still called 2024.06.x and is patched (2024.06.57, 26 Jul 2026): active, but the branch name does not indicate the patch date |
| Integrated suite |
iRedMail for an install on top of the OS |
GPLv3 for the installer; commercial model = proprietary iRedAdmin-Pro with an annual licence (SQL and LDAP editions) plus a separate upgrade contract — the paid panel does not include server support |
| Modern all-in-one server |
Stalwart only with judgement: still on 0.x (v0.16.16, 2 Aug 2026) |
Dual licence: LICENSES/AGPL-3.0-only.txt and LICENSES/LicenseRef-SEL.txt; SELv2 is proprietary and defines Subscription as "paid access to the Software… billed on a monthly or annual basis". AGPL + paid Enterprise edition: verify which feature sits on which side before depending on it |
| Mailbox migration |
imapsync (imapsync-2.314) |
"NO LIMIT PUBLIC LICENSE", its own text: "0 No limits to do anything with this work and this license. 1 GOTO 0". It is not GPL; the author sells binaries and support |
Separation of responsibilities: MTA (receives, queues, delivers), MDA/store (local delivery,
IMAP, quota, Sieve), filter (milter/proxy before accepting) and authentication (identity base).
Keep them separate even if they run on the same machine: the filter never decides final delivery and
the store never talks to the outside.
4. Protocols, ports and TLS
RFCs verified one by one against rfc-editor.org (and several common assumptions are
false):
- SMTP: RFC 5321 — status DRAFT STANDARD, Oct 2008, not obsolete, updated by
RFC 7504. Message format: RFC 5322 (Draft Standard, updated by RFC 6854).
- STARTTLS in SMTP: RFC 3207 (Proposed Standard), updated by RFC 7817 (verification of
TLS server identity in mail protocols).
- Submission: RFC 6409 is an INTERNET STANDARD —not "just Proposed"—, updated by RFC 8314
("Cleartext Considered Obsolete"), itself updated by RFC 8997, which deprecates TLS 1.1
for submission and access.
- IMAP4rev2: RFC 9051 (Proposed Standard, Aug 2021) obsoletes RFC 3501.
- POP3: RFC 1939 is an INTERNET STANDARD and is NOT obsolete. Retiring it is a product
decision, not an IETF one: do it because it has no shared state across devices, because
"download and delete" makes the client the sole holder of the mail and ruins backup, and because
its installed base is the one still most anchored to old authentication. Turn it off by default and
enable it by documented exception.
- JMAP: RFC 8620 (core, Jul 2019, updated by RFC 9404 and RFC 9670) and RFC 8621 (mail,
Aug 2019). Actual status: implemented by Fastmail, Cyrus, Stalwart and Apache James; Dovecot does not
implement it; the mainstream client is only starting now. Criteria: JMAP does not replace IMAP in a
2026 infrastructure decision; watch it, do not bet the design on it.
Ports: 25 only between MTAs (never for clients and never with AUTH in the clear); 587
submission with mandatory STARTTLS and 465 submission with implicit TLS —RFC 8314 pushes towards
implicit—; 143/993 IMAP; 110/995 POP3 if it is still alive. TLS mandatory everywhere: on submission and
access it is not negotiable; between MTAs it is opportunistic by SMTP design, and what hardens it is MTA-STS
or DANE, which belong to email-security-standards. Verify that your server validates the certificate
when the policy requires it, not just that it encrypts.
5. Stack security
- Open relay: the classic failure, and today it is hours until the blocklist. Restrict relaying by
explicit rule, keep
mynetworks at the real minimum, require authentication over TLS for everything
that goes out, and test it from outside after every change.
- Signing and verification: the DKIM private key is a server secret (permissions, rotation,
outside the repository); the server does not sign mail it has not authenticated. The policy —what
to publish, what alignment to require, how to read the reports— belongs to
email-security-standards.
- Rate limits per account and per IP: messages/hour, recipients per message, maximum size and
concurrent connections. Without them there is no defence against the next point.
- The compromised account that turns your server into a spam source is the typical incident, not
the hypothetical one: it is detected by deviation in volume and recipients, not by a complaint. Decide
in advance the automatic cut-off, credential rotation, queue purging and
the notification; and treat automatic forwarding to an external mailbox as a signal (IAM owns it).
- Backscatter: reject the invalid recipient inside the SMTP conversation (5xx on
RCPT TO). Accepting and then bouncing turns you into a spam source towards forged addresses
and ends in a blocklist.
- Authentication: SASL against the identity base, never plaintext password files; no basic
authentication over an unencrypted channel. Lockout on failed attempts and logging of the origin.
- Surface: webmail and the panel are web applications (
web-app-servers-standards +
appsec-standards); the antivirus and the filter run under their own user; the MTA does not execute
content, and everything that decompresses attachments is bounded in time, memory and depth.
- Encryption at rest for the store and encrypted backup: a mailbox is the organisation's largest
concentration of personal data, and the backup replicates all of it.
6. Storage, availability and operation
- Format: Maildir (one file per message) is robust and debuggable, but punishes the
filesystem with millions of small files and makes backup and traversal painfully slow. mdbox
groups messages and performs far better, at the cost of a Dovecot-specific format and maintenance
(
doveadm purge). mbox: forbidden with multi-access. Choose by backup profile, not by taste.
- Quotas mandatory, no exceptions: the mailbox grows until it fills the disk, and a full disk
on a mail server is an immediate service outage. Per-mailbox quota, alert at 80 % of the
volume and a written archiving policy.
- High availability, with the right nuance: a downed server does not lose mail on its own
—the sender queues and retries for days—. Mail is lost when you answer 5xx because of a
half-finished configuration, when you accept and cannot deliver locally, or when the secondary
MX accepts for recipients it cannot validate and then bounces. Rule: a backup MX that does not
share the table of valid recipients is worse than having none. And
Dovecot 2.4 removed the
replicator: if your HA design depended on it, it no longer exists —verify
the supported path before replicating the old design.
- Queue as the primary signal: watch size, age of the oldest message and deferral rate.
A deferred queue growing towards a single domain is a reputation problem; towards all of them, a
network or DNS problem.
- Reputation as a permanent task: PTR matching the HELO and the public name, dedicated
IP, gradual volume warm-up, enrolment in the receiver's tools (Postmaster
Tools, SNDS) and a complaint feedback loop. Blocklist monitoring with alerting, not a
manual lookup when somebody complains.
- Migration between platforms:
imapsync and equivalents work, and the real cost is not the
tool: it is the time per mailbox (hours per gigabyte with source-side rate limits), the special
folders and flags that do not map, the dual-delivery window, the MX change with its
TTL (dns-standards) and reconfiguring every client. Plan incremental passes and a
short final one, never a single pass on cut-over day.
- Logging and personal data: mail logs contain addresses, subjects at some
levels and relationship patterns. Bounded retention, restricted access and a justified level of
detail (
privacy-engineering-standards).
7. Sustainability and prohibitions
Cadence: patch the MTA/MDA outside the window on a remotely exploitable CVE (Exim and Dovecot
have form); a major version jump treated as a project —Dovecot's 2.3→2.4 rewrites the
configuration—; quarterly review of licences and commercial models of the suites, which change.
- ❌ Exposing a mail server without a reputation plan (PTR, warm-up, blocklist
monitoring, receiver tools and someone on call).
- ❌ Running your own mail to "save money" without counting on-call, patching and incident response.
- ❌ Leaving an open relay, or not re-testing the relay from outside after every change.
- ❌ Accepting mail for recipients you cannot validate and bouncing afterwards (backscatter).
- ❌ Standing up a secondary MX that does not share the list of valid recipients.
- ❌ Allowing AUTH without TLS, or leaving POP3/IMAP in the clear "only on the internal network".
- ❌ Leaving POP3 enabled by default with no documented exception.
- ❌ Mailboxes without a quota, or without an alert on volume usage.
- ❌ Using
mbox with concurrent access.
- ❌ Signing with DKIM mail that the server has not authenticated.
- ❌ Storing the DKIM private key in the repository or in the container image.
- ❌ Upgrading Dovecot 2.3 → 2.4 without converting the configuration and without testing in a separate environment.
- ❌ Trusting the commercial edition's version number as if it were the community one's
(Dovecot Pro 3.x versus CE 2.4.x).
- ❌ Writing a project off as abandoned because its GitHub repository is archived (the Exim case).
- ❌ Migrating mailboxes in a single pass on cut-over day, with no prior incremental.
- ❌ Duplicating the SPF/DKIM/DMARC policy here: it belongs to
email-security-standards.
8. Mandatory web verification
- Version and security advisories for Postfix (
postfix.org/announcements.html), Exim
(exim.org, not GitHub; its identifiers are GCVE), Dovecot CE (dovecot.org/releases/)
and Rspamd, before pinning any version.
- Licence in raw, always:
LICENSE/LICENCE/COPYING/LICENSE.md/LICENSES/ and on the
right branch. In this batch: Postfix EPL-2.0 or IPL-1.0; Exim LICENCE GPL-2.0-or-later with
an OpenSSL exception; Dovecot mixed MIT+LGPL-2.1; Rspamd Apache-2.0; mailcow GPL-3.0; Mailu MIT;
iRedMail GPLv3 + proprietary Pro; Stalwart AGPL-3.0-only + SELv2; imapsync its own licence.
- Commercial model of the suites: it changes faster than the code and decides whether you can use them.
- Requirements of the large receivers: re-read Google's, Yahoo's and Microsoft's guidance
before promising delivery. Declared gap: Microsoft's page on high-volume
senders is rendered by JavaScript and could not be read in raw; the dates of 2 Apr 2025 and
5 May 2025 come from a web search that cites it, and the date for moving to outright rejection
was "to be announced": re-verify it on Microsoft's blog.
- Declared gap — DMARC hardening: it is claimed that in 2026 the large receivers would require
p=quarantine/p=reject. I could not confirm this in a primary source: treat it as a rumour
until you see it in the provider's guidance, and consult email-security-standards.
- RFCs one by one at
rfc-editor.org before citing them: check status and the
obsoleted_by / updated_by fields. Common assumptions were already corrected here: 5321 and 5322 are
Draft Standard and are not obsolete, 6409 and 1939 are Internet Standard, and 3501
is obsoleted by 9051.
- JMAP status: which servers and clients actually implement it, and whether Dovecot has
added it. That is the data point that decides whether you stop ignoring it.
- Supported HA path in Dovecot 2.4 after the removal of the
replicator, and the status of the
configuration converter.
If the web contradicts this document, the web wins — flag the discrepancy.
1---2name: mail-servers-standards3description: Running your own mail server — the decision first, the daemons second, because deliverability reputation decides the outcome. Use when working with Postfix (main.cf, master.cf, postconf, postqueue, postfix check, mynetworks, smtpd_relay_restrictions, smtpd_recipient_restrictions, transport and virtual maps, milter_default_action), Exim (exim.conf, exim4.conf.template, exim -bt, routers/transports/ACLs), Dovecot (dovecot.conf, conf.d 10-mail.conf and 10-auth.conf, dovecot_config_version, doveadm, dsync, Maildir, mdbox and sdbox, mail_location, quota plugin, Sieve and managesieve), Rspamd (rspamd.conf, local.d, worker-proxy, greylisting, milter headers) or SpamAssassin, an integrated suite (mailcow-dockerized, Mailu, iRedMail with iRedAdmin-Pro, Stalwart), SMTP and its extensions (RFC 5321, STARTTLS, SMTP AUTH, submission on 587 and implicit TLS on 465, port 25 blocked by the cloud provider), IMAP (RFC 9051) versus POP3 retirement, JMAP, mailbox storage format, quotas and mailbox growth, an open relay or a rate limit, a compromised account turning the server into a spam source, backscatter and a secondary MX that cannot validate recipients, IP and PTR reputation, bulk sender requirements from Gmail, Yahoo and Outlook, choosing between a managed outbound relay and a full self-hosted server, or migrating mailboxes between platforms with imapsync.4metadata:5 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/serialexperimentslainnnn/mail-servers-standards6---78# Mail server standards — the decision weighs more than the configuration910Criteria verified as of **August 2026**. Re-verify on the web before committing to anything (§8).1112## 1. Scope and triggers1314Applies to **deciding, building and operating** your own mail: the prior choice between a managed15relay and a full server, MTA, MDA/store, filtering, protocols and ports, TLS, storage and quotas,16high availability, outbound reputation and mailbox migration.1718Triggers: `main.cf`, `master.cf`, `postconf`, `postqueue`/`mailq`, `exim.conf`, `dovecot.conf`,19`doveadm`, `dsync`, `rspamd.conf`, `local.d`, `sieve`, `imapsync`, `mailcow`, `Mailu`, `iRedMail`,20`Stalwart`, "open relay", "port 25 blocked", "587", "465", "Maildir", "mdbox", "mailbox21quota", "deferred queue", "backscatter", "secondary MX", "listed on a blocklist".2223**The premise that overrides everything else**: **running your own mail in 2026 almost never ends24well, and the reason is not technical but deliverability reputation.** Postfix and Dovecot can be25configured in an afternoon; what cannot be solved in an afternoon is getting your mail into someone26else's inbox. The three parts of the wall, verified: (1) **the cloud provider blocks your outbound27port 25** —Azure blocks it except on Enterprise Agreement/MCA-E subscriptions and recommends an28authenticated relay on 587; Google Cloud blocks it "due to the risk of abuse" and its Workspace29relay only accepts 465 or 587—, so your IP range is born suspicious; (2) **the large receivers set30hard requirements for anyone sending volume**: since **1 Feb 2024** Gmail requires anyone sending31more than **5,000 messages/day** to have DMARC, valid forward and reverse DNS (PTR), TLS in32transport, a spam rate **below 0.30 %** and **one-click unsubscribe** (RFC 8058) in marketing mail33—Yahoo aligned on almost identical requirements and the one-click deadline was **1 Jun 2024**—;34Microsoft announced theirs on **2 Apr 2025** and started enforcing on **5 May 2025** on35Outlook.com/Hotmail/Live for domains sending more than 5,000 messages/day, initially diverting to36Junk; (3) **building reputation takes months and is destroyed in hours**. With that on the table,37the right question is not "which MTA do I use?" but "**why not a managed relay?**".3839**Not applicable**: the catalogue split: **`email-security-standards` owns SPF, DKIM,40DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, antiphishing filtering, BEC and mail policy**; here only41**the server that implements them** (where the key lives, what it signs and what it verifies), and **not42a single record is duplicated**; **`dns-standards` owns the records** —MX, PTR, TXT and their operation—,43`cryptography-pki-standards` the algorithm choice and the certificate, `identity-access-management-standards`44the account, MFA and session revocation, and `firewall-policy-standards` with `networking-standards`45filtering and egress. Towards operation: `backup-recovery-standards` owns mailbox backup and46restore, `bcdr-standards` the RTO/RPO, `ha-clustering-standards` the cluster,47`observability-standards` metrics and dashboards, `incident-management-standards` and48`incident-response-forensics-standards` the incident and the forensics of a compromised mailbox,49`vulnerability-management-standards` the CVE, `privacy-engineering-standards` personal data in50logs and mailboxes, and `grc-compliance-standards` legal retention. The system underneath belongs to51`linux-administration-standards`, `rhel-fedora-standards` and `linux-hardening-standards`;52`kubernetes-standards` if it runs in a container, `iac-standards`/`cicd-standards` how the53configuration gets there, and `onprem-standards` is the umbrella (`homelab-standards` for the lab). Its54sisters in this batch: **`web-app-servers-standards` owns webmail and the panels** (SOGo, Roundcube,55iRedAdmin are web applications, not mail) and `file-servers-standards` is another service.5657## 2. The prior decision, and only then the components5859| Situation | Decision |60|---|---|61| General corporate mail, no sovereignty requirement | **Managed mailboxes** (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, a European provider). This is not surrender: it is not spending the budget on reputation |62| Application sending notifications, invoices or alerts | **Managed outbound SMTP relay** (authenticated on 587). Your application does not need its own MTA, it needs to deliver |63| Legal or contractual requirement that the data must not leave, or volume that makes the relay unaffordable | **Full self-hosted server**, with an explicit budget for operation, reputation monitoring and on-call |64| Own mailboxes but unreliable delivery | **Hybrid**: own reception and store, **outbound via a managed relay**. The most underrated option in this domain |65| Lab, learning, a domain with no traffic | Self-hosted server, accepting that delivery to the big receivers will be erratic |6667**Honest criteria**: data sovereignty, cost at high volume and a legal requirement justify the68self-hosted server. "Saving money", "control" and "I do not trust the cloud" do **not** on their own justify the69real cost: on-call, patching, blocklist monitoring and responding to a compromised account.7071## 3. Components, versions and licences7273> Verify the latest version on the web before pinning it in a real project (§8).7475| Component | Recommended | Verified data |76|---|---|---|77| MTA | **Postfix** | `3.11.5` (6 Jul 2026); legacy branches maintained (3.10.x, 3.9.x, 3.8.x) and occasional patches even for 3.5–3.7. **Dual licence**: `LICENSE` literally says *"dual-licensed under both the Eclipse Public License version 2.0 and the IBM Public License version 1.0"* — **it is neither GPL nor BSD** |78| Alternative MTA | **Exim** only if you already know it well or your distro ships it (Debian) | `4.99.5`, security release. **`LICENCE`** (British spelling, not `LICENSE`) is GPL-2; the tarball's `NOTICE` declares `SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later` with an explicit exception for linking with OpenSSL. **The GitHub repository is ARCHIVED** (last push Dec 2025): the project lives at `exim.org` and on its own Forgejo, and numbers its advisories as **GCVE**, not CVE. A 404 on GitHub is not abandonment |79| MDA / store | **Dovecot CE 2.4.x** (latest published tarball: `2.4.4`) | `2.4.0` was the first major in ~7 years. **Official lifecycle, verbatim**: *"All Dovecot versions before 2.3 are now fully EOL"*, for 2.3 *"we will provide critical security bug fixes"* and *"Dovecot CE 2.4.x is the current main release"*. **It is not a hot upgrade**: the 2.3 configuration is not valid, `dovecot_config_version` becomes mandatory and there is an official converter at `dovecot.org/upgrader/`. **Mixed licence**: MIT in `src/lib`, `src/auth` and `src/lib-sql`; **LGPL-2.1 for the rest**. The commercial version **OX Dovecot Pro is numbered 3.x** and has its own end-of-life policy: do not compare numbers |80| Antispam filtering | **Rspamd** | `4.1.4` (29 Jul 2026), high tempo. `LICENSE.md` in raw: **Apache-2.0** |81| Alternative filtering | **SpamAssassin** only for legacy integration | Apache-2.0, active repository but **latest release `4.0.2` of 27 Aug 2025**: slow cadence compared with Rspamd |82| Integrated suite | **mailcow-dockerized** if you want a ready-made stack | **GPL-3.0** (`LICENSE` in raw); date-based versioning (`2026-07a`); commercial model = optional paid **"Stay Awesome License"** (support/backing), the product is not cut down |83| Integrated suite | **Mailu** for a minimal deployment | **MIT** (`LICENSE.md` in raw); the stable line is still called **`2024.06.x`** and is patched (`2024.06.57`, 26 Jul 2026): active, but **the branch name does not indicate the patch date** |84| Integrated suite | **iRedMail** for an install on top of the OS | **GPLv3** for the installer; commercial model = **proprietary iRedAdmin-Pro** with an annual licence (SQL and LDAP editions) **plus** a separate upgrade contract — the paid panel **does not include server support** |85| Modern all-in-one server | **Stalwart** only with judgement: **still on `0.x`** (`v0.16.16`, 2 Aug 2026) | **Dual licence**: `LICENSES/AGPL-3.0-only.txt` and `LICENSES/LicenseRef-SEL.txt`; SELv2 is proprietary and defines *Subscription* as *"paid access to the Software… billed on a monthly or annual basis"*. **AGPL + paid Enterprise edition**: verify which feature sits on which side before depending on it |86| Mailbox migration | **imapsync** (`imapsync-2.314`) | **"NO LIMIT PUBLIC LICENSE"**, its own text: *"0 No limits to do anything with this work and this license. 1 GOTO 0"*. **It is not GPL**; the author sells binaries and support |8788**Separation of responsibilities**: MTA (receives, queues, delivers), MDA/store (local delivery,89IMAP, quota, Sieve), filter (milter/proxy before accepting) and authentication (identity base).90Keep them separate even if they run on the same machine: **the filter never decides final delivery and91the store never talks to the outside**.9293## 4. Protocols, ports and TLS9495**RFCs verified one by one against `rfc-editor.org`** (and several common assumptions are96false):9798- **SMTP: RFC 5321** — status **DRAFT STANDARD**, Oct 2008, **not obsolete**, updated by99 RFC 7504. Message format: **RFC 5322** (Draft Standard, updated by RFC 6854).100- **STARTTLS in SMTP: RFC 3207** (Proposed Standard), updated by RFC 7817 (verification of101 TLS server identity in mail protocols).102- **Submission: RFC 6409 is an INTERNET STANDARD** —not "just Proposed"—, updated by **RFC 8314**103 (*"Cleartext Considered Obsolete"*), itself updated by **RFC 8997**, which **deprecates TLS 1.1**104 for submission and access.105- **IMAP4rev2: RFC 9051** (Proposed Standard, Aug 2021) **obsoletes RFC 3501**.106- **POP3: RFC 1939 is an INTERNET STANDARD and is NOT obsolete.** Retiring it is a **product107 decision, not an IETF one**: do it because it has no shared state across devices, because108 "download and delete" makes the client the sole holder of the mail and ruins backup, and because109 its installed base is the one still most anchored to old authentication. **Turn it off by default and110 enable it by documented exception.**111- **JMAP: RFC 8620** (core, Jul 2019, updated by RFC 9404 and RFC 9670) and **RFC 8621** (mail,112 Aug 2019). Actual status: implemented by Fastmail, Cyrus, Stalwart and Apache James; **Dovecot does not113 implement it**; the mainstream client is only starting now. **Criteria: JMAP does not replace IMAP in a114 2026 infrastructure decision**; watch it, do not bet the design on it.115116**Ports**: 25 only between MTAs (never for clients and **never with AUTH in the clear**); **587**117submission with mandatory STARTTLS and **465** submission with implicit TLS —RFC 8314 pushes towards118implicit—; 143/993 IMAP; 110/995 POP3 if it is still alive. **TLS mandatory everywhere**: on submission and119access it is not negotiable; between MTAs it is opportunistic by SMTP design, and **what hardens it is MTA-STS120or DANE, which belong to `email-security-standards`**. Verify that your server **validates** the certificate121when the policy requires it, not just that it encrypts.122123## 5. Stack security124125- **Open relay**: the classic failure, and today it is hours until the blocklist. Restrict relaying by126 explicit rule, keep `mynetworks` at the real minimum, **require authentication over TLS** for everything127 that goes out, and **test it from outside** after every change.128- **Signing and verification**: the DKIM private key is a server secret (permissions, rotation,129 outside the repository); the server **does not sign mail it has not authenticated**. **The policy —what130 to publish, what alignment to require, how to read the reports— belongs to `email-security-standards`.**131- **Rate limits per account and per IP**: messages/hour, recipients per message, maximum size and132 concurrent connections. Without them there is no defence against the next point.133- **The compromised account that turns your server into a spam source** is the typical incident, not134 the hypothetical one: it is detected by deviation in volume and recipients, not by a complaint. Decide135 in advance the automatic cut-off, credential rotation, **queue purging** and136 the notification; and treat automatic forwarding to an external mailbox as a signal (IAM owns it).137- **Backscatter**: reject the invalid recipient **inside the SMTP conversation** (5xx on138 `RCPT TO`). Accepting and then bouncing turns you into a spam source towards forged addresses139 and ends in a blocklist.140- **Authentication**: SASL against the identity base, never plaintext password files; no basic141 authentication over an unencrypted channel. Lockout on failed attempts and logging of the origin.142- **Surface**: webmail and the panel are web applications (`web-app-servers-standards` +143 `appsec-standards`); the antivirus and the filter run under their own user; **the MTA does not execute144 content**, and everything that decompresses attachments is bounded in time, memory and depth.145- **Encryption at rest for the store and encrypted backup**: a mailbox is the organisation's largest146 concentration of personal data, and the backup replicates all of it.147148## 6. Storage, availability and operation149150- **Format**: **Maildir** (one file per message) is robust and debuggable, but punishes the151 filesystem with millions of small files and makes backup and traversal painfully slow. **mdbox**152 groups messages and performs far better, at the cost of a Dovecot-specific format and maintenance153 (`doveadm purge`). **mbox: forbidden** with multi-access. Choose by backup profile, not by taste.154- **Quotas mandatory, no exceptions**: the mailbox grows until it fills the disk, and **a full disk155 on a mail server is an immediate service outage**. Per-mailbox quota, alert at 80 % of the156 volume and a written archiving policy.157- **High availability, with the right nuance**: a downed server **does not lose mail on its own**158 —the sender queues and retries for days—. Mail is lost when you answer 5xx because of a159 half-finished configuration, when you accept and cannot deliver locally, or when the **secondary160 MX accepts for recipients it cannot validate** and then bounces. Rule: **a backup MX that does not161 share the table of valid recipients is worse than having none.** And162 **Dovecot 2.4 removed the `replicator`**: if your HA design depended on it, it no longer exists —verify163 the supported path before replicating the old design.164- **Queue as the primary signal**: watch size, age of the oldest message and deferral rate.165 A deferred queue growing towards a single domain is a reputation problem; towards all of them, a166 network or DNS problem.167- **Reputation as a permanent task**: PTR matching the HELO and the public name, dedicated168 IP, gradual volume warm-up, enrolment in the receiver's tools (Postmaster169 Tools, SNDS) and a complaint feedback loop. **Blocklist monitoring with alerting**, not a170 manual lookup when somebody complains.171- **Migration between platforms**: `imapsync` and equivalents work, and the real cost **is not the172 tool**: it is the time per mailbox (hours per gigabyte with source-side rate limits), the special173 folders and flags that do not map, the dual-delivery window, the MX change with its174 TTL (`dns-standards`) and reconfiguring every client. Plan incremental passes and a175 short final one, never a single pass on cut-over day.176- **Logging and personal data**: mail logs contain addresses, subjects at some177 levels and relationship patterns. Bounded retention, restricted access and a justified level of178 detail (`privacy-engineering-standards`).179180## 7. Sustainability and prohibitions181182Cadence: patch the MTA/MDA **outside the window** on a remotely exploitable CVE (Exim and Dovecot183have form); a major version jump treated as a project —Dovecot's 2.3→2.4 **rewrites the184configuration**—; quarterly review of licences and commercial models of the suites, which change.185186- ❌ Exposing a mail server without a **reputation plan** (PTR, warm-up, blocklist187 monitoring, receiver tools and someone on call).188- ❌ Running your own mail to "save money" without counting on-call, patching and incident response.189- ❌ Leaving an open relay, or not re-testing the relay from outside after every change.190- ❌ Accepting mail for recipients you cannot validate and bouncing afterwards (backscatter).191- ❌ Standing up a secondary MX that does not share the list of valid recipients.192- ❌ Allowing AUTH without TLS, or leaving POP3/IMAP in the clear "only on the internal network".193- ❌ Leaving POP3 enabled by default with no documented exception.194- ❌ Mailboxes without a quota, or without an alert on volume usage.195- ❌ Using `mbox` with concurrent access.196- ❌ Signing with DKIM mail that the server has not authenticated.197- ❌ Storing the DKIM private key in the repository or in the container image.198- ❌ Upgrading Dovecot 2.3 → 2.4 without converting the configuration and without testing in a separate environment.199- ❌ Trusting the commercial edition's version number as if it were the community one's200 (Dovecot Pro 3.x versus CE 2.4.x).201- ❌ Writing a project off as abandoned because its GitHub repository is archived (the Exim case).202- ❌ Migrating mailboxes in a single pass on cut-over day, with no prior incremental.203- ❌ Duplicating the SPF/DKIM/DMARC policy here: it belongs to `email-security-standards`.204205## 8. Mandatory web verification2062071. **Version and security advisories** for Postfix (`postfix.org/announcements.html`), Exim208 (**`exim.org`, not GitHub**; its identifiers are **GCVE**), Dovecot CE (`dovecot.org/releases/`)209 and Rspamd, before pinning any version.2102. **Licence in raw, always**: `LICENSE`/`LICENCE`/`COPYING`/`LICENSE.md`/`LICENSES/` and on the211 right branch. In this batch: Postfix EPL-2.0 **or** IPL-1.0; Exim `LICENCE` GPL-2.0-or-later with212 an OpenSSL exception; Dovecot mixed MIT+LGPL-2.1; Rspamd Apache-2.0; mailcow GPL-3.0; Mailu MIT;213 iRedMail GPLv3 + proprietary Pro; Stalwart AGPL-3.0-only + SELv2; imapsync its own licence.2143. **Commercial model** of the suites: it changes faster than the code and decides whether you can use them.2154. **Requirements of the large receivers**: re-read Google's, Yahoo's and Microsoft's guidance216 before promising delivery. **Declared gap**: Microsoft's page on high-volume217 senders **is rendered by JavaScript and could not be read in raw**; the dates of 2 Apr 2025 and218 5 May 2025 come from a web search that cites it, and **the date for moving to outright rejection219 was "to be announced"**: re-verify it on Microsoft's blog.2205. **Declared gap — DMARC hardening**: it is claimed that in 2026 the large receivers would require221 `p=quarantine`/`p=reject`. **I could not confirm this in a primary source**: treat it as a rumour222 until you see it in the provider's guidance, and consult `email-security-standards`.2236. **RFCs one by one at `rfc-editor.org`** before citing them: check status and the224 *obsoleted_by* / *updated_by* fields. Common assumptions were already corrected here: 5321 and 5322 are225 **Draft Standard** and are **not** obsolete, 6409 and 1939 are **Internet Standard**, and 3501226 is obsoleted by 9051.2277. **JMAP status**: which servers and clients actually implement it, and whether Dovecot has228 added it. That is the data point that decides whether you stop ignoring it.2298. **Supported HA path in Dovecot 2.4** after the removal of the `replicator`, and the status of the230 configuration converter.231232If the web contradicts this document, **the web wins** — flag the discrepancy.