ROS 2 robotics standards
Criteria verified as of August 2026. Re-verify on the web before committing to anything (§8).
1. Scope and triggers
Sets the engineering criteria for building and operating a robot with ROS 2: how the workspace
is structured, how nodes communicate and why sometimes they do not, what real time demands, what
gets simulated and with what, how to secure a network where the traffic moves mass, and which
machine safety standards apply before the arm moves with someone standing in front of it.
Hard fact that comes first: ROS 1 is dead. Verbatim from REP-3 (the official index of ROS
distributions): «Noetic Ninjemys (May 2020 - May 2025)». Noetic was the last ROS 1
distribution and its support ended in May 2025; there are no patches, no new binary packages, no
security fixes. A project starting today on ROS 1 starts unmaintained and with no way out, and
one already on ROS 1 has a pending migration, not a pending decision.
ros1_bridge is for migrating piece by piece, not for staying put.
Second axis: in ROS 2 the middleware is part of the design, not a detail. ROS 2 does not
transport messages by itself: it delegates to DDS (or to Zenoh) through an RMW layer. That is where
the domain's number one pathology comes from —"I publish and the other node receives nothing, and
there is no error at all"— which is almost never a bug: it is incompatible QoS, or a different
ROS_DOMAIN_ID, or multicast blocked by the network. Silence is this system's default failure
mode, and that is why QoS and discovery are designed and documented like any other contract.
Third axis: here a failure moves mass. An overflow on a website returns a 500; on a 30 kg arm at
2 m/s it is an injury. That raises the bar for everything else: network security, change control,
testing before touching hardware and machine safety regulation (§5, §6).
Triggers: package.xml, CMakeLists.txt with ament_cmake, setup.py with ament_python,
colcon build, install/setup.bash, src/ with multiple packages, rclcpp::Node,
rclpy.node.Node, create_publisher/create_subscription, .msg/.srv/.action,
ros2 topic echo, ros2 doctor, ros2 bag record, *.launch.py, ros__parameters in YAML,
ROS_DOMAIN_ID, RMW_IMPLEMENTATION, rmw_fastrtps_cpp, rmw_cyclonedds_cpp, rmw_zenoh_cpp,
tf2_ros, TransformListener, static_transform_publisher, "extrapolation into the future",
urdf/xacro, robot_state_publisher, ros_gz_bridge, controller_manager, nav2_bringup,
move_group, sros2, --enclave, and the symptoms: "the topic is there but nothing arrives", "it
works in simulation and fails on the robot", "communication drops over wifi", "TF_OLD_DATA".
Not applicable: see embedded-iot-standards (the microcontroller and the firmware are theirs,
without exception: MCU, boot, partitioning, watchdog, power, device OTA update, hardware identity.
Operational boundary: if the code runs on an MCU without a full operating system —including
micro-ROS on an MCU—, the firmware is theirs and all that remains here is the message contract
and the link QoS; if it runs on an SBC/PC with Linux and rclcpp/rclpy, it belongs here),
ot-ics-security-standards (the industrial plant is theirs, without exception: Purdue/ISA-95
model, IEC 62443 zones and conduits, PLC/DCS/SCADA/SIS, fieldbus protocols, passive monitoring,
shutdown window. Boundary: a robot in a production cell is designed under this skill and
governed under theirs — segmentation, the vendor's remote access policy and process risk
governance are theirs; the node, QoS, TF and control are ours),
computer-vision-standards (perception: SLAM, detection, segmentation, camera calibration,
labelling and evaluation are theirs; here only consuming the result on a topic and its
timing), deep-learning-standards and model-finetuning-standards (training networks;
reinforcement learning and learned policy are designed there and deployed with the rules from
here), local-inference-standards (serving the model on the robot: engine, quantisation, memory),
gpu-computing-standards (the embedded GPU as a resource: driver, sharing, toolchain),
edge-computing-standards (the edge node and the fleet as a distributed system are theirs:
remote orchestration, synchronisation, deployment across many devices; here the robot as a
system), linux-administration-standards and linux-hardening-standards (the operating system,
its hardening and systemd; here only the specifics: PREEMPT_RT, CPU isolation and
priorities), networking-standards and wireless-standards (network design, VLANs, and wifi as a
medium: roaming and packet loss are theirs; here their consequences on QoS and discovery),
cpp-standards and c-standards (the language: UB, RAII, sanitizers, MISRA/CERT), python-standards
(Python outside ament_python), cicd-standards (pipeline and gates), observability-standards
(OTel pipeline and backend; here rosbag2, /rosout and diagnostics), mlops-standards (model
lifecycle), game-development-standards and xr-standards (batch 22: game engine,
frame budget and immersive teleoperation — a headset for piloting a robot is a client,
the robot still belongs here), functional-safety as a formal discipline (does not exist in
the catalogue: this skill sets the engineering criteria and the applicable standards, it does
not replace a functional safety assessor).
2. Default decisions / Toolchain
Verify the current distribution, its EOL and the status of the standards on the web before pinning
them in a real project (§8).
| Decision |
Default |
Justifiable alternative |
Reason |
| ROS version |
ROS 2 LTS |
— |
ROS 1 unsupported since May 2025 |
| Distribution |
Lyrical Luth (LTS, EOL May 2031) |
Jazzy (EOL May 2029) if the ecosystem has not migrated |
Robot service life |
| Non-LTS distribution |
Not in a product |
Prototype and R&D |
1.5 years of support |
| RMW |
The distro default (rmw_fastrtps_cpp) |
Cyclone DDS; rmw_zenoh_cpp on a bad link or WAN |
Tier 1 support and tested packages |
| Build |
colcon + ament_cmake/ament_python |
— |
It is the supported toolchain |
| Node language |
C++ (rclcpp) in the control loop; Python (rclpy) in orchestration and tooling |
— |
GIL and non-deterministic latency |
| Stateful nodes |
Lifecycle nodes (rclcpp_lifecycle) |
Plain node in utilities |
Governable startup and shutdown |
| Simulation |
Gazebo (Jetty LTS or Harmonic LTS) |
Isaac Sim / Webots / MuJoCo case by case |
ros_gz integration |
| Control |
ros2_control |
Own controller with an ADR |
Reusable hardware interfaces |
| Navigation / manipulation |
Nav2 / MoveIt 2 |
Own only with an impossible requirement |
Cost of reimplementing |
| Real time |
PREEMPT_RT + CPU isolation for the loop, not for everything |
Loop on a separate MCU/FPGA |
ROS 2 is not hard real time §6 |
| Network security |
SROS2 enabled from the design stage |
Documented physical isolation |
DDS runs in the clear by default §5 |
Verified ROS 2 calendar (source: Releases.rst from ros2_documentation, read raw,
Aug 2026):
| Distro |
Release |
EOL |
Type |
| Lyrical Luth |
22 May 2026 |
May 2031 |
LTS |
| Kilted Kaiju |
23 May 2025 |
Dec 2026 |
non-LTS |
| Jazzy Jalisco |
23 May 2024 |
May 2029 |
LTS |
| Iron Irwini |
23 May 2023 |
4 Dec 2024 |
EOL |
| Humble Hawksbill |
23 May 2022 |
May 2027 |
LTS, expires in 9 months |
Lyrical's platform and languages, verified on its supported platforms page: Ubuntu
Resolute (26.04) Tier 1 on amd64 and arm64 (Ubuntu Noble on Tier 3, with EOL brought forward to
2029-06-01), C++20, C17, Python 3.12–3.14, Gazebo Jetty as a dependency, and
—verbatim— «The default middleware in ROS Lyrical is rmw_fastrtps_cpp». rmw_zenoh_cpp entered
as Tier 1 already in Kilted (REP-2000). REP-2000 also sets the rhythm: «New ROS 2 releases will be
published in a time based fashion every 12 months», LTS 5 years, non-LTS 1.5 years.
Gazebo — the naming mess, cleared up with verified dates. There were three different things
named almost the same: Gazebo Classic (gazebo11, the old one), Ignition Gazebo (the rewrite)
and Gazebo (the current name of the rewrite, after the name was given back in 2022; versions are
named by letter: Fortress, Garden, Harmonic, Ionic, Jetty…). Verified status:
- Gazebo Classic: verbatim from
classic.gazebosim.org — «This version of Gazebo, now called
Gazebo classic, reaches end-of-life in January 2025», with the exact date «end-of-life on January
29, 2025». Dead. Nothing new is started on it and what exists gets migrated.
- Gazebo (new), per the official releases table: Jetty Sep 2025 → May 2031 (LTS);
Ionic Sep 2024 → Dec 2026; Harmonic Sep 2023 → May 2029 (LTS); Fortress Sep 2021 →
May 2027 (LTS); Garden EOL Nov 2024.
- Practical rule: pick the ROS distro ↔ Gazebo version pairing that the REP/platform itself
declares (Lyrical→Jetty, Jazzy→Harmonic) and do not mix. The bridge is
ros_gz.
3. Structure and conventions
Workspace. One src/ with small, single-responsibility packages; never a
mega-package with everything inside. Separate by nature, because reusability and testability depend
on it:
ws/src/
mi_robot_msgs/ # ONLY .msg/.srv/.action interfaces (change little, break a lot)
mi_robot_description/ # URDF/xacro, meshes, ros2_control tags
mi_robot_bringup/ # launch + per-environment YAML parameters (sim / robot / lab)
mi_robot_control/ # control nodes (C++), with no simulation dependencies
mi_robot_perception/ # nodes that consume sensors
mi_robot_bt/ # behaviour trees / mission logic
- Interfaces go in their own package: anyone using them does not drag in your dependencies, and
their versioning is visible. Changing a published
.msg is a breaking change: you add a
field, you do not reorder or reinterpret; if you must break, create a new type and migrate.
colcon build --symlink-install in development; in CI and on the robot, a clean build. A
single active overlay: chaining three setup.bash from three workspaces is the classic cause of
"it runs an old version of the node and I cannot explain why". ros2 doctor and ros2 pkg prefix
before blaming the code.
- No absolute paths and no
~/ws/... in the code: ament_index and $(find-pkg-share ...).
Parameters and launch. Everything configurable is a declared parameter (with descriptor,
range and default value), loaded from per-environment YAML, never a hidden constant nor an ad hoc
environment variable. launch files describe composition and nothing else: no business logic inside.
For latency, composing nodes in the same process (component composition) avoids serialisation and
copying —worth more than any micro-optimisation of the node—.
QoS — the contract nobody writes and everybody breaks. Verbatim from the official documentation:
«A connection between a publisher and a subscription is only made if the pair has compatible QoS
profiles», under the «Request vs Offered» model: «Subscriptions request a QoS profile that is the
"minimum quality" that it is willing to accept, and publishers offer a QoS profile that is the
"maximum quality" that it is able to provide». The two tables that explain 90 % of
"messages that never arrive":
| Reliability: publisher → subscriber |
Compatible? |
| Best effort → Best effort |
Yes |
| Best effort → Reliable |
No |
| Reliable → Best effort |
Yes |
| Reliable → Reliable |
Yes |
| Durability: publisher → subscriber |
Compatible? |
Result |
| Volatile → Volatile |
Yes |
New messages only |
| Volatile → Transient local |
No |
No communication |
| Transient local → Volatile |
Yes |
New messages only |
| Transient local → Transient local |
Yes |
New and old |
And the detail that gets paid for dearly: «To achieve a "latched" topic that is visible to late subscribers,
both the publisher and subscriber must agree to use 'Transient Local'» — the equivalent of the ROS 1
latched requires agreement at both ends (map, robot description, static configuration).
The defaults, also verbatim: «By default, publishers and subscriptions in ROS 2 have
"keep last" for history with a queue size of 10, "reliable" for reliability, "volatile" for
durability»; the sensor data profile uses best effort and a small queue, and services are
reliable and volatile on purpose —«otherwise service servers that re-start may receive outdated
requests»—. House rules:
- Each topic's QoS is declared in the package documentation, next to the type. It is part of the
interface.
- High-frequency sensors → sensor data (best effort, short queue). Maps, static TF, robot
description and configuration state → transient local at both ends. Actuation commands
→ reliable, queue 1 (an old command is of no interest).
deadline and liveliness are not decoration: they are the standard way of finding out that a
node stopped publishing. In a safety loop, the watchdog timer goes here, not in an if.
- Faced with "nothing arrives": check in this order
ROS_DOMAIN_ID → same network and multicast →
ros2 topic info -v (profiles at both ends) → message type → namespace/remapping.
TF2 — the transform tree. Rules that avoid almost all of its failures:
- A single parent per frame and a single connected tree: two publishers of the same
parent→child pair is a design error (the classic:
odom→base_link published by two nodes).
- Standard naming convention and hierarchy (
map → odom → base_link → sensors; REP-105) and
axes per REP-103 (metres, radians, x forward, y left, z up). Departing from it costs you
integration with the whole ecosystem.
- Every piece of data carries the sensor's timestamp, not the receiving clock's. Extrapolation
errors and
TF_OLD_DATA are almost always unsynchronised clocks across machines (NTP/PTP
mandatory on multi-computer robots) or timestamps filled in with now().
- Fixed transforms with
static_transform_publisher / tf2_ros::StaticTransformBroadcaster
(which use transient local), never republished at 100 Hz.
- In simulation,
use_sim_time set to true on every node. A single one on the wall clock
desynchronises the entire tree.
4. Quality and testing
- Pyramid adapted to the robot: (1) unit tests of the logic separated from the node —extracting
the algorithm into a class without
rclcpp is the design decision that enables the most testing—; (2)
node tests with launch_testing (startup, parameters, expected publication, declared QoS); (3)
replay of a rosbag2 recorded from the real robot against the new version, comparing outputs;
(4) simulation with scenarios; (5) test bench with the hardware; (6) the robot in its environment.
rosbag2 is the domain's regression tool: every field incident leaves a trimmed bag and a
test that reproduces it. Without that, every failure is investigated from scratch.
- Simulation lies and you have to know where: friction, backlash, sensor noise, bus latency,
thermal drift and CPU timings. It is good for logic, integration and dangerous cases; it does not
validate timings or mechanical tolerances. "It works in Gazebo" is not an acceptance criterion.
- CI gates in order of cost: formatting and
ament linters (ament_cpplint,
ament_clang_format, ament_flake8, ament_mypy, ament_copyright) → build with warnings as
errors → unit tests → launch_testing → replay of reference bags → automated simulation
→ deployment to the bench. main green or the robot is not touched.
- Dynamic analysis in the control node: ASan/UBSan/TSan in CI (
cpp-standards); a race
condition in a control loop shows up as movement.
- Startup determinism: test out-of-order startup —a node that starts before its source,
incomplete TF, a missing parameter—. A system that only works if everything starts in the
pretty order fails at the first field restart.
- Degraded network test mandatory if there is wifi: packet loss, latency and total outage.
Check what the robot does when it loses its operator: stopping is the correct default
answer.
5. Stack security
The founding fact, verbatim from the official ROS 2 design documentation
(design.ros2.org, article ROS 2 DDS-Security integration):
«By default, none of the security features of DDS are enabled in ROS 2.»
Translated: without sros2 configured, ROS 2 traffic travels with no authentication, no
authorisation and no encryption. Any machine with access to the network and the same
ROS_DOMAIN_ID can discover every topic, read them, publish actuation commands, change parameters
and call services. There is no password to break because there is no password. On a robot, that
is not a data leak: it is physical control of the device in the hands of anyone who reaches the network.
- A robot on a flat network is a physical security risk, not an IT one. The first measure is
architectural: its own segment, no route to (or from) the office network, no guest wifi, remote
access only through a bastion and with strong authentication. The network and governance of that
zone belong to
ot-ics-security-standards and networking-standards; demanding it is our duty.
ROS_DOMAIN_ID is not security. It is a traffic separator: anyone can set it. Neither is
"it is behind NAT" nor "it is a VLAN".
- SROS2 enables DDS-Security: identity and permissions CA, X.509 certificates per enclave, a
governance file that —verbatim from the same document— «will encrypt all DDS traffic by
default», and permissions expressed in ROS terms (which node may publish/subscribe to what).
Its cost is real and must be budgeted for: a PKI someone has to operate (issuance,
distribution, expiry, revocation and rotation), CPU and latency overhead from encryption
and signing, deployment and debugging complexity, and a configuration mistake that shows up
—how else— as silence. It is enabled from the design stage, not at the end: retrofitting
security into a 40-node system is a project.
- Real least privilege: one enclave per node or per functional group, with explicit read/write
permissions per topic. A single enclave for the whole robot is encryption without authorisation.
- Surface that DDS-Security does not cover: operator interfaces (web,
rosbridge,
web_video_server, Foxglove) exposed without authentication —they are a remote control—;
rosbag2 with personal data (video of the surroundings, faces, number plates:
privacy-engineering-standards); robot software updates without signing or origin verification;
cloud credentials in the image; and debug ports and serial consoles reachable on the machine.
- Supply chain: third-party packages from
rosdistro, the manufacturer's drivers and the
downloaded models are code that runs with permission to move the robot. Pin versions, review
licences (opensource-licensing-standards) and do not install from unverified sources.
- Logging and traceability: who enabled manual mode, who changed a speed parameter,
who overrode a limit. In an incident with an injury, that is the evidence.
6. Performance and operability
Real time: where the limit is, said without ambiguity. ROS 2 is not a hard real-time system
on its own. That it uses DDS and has configurable executors does not make it deterministic:
there is still dynamic memory allocation, operating system scheduling, the GIL in rclpy,
copies in the transport, background discovery and a standard Linux kernel that does not guarantee
latency. What you can build:
- Kernel with
PREEMPT_RT: the real-time patch was merged into Linux kernel 6.12
(released on 17 Nov 2024), after two decades out of tree —verified in the official release
summary—. It stops being an external patch, but you still have to compile/enable it and, above
all, tune the entire system.
- Isolation:
isolcpus/cpuset for the control loop, IRQs off those cores, a fixed frequency
governor, no power saving, no shared hyperthreading, locked memory
(mlockall) and no allocations in the loop, well-chosen SCHED_FIFO priorities.
- Measure, do not assume:
cyclictest for kernel latency and loop jitter measurement on the
real robot, over hours and under load (perception, network, disk). Average latency does not
matter: the worst case does.
- The honest limit: when the requirement is safety-related and measured in microseconds
—emergency stop, current loop, torque limit—, that does not live in ROS 2. It lives in the
robot controller, in an MCU/FPGA or in a certified safety relay, and ROS 2 talks to it from
outside. An emergency stop implemented as a ROS 2 node is a safety design failure, not a
pending optimisation.
Operability:
- Diagnostics (
diagnostic_updater/diagnostic_aggregator) for every subsystem, with status
readable by an operator, not only by a developer. /rosout structured and at the
right level; no INFO at 100 Hz (it fills the disk and the CPU).
- Metrics: actual frequency of every critical topic against the expected one, end-to-end
latency, loop cycle time (p99), lost messages, CPU usage per node, temperature,
battery. Export to the
observability-standards backend.
- Permanent ring recording with
rosbag2 (bounded size, with rotation) so you have the
"before" of any incident; with a retention and personal data policy.
- Supervised startup:
systemd with controlled restart, explicit dependencies, and a safe
state at boot (brakes engaged, actuator power disabled until explicit
enablement).
- Degradation: loss of a sensor, of the network or of the operator → a defined safe state, not
"carry on with the last known value". Each node declares what it does when its input ages
(that is what
deadline is for).
- Field update: versioned image, deployment with tested rollback, and never
update with the robot enabled. The maintenance window is agreed with whoever operates it.
Machine safety (regulation) — verified status, and it is a big change from 2025:
- ISO 10218-1:2025 (industrial robots) and ISO 10218-2:2025 (applications and cells) were
published in February 2025 and supersede the 2011 versions. ISO/TS 15066 ceases to be
a separate technical specification: its content —collaboration by power and force limiting
(PFL), speed and separation monitoring (SSM), hand guiding (HGC), and the force
and pressure limits— has been incorporated into ISO 10218-2. The new series additionally introduces two robot
classes (Class 1 for very weak robots with no significant risk, with reduced control
requirements; Class 2 for the rest), abandons the single performance level PL d/cat. 3 in favour of
a PL per safety function (with the option to deviate through an extended risk assessment),
requires a normal stop function distinct from the emergency stop, and incorporates for the first
time cybersecurity requirements insofar as they affect safety.
- Terminology: the new series speaks of a "collaborative application", not a "collaborative
robot": what is assessed and validated is the specific use —robot + tool + workpiece +
environment + task—, not the device. Buying a "cobot" does not exempt you from a risk assessment.
- Legal framework in the EU: the Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 supersedes Directive
2006/42/EC; verbatim from EUR-Lex: «It shall apply from 14 January 2027» and «Directive 2006/42/EC
is repealed with effect from 14 January 2027». A planning date, not a surprise.
- Presumption of conformity: the citation of EN ISO 10218-1/-2 in the Official Journal of the EU
was pending at the time of verification (with a 24-month transitional period
requested). Verify the status before resting a technical file on it (§8).
- What this skill does not do: it does not replace the risk assessment, nor the PL/SIL calculation
(ISO 13849-1 / IEC 62061), nor the relevant body or assessor. It establishes that the
obligation exists and that it is planned from the start, not just before delivery.
7. Long-term sustainability
- Cadence: product on LTS, with a planned jump before EOL (Humble expires in
May 2027: if there is a fleet on Humble, migrating to Jazzy or Lyrical is this year's work, not
next year's). Non-LTS only for prototypes.
- Migration as a continuous practice: test against
rolling in a non-blocking CI job to
find out about breakage early, instead of discovering it all at once at the jump.
- Robot life > distro life: an industrial device lasts 10–15 years and no ROS 2 distro
lasts that long. Migration is planned from the design stage: bounded dependencies, an
abstraction layer over what changes and the ability to update in the field. If the robot cannot be
updated, you are signing off on its obsolescence.
- Document in an ADR: distribution and reason, chosen RMW, QoS profiles per topic, real-time
strategy and where the safety boundary is, the decision on SROS2, simulator and version.
Explicit prohibitions:
- ❌ Starting a new project on ROS 1 or keeping one "because it works": Noetic ended in
May 2025 and receives no security patches.
- ❌ Running ROS 2 without SROS2 on a network reachable by anything other than the robot, or believing that
ROS_DOMAIN_ID, the VLAN or NAT are security.
- ❌ Exposing
rosbridge, web_video_server, Foxglove or any teleoperation interface without
authentication.
- ❌ Implementing the emergency stop, the torque limit or the safety interlock as ROS 2
nodes. The safety function goes in certified hardware/controller.
- ❌ Promising "real time" because you use ROS 2, or because you installed
PREEMPT_RT without isolating CPUs, without setting
priorities, without mlockall and without measuring the worst case.
- ❌ Control logic in
rclpy inside the hot loop; allocating memory, doing I/O or waiting on
locks inside a control callback.
- ❌ Publishing TF for the same parent→child pair from two nodes, or using
now() as the timestamp of a
sensor reading.
- ❌ Using default QoS for everything and debugging by restarting; or declaring a topic "latched" without
transient local at both ends.
- ❌ Chaining workspace overlays and debugging the wrong binary.
- ❌ Changing a published message (reordering fields, reinterpreting units) without a new type and a
migration path.
- ❌ Validating only in simulation and calling it done; or testing the first movement at production
speed with people nearby.
- ❌ Starting anything new on Gazebo Classic (EOL 29 Jan 2025) or mixing Gazebo versions with
the distro they do not correspond to.
- ❌ Treating machine safety (ISO 10218 / the Machinery Regulation) as end-of-project paperwork. It is
a design requirement with a date: 14 January 2027.
- ❌
INFO/DEBUG at sensor frequency in production.
8. Mandatory web verification
Before deciding, check against the primary source:
- Current distribution and EOL:
docs.ros.org (Releases/Distributions page) and REP-2000
—careful: the REP on master did not yet list Lyrical when this document was verified, while the
documentation did; the distro documentation wins. Verified: Lyrical Luth 22 May 2026 →
May 2031 (LTS); Jazzy → May 2029; Humble → May 2027; Kilted → Dec 2026.
- Platform and dependencies of the chosen distro on its Supported Platforms page (Ubuntu,
minimum C++/Python, default RMW, Gazebo version). Verified for Lyrical: Ubuntu Resolute
26.04, C++20/C17, Python 3.12–3.14,
rmw_fastrtps_cpp, Gazebo Jetty.
- REP-3 to confirm that Noetic is still the last ROS 1 release and its EOL (verified:
«Noetic Ninjemys (May 2020 - May 2025)»).
- Gazebo: releases and EOL table at
gazebosim.org/docs/latest/releases/ (verified: Jetty
→May 2031, Ionic →Dec 2026, Harmonic →May 2029, Fortress →May 2027) and the EOL notice at
classic.gazebosim.org (verified: 29 Jan 2025).
- Security: that the statement «By default, none of the security features of DDS are enabled in
ROS 2» is still current on
design.ros2.org and in the sros2 documentation; security advisories
for the DDS implementation in use (Fast DDS, Cyclone DDS, Connext) and for the corresponding rmw.
- Real time: the status of
PREEMPT_RT in the kernel version you intend to use (verified:
merged into Linux 6.12, 17 Nov 2024) and the current tuning guide.
- Machine safety regulation: the status of ISO 10218-1/-2:2025, of the absorption of
ISO/TS 15066 and —critically— of their citation in the OJEU under Regulation (EU) 2023/1230,
which was pending on the verification date. Declared gap:
iso.org returns
HTTP 403 to automated access, so the status of the standards was verified against a specialised
secondary source; the normative text has to be bought and read, and the dates of
application are cross-checked on EUR-Lex (verified there: «It shall apply from 14 January 2027»).
- Nav2, MoveIt 2,
ros2_control and manufacturer drivers: which distributions they support today and with
which version; they usually lag behind a freshly released LTS, and that may decide the distro.
- CVEs in the stack: kernel, DDS, C++ dependencies and installed
rosdistro packages.
If the web contradicts this document, the web wins — flag the discrepancy.
1---2name: robotics-ros-standards3description: Robotics with ROS 2, from workspace layout to machine safety. Use when working with package.xml and CMakeLists.txt using ament_cmake or ament_python, colcon build/test with --symlink-install and --packages-select, a src/ workspace and install/setup.bash overlay, rclcpp and rclpy nodes, lifecycle nodes and executors and callback groups, .msg/.srv/.action interfaces and rosidl generation, ros2 topic/node/param/service/bag/doctor CLI, launch.py and launch.xml files with parameter YAML, ROS_DOMAIN_ID and RMW_IMPLEMENTATION, DDS middleware (Fast DDS, Cyclone DDS, Connext) or rmw_zenoh, QoS reliability durability history and deadline mismatches where messages silently never arrive, tf2 transform trees and static_transform_publisher and TF_OLD_DATA or extrapolation errors, URDF and xacro and robot_state_publisher, Gazebo (Harmonic, Ionic, Jetty, Ignition or Gazebo Classic) and ros_gz_bridge, Nav2 behavior trees and costmaps, MoveIt 2 planning, ros2_control hardware interfaces and controller_manager, rosbag2 recording, real-time constraints with PREEMPT_RT and CPU isolation, SROS2 security enclaves and keystore, or ISO 10218 and ISO/TS 15066 machine safety obligations for an industrial or collaborative robot.4metadata:5 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/serialexperimentslainnnn/robotics-ros-standards6---78# ROS 2 robotics standards910Criteria verified as of **August 2026**. Re-verify on the web before committing to anything (§8).1112## 1. Scope and triggers1314Sets the engineering criteria for **building and operating a robot with ROS 2**: how the workspace15is structured, how nodes communicate and why sometimes they do not, what real time demands, what16gets simulated and with what, how to secure a network where the traffic moves mass, and which17machine safety standards apply before the arm moves with someone standing in front of it.1819**Hard fact that comes first: ROS 1 is dead.** Verbatim from REP-3 (the official index of ROS20distributions): **«Noetic Ninjemys (May 2020 - May 2025)»**. Noetic was the **last** ROS 121distribution and its support ended in **May 2025**; there are no patches, no new binary packages, no22security fixes. **A project starting today on ROS 1 starts unmaintained and with no way out**, and23one already on ROS 1 has a pending migration, not a pending decision.24`ros1_bridge` is for migrating piece by piece, not for staying put.2526**Second axis: in ROS 2 the middleware is part of the design, not a detail.** ROS 2 does not27transport messages by itself: it delegates to DDS (or to Zenoh) through an RMW layer. That is where28the domain's number one pathology comes from —**"I publish and the other node receives nothing, and29there is no error at all"**— which is almost never a bug: it is **incompatible QoS**, or a different30`ROS_DOMAIN_ID`, or multicast blocked by the network. **Silence is this system's default failure31mode**, and that is why QoS and discovery are designed and documented like any other contract.3233**Third axis: here a failure moves mass.** An overflow on a website returns a 500; on a 30 kg arm at342 m/s it is an injury. That raises the bar for everything else: network security, change control,35testing before touching hardware and machine safety regulation (§5, §6).3637Triggers: `package.xml`, `CMakeLists.txt` with `ament_cmake`, `setup.py` with `ament_python`,38`colcon build`, `install/setup.bash`, `src/` with multiple packages, `rclcpp::Node`,39`rclpy.node.Node`, `create_publisher`/`create_subscription`, `.msg`/`.srv`/`.action`,40`ros2 topic echo`, `ros2 doctor`, `ros2 bag record`, `*.launch.py`, `ros__parameters` in YAML,41`ROS_DOMAIN_ID`, `RMW_IMPLEMENTATION`, `rmw_fastrtps_cpp`, `rmw_cyclonedds_cpp`, `rmw_zenoh_cpp`,42`tf2_ros`, `TransformListener`, `static_transform_publisher`, "extrapolation into the future",43`urdf`/`xacro`, `robot_state_publisher`, `ros_gz_bridge`, `controller_manager`, `nav2_bringup`,44`move_group`, `sros2`, `--enclave`, and the symptoms: "the topic is there but nothing arrives", "it45works in simulation and fails on the robot", "communication drops over wifi", "TF_OLD_DATA".4647**Not applicable**: see `embedded-iot-standards` (**the microcontroller and the firmware are theirs,48without exception**: MCU, boot, partitioning, watchdog, power, device OTA update, hardware identity.49**Operational boundary**: if the code runs on an MCU without a full operating system —including50`micro-ROS` on an MCU—, **the firmware is theirs and all that remains here is the message contract51and the link QoS**; if it runs on an SBC/PC with Linux and `rclcpp`/`rclpy`, it belongs here),52`ot-ics-security-standards` (**the industrial plant is theirs, without exception**: Purdue/ISA-9553model, IEC 62443 zones and conduits, PLC/DCS/SCADA/SIS, fieldbus protocols, passive monitoring,54shutdown window. **Boundary**: a robot in a production cell **is designed under this skill and55governed under theirs** — segmentation, the vendor's remote access policy and process risk56governance are theirs; the node, QoS, TF and control are ours),57`computer-vision-standards` (**perception: SLAM, detection, segmentation, camera calibration,58labelling and evaluation are theirs**; here only **consuming** the result on a topic and its59timing), `deep-learning-standards` and `model-finetuning-standards` (training networks;60reinforcement learning and learned policy are designed there and **deployed** with the rules from61here), `local-inference-standards` (serving the model on the robot: engine, quantisation, memory),62`gpu-computing-standards` (the embedded GPU as a resource: driver, sharing, toolchain),63`edge-computing-standards` (**the edge node and the fleet as a distributed system are theirs**:64remote orchestration, synchronisation, deployment across many devices; **here the robot as a65system**), `linux-administration-standards` and `linux-hardening-standards` (the operating system,66its hardening and `systemd`; **here only the specifics**: `PREEMPT_RT`, CPU isolation and67priorities), `networking-standards` and `wireless-standards` (network design, VLANs, and **wifi as a68medium**: roaming and packet loss are theirs; here their consequences on QoS and discovery),69`cpp-standards` and `c-standards` (the language: UB, RAII, sanitizers, MISRA/CERT), `python-standards`70(Python outside `ament_python`), `cicd-standards` (pipeline and gates), `observability-standards`71(OTel pipeline and backend; here `rosbag2`, `/rosout` and diagnostics), `mlops-standards` (model72lifecycle), `game-development-standards` and `xr-standards` (**batch 22**: game engine,73frame budget and immersive teleoperation — a headset for piloting a robot is a client,74**the robot still belongs here**), `functional-safety` as a formal discipline (**does not exist in75the catalogue**: this skill sets the engineering criteria and the applicable standards, **it does76not replace a functional safety assessor**).7778## 2. Default decisions / Toolchain7980> Verify the current distribution, its EOL and the status of the standards on the web before pinning81> them in a real project (§8).8283| Decision | Default | Justifiable alternative | Reason |84|---|---|---|---|85| ROS version | **ROS 2 LTS** | — | ROS 1 unsupported since May 2025 |86| Distribution | **Lyrical Luth (LTS, EOL May 2031)** | Jazzy (EOL May 2029) if the ecosystem has not migrated | Robot service life |87| Non-LTS distribution | **Not in a product** | Prototype and R&D | 1.5 years of support |88| RMW | **The distro default** (`rmw_fastrtps_cpp`) | Cyclone DDS; `rmw_zenoh_cpp` on a bad link or WAN | Tier 1 support and tested packages |89| Build | **`colcon` + `ament_cmake`/`ament_python`** | — | It is the supported toolchain |90| Node language | **C++ (`rclcpp`)** in the control loop; Python (`rclpy`) in orchestration and tooling | — | GIL and non-deterministic latency |91| Stateful nodes | **Lifecycle nodes** (`rclcpp_lifecycle`) | Plain node in utilities | Governable startup and shutdown |92| Simulation | **Gazebo (Jetty LTS or Harmonic LTS)** | Isaac Sim / Webots / MuJoCo case by case | `ros_gz` integration |93| Control | **`ros2_control`** | Own controller with an ADR | Reusable hardware interfaces |94| Navigation / manipulation | **Nav2** / **MoveIt 2** | Own only with an impossible requirement | Cost of reimplementing |95| Real time | `PREEMPT_RT` + CPU isolation **for the loop**, not for everything | Loop on a separate MCU/FPGA | ROS 2 is not hard real time §6 |96| Network security | **SROS2 enabled from the design stage** | Documented physical isolation | DDS runs in the clear by default §5 |9798**Verified ROS 2 calendar** (source: `Releases.rst` from `ros2_documentation`, read raw,99Aug 2026):100101| Distro | Release | EOL | Type |102|---|---|---|---|103| **Lyrical Luth** | 22 May 2026 | **May 2031** | **LTS** |104| Kilted Kaiju | 23 May 2025 | Dec 2026 | non-LTS |105| **Jazzy Jalisco** | 23 May 2024 | **May 2029** | **LTS** |106| Iron Irwini | 23 May 2023 | 4 Dec 2024 | EOL |107| **Humble Hawksbill** | 23 May 2022 | **May 2027** | LTS, **expires in 9 months** |108109Lyrical's platform and languages, verified on its supported platforms page: **Ubuntu110Resolute (26.04) Tier 1** on amd64 and arm64 (Ubuntu Noble on Tier 3, with EOL brought forward to111**2029-06-01**), **C++20**, **C17**, **Python 3.12–3.14**, **Gazebo Jetty** as a dependency, and112—verbatim— *«The default middleware in ROS Lyrical is rmw_fastrtps_cpp»*. `rmw_zenoh_cpp` entered113as **Tier 1** already in Kilted (REP-2000). REP-2000 also sets the rhythm: *«New ROS 2 releases will be114published in a time based fashion every 12 months»*, LTS **5 years**, non-LTS **1.5 years**.115116**Gazebo — the naming mess, cleared up with verified dates.** There were three different things117named almost the same: **Gazebo Classic** (`gazebo11`, the old one), **Ignition Gazebo** (the rewrite)118and **Gazebo** (the current name of the rewrite, after the name was given back in 2022; versions are119named by letter: Fortress, Garden, Harmonic, Ionic, Jetty…). Verified status:120121- **Gazebo Classic**: verbatim from `classic.gazebosim.org` — *«This version of Gazebo, now called122 Gazebo classic, reaches end-of-life in January 2025»*, with the exact date *«end-of-life on January123 29, 2025»*. **Dead. Nothing new is started on it and what exists gets migrated.**124- **Gazebo (new)**, per the official releases table: **Jetty** Sep 2025 → **May 2031 (LTS)**;125 **Ionic** Sep 2024 → Dec 2026; **Harmonic** Sep 2023 → **May 2029 (LTS)**; **Fortress** Sep 2021 →126 May 2027 (LTS); **Garden** EOL Nov 2024.127- Practical rule: **pick the ROS distro ↔ Gazebo version pairing that the REP/platform itself128 declares** (Lyrical→Jetty, Jazzy→Harmonic) and do not mix. The bridge is `ros_gz`.129130## 3. Structure and conventions131132**Workspace.** One `src/` with small, single-responsibility packages; never a133mega-package with everything inside. Separate by nature, because reusability and testability depend134on it:135136```137ws/src/138 mi_robot_msgs/ # ONLY .msg/.srv/.action interfaces (change little, break a lot)139 mi_robot_description/ # URDF/xacro, meshes, ros2_control tags140 mi_robot_bringup/ # launch + per-environment YAML parameters (sim / robot / lab)141 mi_robot_control/ # control nodes (C++), with no simulation dependencies142 mi_robot_perception/ # nodes that consume sensors143 mi_robot_bt/ # behaviour trees / mission logic144```145146- **Interfaces go in their own package**: anyone using them does not drag in your dependencies, and147 their versioning is visible. **Changing a published `.msg` is a breaking change**: you add a148 field, you do not reorder or reinterpret; if you must break, create a new type and migrate.149- **`colcon build --symlink-install`** in development; in CI and on the robot, a clean build. **A150 single active *overlay***: chaining three `setup.bash` from three workspaces is the classic cause of151 "it runs an old version of the node and I cannot explain why". `ros2 doctor` and `ros2 pkg prefix`152 before blaming the code.153- **No absolute paths and no `~/ws/...` in the code**: `ament_index` and `$(find-pkg-share ...)`.154155**Parameters and launch.** Everything configurable is a **declared parameter** (with descriptor,156range and default value), loaded from per-environment YAML, never a hidden constant nor an ad hoc157environment variable. `launch` files describe composition and nothing else: no business logic inside.158For latency, **composing nodes in the same process** (component composition) avoids serialisation and159copying —worth more than any micro-optimisation of the node—.160161**QoS — the contract nobody writes and everybody breaks.** Verbatim from the official documentation:162*«A connection between a publisher and a subscription is only made if the pair has compatible QoS163profiles»*, under the **«Request vs Offered»** model: *«Subscriptions request a QoS profile that is the164"minimum quality" that it is willing to accept, and publishers offer a QoS profile that is the165"maximum quality" that it is able to provide»*. The two tables that explain 90 % of166"messages that never arrive":167168| Reliability: publisher → subscriber | Compatible? |169|---|---|170| Best effort → Best effort | Yes |171| **Best effort → Reliable** | **No** |172| Reliable → Best effort | Yes |173| Reliable → Reliable | Yes |174175| Durability: publisher → subscriber | Compatible? | Result |176|---|---|---|177| Volatile → Volatile | Yes | New messages only |178| **Volatile → Transient local** | **No** | **No communication** |179| Transient local → Volatile | Yes | New messages only |180| Transient local → Transient local | Yes | New and old |181182And the detail that gets paid for dearly: *«To achieve a "latched" topic that is visible to late subscribers,183both the publisher and subscriber must agree to use 'Transient Local'»* — the equivalent of the ROS 1184*latched* requires **agreement at both ends** (map, robot description, static configuration).185The defaults, also verbatim: *«By default, publishers and subscriptions in ROS 2 have186"keep last" for history with a queue size of 10, "reliable" for reliability, "volatile" for187durability»*; the **sensor data** profile uses *best effort* and a small queue, and **services** are188reliable and **volatile on purpose** —*«otherwise service servers that re-start may receive outdated189requests»*—. House rules:190191- **Each topic's QoS is declared in the package documentation**, next to the type. It is part of the192 interface.193- **High-frequency sensors → sensor data** (best effort, short queue). **Maps, static TF, robot194 description and configuration state → transient local at both ends.** Actuation commands195 → reliable, queue 1 (an old command is of no interest).196- **`deadline` and `liveliness`** are not decoration: they are the standard way of finding out that a197 node stopped publishing. In a safety loop, the watchdog timer goes here, not in an `if`.198- Faced with "nothing arrives": check in this order **`ROS_DOMAIN_ID` → same network and multicast →199 `ros2 topic info -v` (profiles at both ends) → message type → *namespace*/remapping**.200201**TF2 — the transform tree.** Rules that avoid almost all of its failures:202203- **A single parent per frame and a single connected tree**: two publishers of the same204 parent→child pair is a design error (the classic: `odom→base_link` published by two nodes).205- Standard naming convention and hierarchy (`map` → `odom` → `base_link` → sensors; REP-105) and206 axes per REP-103 (metres, radians, x forward, y left, z up). Departing from it costs you207 integration with the whole ecosystem.208- **Every piece of data carries the sensor's timestamp, not the receiving clock's.** Extrapolation209 errors and `TF_OLD_DATA` are almost always unsynchronised clocks across machines (NTP/PTP210 mandatory on multi-computer robots) or *timestamps* filled in with `now()`.211- **Fixed** transforms with `static_transform_publisher` / `tf2_ros::StaticTransformBroadcaster`212 (which use *transient local*), never republished at 100 Hz.213- **In simulation, `use_sim_time` set to `true` on every node.** A single one on the wall clock214 desynchronises the entire tree.215216## 4. Quality and testing217218- **Pyramid adapted to the robot**: (1) unit tests of the logic **separated from the node** —extracting219 the algorithm into a class without `rclcpp` is the design decision that enables the most testing—; (2)220 node tests with `launch_testing` (startup, parameters, expected publication, declared QoS); (3)221 **replay of a `rosbag2`** recorded from the real robot against the new version, comparing outputs;222 (4) simulation with scenarios; (5) test bench with the hardware; (6) the robot in its environment.223- **`rosbag2` is the domain's regression tool**: every field incident leaves a trimmed *bag* and a224 test that reproduces it. Without that, every failure is investigated from scratch.225- **Simulation lies and you have to know where**: friction, backlash, sensor noise, bus latency,226 thermal drift and CPU timings. It is good for logic, integration and dangerous cases; **it does not227 validate timings or mechanical tolerances**. "It works in Gazebo" is not an acceptance criterion.228- **CI gates in order of cost**: formatting and `ament` linters (`ament_cpplint`,229 `ament_clang_format`, `ament_flake8`, `ament_mypy`, `ament_copyright`) → build with warnings as230 errors → unit tests → `launch_testing` → replay of reference bags → automated simulation231 → deployment to the bench. **`main` green or the robot is not touched.**232- **Dynamic analysis in the control node**: ASan/UBSan/TSan in CI (`cpp-standards`); a race233 condition in a control loop shows up as movement.234- **Startup determinism**: test out-of-order startup —a node that starts before its source,235 incomplete TF, a missing parameter—. A system that only works if everything starts in the236 pretty order fails at the first field restart.237- **Degraded network test mandatory** if there is wifi: packet loss, latency and total outage.238 Check what the robot does when it loses its operator: **stopping is the correct default239 answer**.240241## 5. Stack security242243**The founding fact, verbatim from the official ROS 2 design documentation244(`design.ros2.org`, article *ROS 2 DDS-Security integration*):**245246> ***«By default, none of the security features of DDS are enabled in ROS 2.»***247248Translated: **without `sros2` configured, ROS 2 traffic travels with no authentication, no249authorisation and no encryption**. Any machine with access to the network and the same250`ROS_DOMAIN_ID` can **discover every topic, read them, publish actuation commands, change parameters251and call services**. There is no password to break because there is no password. **On a robot, that252is not a data leak: it is physical control of the device in the hands of anyone who reaches the network.**253254- **A robot on a flat network is a physical security risk**, not an IT one. The first measure is255 architectural: its own segment, no route to (or from) the office network, no guest wifi, remote256 access only through a bastion and with strong authentication. The network and governance of that257 zone belong to `ot-ics-security-standards` and `networking-standards`; **demanding it is our duty**.258- **`ROS_DOMAIN_ID` is not security.** It is a traffic separator: anyone can set it. Neither is259 "it is behind NAT" nor "it is a VLAN".260- **SROS2** enables DDS-Security: identity and permissions CA, X.509 certificates per *enclave*, a261 governance file that —verbatim from the same document— *«will encrypt all DDS traffic by262 default»*, and permissions expressed in ROS terms (which node may publish/subscribe to what).263 **Its cost is real and must be budgeted for**: a PKI someone has to operate (issuance,264 distribution, expiry, **revocation and rotation**), CPU and latency overhead from encryption265 and signing, deployment and debugging complexity, and a configuration mistake that shows up266 —how else— **as silence**. It is enabled **from the design stage**, not at the end: retrofitting267 security into a 40-node system is a project.268- **Real least privilege**: one *enclave* per node or per functional group, with explicit read/write269 permissions per topic. A single enclave for the whole robot is encryption without authorisation.270- **Surface that DDS-Security does not cover**: operator interfaces (web, `rosbridge`,271 `web_video_server`, Foxglove) **exposed without authentication** —they are a remote control—;272 `rosbag2` with personal data (video of the surroundings, faces, number plates:273 `privacy-engineering-standards`); robot software updates without signing or origin verification;274 cloud credentials in the image; and **debug ports and serial consoles** reachable on the machine.275- **Supply chain**: third-party packages from `rosdistro`, the manufacturer's drivers and the276 downloaded models are code that runs with permission to move the robot. Pin versions, review277 licences (`opensource-licensing-standards`) and do not install from unverified sources.278- **Logging and traceability**: who enabled manual mode, who changed a speed parameter,279 who overrode a limit. In an incident with an injury, **that is the evidence**.280281## 6. Performance and operability282283**Real time: where the limit is, said without ambiguity.** **ROS 2 is not a hard real-time system284on its own.** That it uses DDS and has configurable *executors* does not make it deterministic:285there is still dynamic memory allocation, operating system scheduling, the GIL in `rclpy`,286copies in the transport, background discovery and a standard Linux kernel that does not guarantee287latency. What you **can** build:288289- **Kernel with `PREEMPT_RT`**: the real-time patch **was merged into Linux kernel 6.12**290 (released on **17 Nov 2024**), after two decades out of tree —verified in the official release291 summary—. It stops being an external patch, but **you still have to compile/enable it and, above292 all, tune the entire system**.293- **Isolation**: `isolcpus`/`cpuset` for the control loop, IRQs off those cores, a fixed frequency294 governor, no power saving, no shared *hyperthreading*, **locked memory295 (`mlockall`) and no allocations in the loop**, well-chosen `SCHED_FIFO` priorities.296- **Measure, do not assume**: `cyclictest` for kernel latency and loop *jitter* measurement on the297 real robot, over hours and under load (perception, network, disk). **Average latency does not298 matter: the worst case does.**299- **The honest limit**: when the requirement is safety-related and measured in microseconds300 —emergency stop, current loop, torque limit—, **that does not live in ROS 2**. It lives in the301 robot controller, in an MCU/FPGA or in a certified safety relay, and ROS 2 talks to it from302 outside. **An emergency stop implemented as a ROS 2 node is a safety design failure**, not a303 pending optimisation.304305**Operability:**306307- **Diagnostics** (`diagnostic_updater`/`diagnostic_aggregator`) for every subsystem, with status308 readable by an operator, not only by a developer. `/rosout` structured and at the309 right level; **no `INFO` at 100 Hz** (it fills the disk and the CPU).310- **Metrics**: actual frequency of every critical topic against the expected one, end-to-end311 latency, loop cycle time (p99), lost messages, CPU usage per node, temperature,312 battery. Export to the `observability-standards` backend.313- **Permanent ring recording** with `rosbag2` (bounded size, with rotation) so you have the314 "before" of any incident; with a retention and personal data policy.315- **Supervised startup**: `systemd` with controlled restart, explicit dependencies, and a **safe316 state at boot** (brakes engaged, actuator power disabled until explicit317 enablement).318- **Degradation**: loss of a sensor, of the network or of the operator → **a defined safe state**, not319 "carry on with the last known value". Each node declares what it does when its input ages320 (that is what `deadline` is for).321- **Field update**: versioned image, deployment with tested rollback, and **never322 update with the robot enabled**. The maintenance window is agreed with whoever operates it.323324**Machine safety (regulation) — verified status, and it is a big change from 2025:**325326- **ISO 10218-1:2025** (industrial robots) and **ISO 10218-2:2025** (applications and cells) were327 published in **February 2025** and supersede the 2011 versions. **ISO/TS 15066 ceases to be328 a separate technical specification: its content —collaboration by power and force limiting329 (PFL), speed and separation monitoring (SSM), hand guiding (HGC), and the force330 and pressure limits— has been incorporated into ISO 10218-2.** The new series additionally introduces **two robot331 classes** (Class 1 for very weak robots with no significant risk, with reduced control332 requirements; Class 2 for the rest), abandons the single performance level PL d/cat. 3 in favour of333 a **PL per safety function** (with the option to deviate through an extended risk assessment),334 requires a **normal stop** function distinct from the emergency stop, and incorporates for the first335 time **cybersecurity requirements** insofar as they affect safety.336- **Terminology**: the new series speaks of a **"collaborative application"**, not a "collaborative337 robot": what is assessed and validated is **the specific use** —robot + tool + workpiece +338 environment + task—, not the device. Buying a "cobot" does **not** exempt you from a risk assessment.339- **Legal framework in the EU**: the **Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230** supersedes Directive340 2006/42/EC; verbatim from EUR-Lex: *«It shall apply from 14 January 2027»* and *«Directive 2006/42/EC341 is repealed with effect from 14 January 2027»*. **A planning date, not a surprise.**342- **Presumption of conformity**: the citation of EN ISO 10218-1/-2 in the Official Journal of the EU343 was pending at the time of verification (with a 24-month transitional period344 requested). **Verify the status before resting a technical file on it (§8).**345- **What this skill does not do**: it does not replace the risk assessment, nor the PL/SIL calculation346 (ISO 13849-1 / IEC 62061), nor the relevant body or assessor. It establishes that **the347 obligation exists** and that it is planned from the start, not just before delivery.348349## 7. Long-term sustainability350351- **Cadence**: product on **LTS**, with a planned jump before EOL (Humble expires in352 **May 2027**: if there is a fleet on Humble, migrating to Jazzy or Lyrical is this year's work, not353 next year's). Non-LTS only for prototypes.354- **Migration as a continuous practice**: test against `rolling` in a *non-blocking* CI job to355 find out about breakage early, instead of discovering it all at once at the jump.356- **Robot life > distro life**: an industrial device lasts 10–15 years and no ROS 2 distro357 lasts that long. **Migration is planned from the design stage**: bounded dependencies, an358 abstraction layer over what changes and the ability to update in the field. If the robot cannot be359 updated, you are signing off on its obsolescence.360- **Document in an ADR**: distribution and reason, chosen RMW, QoS profiles per topic, real-time361 strategy and where the safety boundary is, the decision on SROS2, simulator and version.362363**Explicit prohibitions:**364365- ❌ **Starting a new project on ROS 1** or keeping one "because it works": Noetic ended in366 **May 2025** and receives no security patches.367- ❌ Running ROS 2 **without SROS2 on a network reachable by anything other than the robot**, or believing that368 `ROS_DOMAIN_ID`, the VLAN or NAT are security.369- ❌ Exposing `rosbridge`, `web_video_server`, Foxglove or any teleoperation interface **without370 authentication**.371- ❌ **Implementing the emergency stop, the torque limit or the safety interlock as ROS 2372 nodes.** The safety function goes in certified hardware/controller.373- ❌ Promising "real time" because you use ROS 2, or because you installed `PREEMPT_RT` without isolating CPUs, without setting374 priorities, without `mlockall` and **without measuring the worst case**.375- ❌ Control logic in `rclpy` inside the hot loop; allocating memory, doing I/O or waiting on376 locks inside a control *callback*.377- ❌ Publishing TF for the same parent→child pair from two nodes, or using `now()` as the timestamp of a378 sensor reading.379- ❌ Using default QoS for everything and debugging by restarting; or declaring a topic "latched" without380 *transient local* **at both ends**.381- ❌ Chaining workspace *overlays* and debugging the wrong binary.382- ❌ Changing a published message (reordering fields, reinterpreting units) without a new type and a383 migration path.384- ❌ Validating only in simulation and calling it done; or testing the first movement at production385 speed with people nearby.386- ❌ Starting anything new on **Gazebo Classic** (EOL 29 Jan 2025) or mixing Gazebo versions with387 the distro they do not correspond to.388- ❌ Treating machine safety (ISO 10218 / the Machinery Regulation) as end-of-project paperwork. It is389 a design requirement with a date: **14 January 2027**.390- ❌ `INFO`/`DEBUG` at sensor frequency in production.391392## 8. Mandatory web verification393394Before deciding, check against the primary source:3953961. **Current distribution and EOL**: `docs.ros.org` (*Releases*/*Distributions* page) and **REP-2000**397 —careful: the REP on `master` **did not yet list Lyrical** when this document was verified, while the398 documentation did; **the distro documentation wins**. Verified: Lyrical Luth 22 May 2026 →399 **May 2031 (LTS)**; Jazzy → May 2029; Humble → **May 2027**; Kilted → Dec 2026.4002. **Platform and dependencies** of the chosen distro on its *Supported Platforms* page (Ubuntu,401 minimum C++/Python, default RMW, Gazebo version). Verified for Lyrical: Ubuntu Resolute402 26.04, C++20/C17, Python 3.12–3.14, `rmw_fastrtps_cpp`, Gazebo Jetty.4033. **REP-3** to confirm that Noetic is still the last ROS 1 release and its EOL (verified:404 *«Noetic Ninjemys (May 2020 - May 2025)»*).4054. **Gazebo**: releases and EOL table at `gazebosim.org/docs/latest/releases/` (verified: Jetty406 →May 2031, Ionic →Dec 2026, Harmonic →May 2029, Fortress →May 2027) and the EOL notice at407 `classic.gazebosim.org` (verified: **29 Jan 2025**).4085. **Security**: that the statement *«By default, none of the security features of DDS are enabled in409 ROS 2»* is still current on `design.ros2.org` and in the `sros2` documentation; security advisories410 for the DDS implementation in use (Fast DDS, Cyclone DDS, Connext) and for the corresponding `rmw`.4116. **Real time**: the status of `PREEMPT_RT` in the kernel version you intend to use (verified:412 merged into **Linux 6.12**, 17 Nov 2024) and the current tuning guide.4137. **Machine safety regulation**: the status of **ISO 10218-1/-2:2025**, of the absorption of414 **ISO/TS 15066** and —**critically**— of their **citation in the OJEU** under Regulation (EU) 2023/1230,415 which was **pending** on the verification date. **Declared gap**: `iso.org` returns416 **HTTP 403** to automated access, so the status of the standards was verified against a specialised417 secondary source; **the normative text has to be bought and read**, and the dates of418 application are cross-checked on EUR-Lex (verified there: *«It shall apply from 14 January 2027»*).4198. **Nav2, MoveIt 2, `ros2_control` and manufacturer drivers**: which distributions they support today and with420 which version; they usually lag behind a freshly released LTS, **and that may decide the distro**.4219. **CVEs** in the stack: kernel, DDS, C++ dependencies and installed `rosdistro` packages.422423If the web contradicts this document, **the web wins** — flag the discrepancy.