Safety-critical software standards
Criteria verified as of August 2026. Re-verify on the web before committing to anything (§8).
1. Scope and triggers
Applies when a software failure can injure or kill someone, or destroy something whose loss
kills: a car, a train, an aircraft, a ventilator, an infusion pump, a press, a turbine. The purpose
of this skill is not writing the code: it is producing the evidence that that code was
developed under a process an authority, a notified body or an independent assessor will accept.
In this domain, code without evidence does not exist.
The distinction that orders the whole document:
- Safety: that the system does no harm when it fails or when the world behaves in an
unexpected way. Adversary: chance, wear, design error, the confused operator.
Metric: probability of dangerous failure per hour, and process rigour.
- Security: that nobody manages to make the system do harm. Adversary: an intelligent
person, with resources, who chooses the worst moment and the worst path.
They are disciplines with different mathematics: safety reasons with random failure rates and
statistical independence; security reasons with an attacker who deliberately breaks that
independence —the common-cause failure mode is caused by him—. That is why a fault tree calculation
does not work for an attack, and why a 2oo3 redundancy of three channels with the same firmware
buys nothing against an adversary even though it buys a lot against chance.
And today they cannot be separated, as a matter of regulation, not opinion: regulation itself has
welded them together. Automotive: UN R155 requires a cybersecurity management system (CSMS) as a
condition of type approval, and UN R156 a software update management system (SUMS) —
mandatory for new vehicle types since July 2022 and for all new vehicles since July 2024
(verify per country, §8). Avionics: the set DO-326A/ED-202A + DO-356A/ED-203A +
DO-355/ED-204 treats information security as an airworthiness process, with EASA's AMC 20-42
as an acceptable means of compliance. Industrial: the ongoing revision of IEC 61508 incorporates
cybersecurity aligned with IEC 62443. Railway: EN 50716:2023 explicitly incorporates
cybersecurity considerations that EN 50128 did not have.
House rule: a hazard analysis that does not consider the intentional cause is incomplete, and a
threat analysis that does not quantify the physical consequence is disconnected.
Both are done, they are cross-checked, and the result goes into the same risk register.
Covers: which standard applies per sector and what integrity level is assigned and how; the V
lifecycle and its artifacts; traceability as the artifact that actually gets audited; structural
coverage; safety analysis (FMEA, FTA, HAZOP, HARA); tool qualification; language and subsets;
determinism, WCET, partitioning and safe state; and how it fits with information security.
Verification note that conditions the whole document: IEC, ISO, RTCA, SAE and CENELEC sell
their standards. Their text could not be read verbatim here. What this document states about the
content of those standards comes from secondary sources (tool vendors, notes from bodies) and
is marked as such in §8. What was verified in accessible primary sources —IEC catalogue records,
CENELEC dates, vendor documentation— is cited with its exact data.
Before committing to a certification plan, you buy the standard and read it. A misquoted objective
here costs an audit cycle.
Not applicable: see ada-standards (the Ada language, SPARK and its toolchain are theirs —levels
Stone→Platinum, gnatprove, Ravenscar/Jorvik profiles, gnatcov, GNAT distributions and their
runtime exception—; here, which coverage criterion and which evidence the standard demands for the
assigned level, which is what that skill explicitly delegates), rust-standards (Rust and its
toolchain are theirs; here only the qualification status of the chain, §2), c-standards and
cpp-standards (owners of MISRA C / MISRA C++ / CERT C, the sanitizers and binary hardening;
here only that a subset is required and with which documented deviations),
embedded-iot-standards (the physical target is theirs: silicon, boot, device tree, memory,
power, firmware image and its field update; here the assurance process of the software that runs on
top), kernel-drivers-standards (supervisor-mode code and its upstream process),
ot-ics-security-standards (the industrial plant and its security are theirs:
IEC 62443, zones and conduits, Purdue model, fieldbus protocols, SIS as an operated asset —
declared boundary: the development of the SIS software under IEC 61508/IEC 61511 belongs here; its
operation, segmentation and monitoring, theirs), grc-compliance-standards (management framework,
SoA, formal acceptance of corporate risk and general audit evidence; here the technical functional
safety dossier, which is another artifact and goes to another auditor),
appsec-standards (STRIDE and application vulnerability classes),
vulnerability-management-standards (CVSS/EPSS/KEV triage — and the reciprocal warning: an IT
patching SLA is not applicable to type-approved equipment), cryptography-pki-standards (algorithms,
curves and key lifecycle, including firmware signing), testing-qa-standards
(general test strategy and the pyramid; here the coverage criterion imposed by the standard,
which is not negotiated with the team), cicd-standards (the pipeline that runs the gates in §4),
healthtech-fhir-standards (sister skill, declared boundary: theirs is health software as an
information product —FHIR, HL7 v2, terminologies, clinical record— and the MDR/IVDR regulatory
classification of whether a piece of software is a medical device; from here the IEC 62304
lifecycle process and the ISO 14971 risk management of that product once classified),
ai-governance-standards (AI Act, AI risk classification and accountability — here the
problem, unsolved, that a learned component has no line-by-line traceable requirements,
§7), incident-management-standards (incident governance),
bcdr-standards, observability-standards, offensive-security-standards (this skill is
defensive).
2. Default decisions
Verify the edition in force and its withdrawal date on the web before pinning it in a real project (§8).
2.1 Which standard rules, by sector
| Sector |
Software standard |
Integrity scale |
Verified as of Aug 2026 |
| Generic / industrial (E/E/PE) |
IEC 61508-3 |
SIL 1 – SIL 4 (4 = most demanding) |
Edition 2.0, published 2010-04-30, in force, stability date 2027 (IEC catalogue record, verbatim). Edition 3 at CDV, publication expected ~2027: do not plan against it |
| Continuous process |
IEC 61511 (sector application of 61508) |
SIL 1–3 in practice |
Outside this skill's detailed scope; see ot-ics-security for its operation |
| Automotive |
ISO 26262-6 (software) |
ASIL A – ASIL D (D = most demanding) + QM |
2018 series. ISO 21448 (SOTIF) covers what 26262 does not: intended function failures with no fault |
| Avionics |
DO-178C / ED-12C |
DAL A – DAL E (A = most demanding, E = no safety effect) |
The DALs are assigned by ARP4754B/ARP4761A, not DO-178C (§2.2) |
| Railway |
EN 50716:2023 |
SIL 0 – SIL 4 |
Verbatim title: "Railway Applications - Requirements for software development". Published 2023-11-16; supersedes EN 50128:2011 (+AC:2014, +A1:2020, +A2:2020) and EN 50657:2017 (+A1:2023); DoW 30-10-2026 — the live date of this domain |
| Medical device |
IEC 62304 |
Class A / B / C |
Class A: no injury is possible; B: non-serious injury; C: death or serious injury (secondary source, §8). Edition 2 in draft with two levels of rigour instead of three classes: not verified against an IEC source (§8) |
| Medical device risk management |
ISO 14971 |
— |
A process, not a scale. Feeds the IEC 62304 classification |
| Space |
ECSS-Q-ST-80C / ECSS-E-ST-40C |
Criticality A–D |
ECSS publishes its standards openly: use it, it is the only body of standards in this domain you can read verbatim without paying |
The SIL ↔ ASIL ↔ DAL cross-mapping that circulates in blog tables is NOT normative. None of the
three standards publishes it as an equivalence, and the scales do not even measure the same thing:
SIL is probabilistic (dangerous failure rate per hour / probability of failure on demand), ASIL is
qualitative (S/E/C matrix), DAL is a failure-condition category assigned at system level.
Operational consequence, no exceptions: a component certified SIL 3 is not declared
ASIL D or DAL B by analogy; you do a documented gap analysis, identify the missing evidence
and produce it. Whoever sells a component as "SIL 3 / equivalent to ASIL D" is selling a
commercial argument, not evidence. ada-standards upholds this same prohibition.
2.2 The avionics nuance that almost everybody quotes wrong
DO-178C does not assign the DAL. The level comes from the safety process at system and
aircraft level: the functional hazard assessment and the safety analysis of ARP4761A
determine the severity of the failure condition, and ARP4754B assigns the FDAL (function
level) and derives the IDAL (item level) for the elements that implement it. DO-178C
defines the assurance objectives to be met given that level, and which ones are "with
independence".
ARP4754B and ARP4761A were published on the same day, 2023-12-20 (SAE; harmonised with EUROCAE's
ED-79B and ED-135), and the split between the two changed: the detail of the safety assessment
activities moved to ARP4761A. If your certification plan cites ARP4754A, check which revision your
authority accepts before rewriting anything.
DO-178C supplements, and when each one applies (they are not optional if you use the technique):
| Supplement |
Applies if |
Effect |
| DO-330 / ED-215 |
You use any tool whose output you do not verify by other means |
Defines the qualification process (§2.3) |
| DO-331 |
Model-based development (the model is the requirement or the design) |
Modifies objectives and what "model review" means |
| DO-332 |
Object orientation and related techniques |
Adds objectives for inheritance, polymorphism, dynamic memory management |
| DO-333 |
Formal methods as a substitute for a verification activity |
Allows replacing testing with mathematical proof under conditions |
2.3 Tool qualification — the rule in one sentence
A tool whose output you do not verify by other means has to be qualified. The corollary that
saves money is the inverse and gets forgotten: if you verify the output independently, there is no
need to qualify it. Qualification exists to replace human work, not to be added to it.
- DO-178C §12.2 / DO-330: three tool criteria — Criterion 1, the tool can
insert an error into the airborne software; Criterion 2, a verification tool that can
fail to detect an error and is used to reduce another activity; Criterion 3, a
verification tool that can fail to detect an error and does not reduce another activity. The
criterion crossed with the software's DAL gives the TQL, from TQL-5 (least demanding) to TQL-1 (rigour
close to DAL A) in Table 12-1 (secondary source, §8).
- ISO 26262-8, cl. 11: you determine TI (tool impact) and TD (confidence in its
error detection) and from there comes the TCL 1–3; TCL1 requires no qualification measures.
- IEC 61508-3 / EN 50716: classes T1 / T2 / T3 — T1 does not generate output that affects the executable,
T2 may fail to detect an error, T3 generates output that forms part of the executable.
What this decides in practice: the compiler is Criterion 1 / T3 / high TI. That is why a
qualified toolchain is a project decision with its own budget, and why
ada-standards insists on the exact status of Ferrocene.
2.4 Language and subset
| Option |
When |
Status as of Aug 2026 |
| C with MISRA C |
What is installed, and what almost every qualified tool supports |
Rules and deviations documented one by one; the subset and its tooling belong to c-standards |
| C++ with MISRA C++ or an agreed subset |
When the design justifies it and with DO-332 in avionics |
No exceptions, no RTTI, no dynamic allocation after initialisation |
| Ada / SPARK |
Maximum integrity; formal proof of absence of run-time error and of properties |
Mature chain, accepted by authorities for decades (ada-standards) |
| Rust with Ferrocene |
New systems, when the required level falls within what is qualified |
Verified on ferrocene.dev, verbatim: "The compiler is TÜV SÜD-qualified for use in safety-critical development according to ISO 26262 (ASIL D)", and also IEC 61508 (SIL 3) and IEC 62304 (Class C); "A certified core subset is available for ISO 26262 (ASIL B) and IEC 61508 (SIL 2)". For SIL 4 and DO-178C (DAL C) the text says "supports customer certification efforts" — support for the customer's effort, NOT qualification at that level. There is literature, academic included, that quotes it wrong |
Cross-cutting prohibition of this section: you do not declare a toolchain qualification level that
does not appear on the body's certificate. You read the certificate, not the press release.
3. Lifecycle, traceability and artifacts
3.1 The V lifecycle, and why it survives
The four standards describe a V lifecycle —requirements → architecture → design → code, and its
right-hand mirror verification branch— not out of conservatism, but because the evidence that gets
audited is the correspondence between the two branches. Agile is compatible: EN 50716:2023 explicitly
admits iterative cycles. What is not negotiable is that each left-hand branch has its verification
on the right, and that both are linked. A sprint that produces code with no traceable requirement
produces code that has to be thrown away.
3.2 Traceability is the product
What an assessor opens first is not the code: it is the traceability matrix. It must close
bidirectionally along the whole chain:
Hazard (hazard log)
→ Safety requirement (with its inherited SIL/ASIL/DAL/Class)
→ High-level software requirement
→ Architecture / design (low-level requirement)
→ Source code (file, function, line)
→ Test case (requirement-based, not code-based)
→ Execution result (with build and environment version)
→ Structural coverage evidence
Hard rules:
- No orphans upwards: code or a test with no requirement to justify it = unrequested
code. In avionics this is exactly the dead code finding (§4.3).
- No orphans downwards: a requirement with no design, no code or no test = an open objective.
- Traceability is generated from the requirements management tool, never by hand in a
spreadsheet. A hand-maintained matrix is out of date the day it is delivered.
- Verification has to be possible: an unverifiable requirement ("the system shall be
robust") is a requirement defect, and it is rejected in review.
- Test cases are derived from the requirement, not from the code. A test written by reading the
implementation proves that the code does what it does.
3.3 The safety case
A structured argument for why the system is acceptably safe in its declared context of use,
with: claim → argument → evidence. GSN (Goal Structuring Notation) is the usual notation and it
is open. It is written at the beginning, not at the end: a safety case drafted after
implementation is a rationalisation, and the assessor can smell it.
And the honest corollary that closes the document (§7): a safety case proves that a process was
followed, not that there are no failures.
4. Quality, analysis and verification
4.1 Hazard analysis — which one, for what
| Technique |
Direction |
Use |
| HAZOP |
Exploratory, guided by keywords (no, more, less, reverse, other than) |
Process systems; finds hazards nobody had stated |
| FMEA / FMEDA |
Inductive: from the component failure mode to the system effect |
Bottom-up; FMEDA adds diagnostic data and feeds diagnostic coverage and hardware SIL |
| FTA (fault tree) |
Deductive: from the hazardous event to its combinations of causes |
Top-down; gives the structure to quantify and to find common-cause failure modes |
| HARA (ISO 26262-3) |
Automotive risk classification |
Output: safety goals, each with its ASIL |
| STPA |
Control-theory based: hazards from interactions, not from component failure |
What FMEA/FTA do not see: correct software that as a whole produces an accident |
ASIL determination (secondary source, §8): for each hazardous event three parameters are
scored and their combination gives the ASIL in a matrix — Severity S0–S3 (S0 no injuries, S3
potentially fatal), Exposure E0–E4 (frequency of the operational situation, not of the
internal failure), Controllability C0–C3 (ability of the driver or another road user to
control the situation). The extreme S3 + E4 + C3 gives ASIL D; any parameter at 0 degrades to
QM (outside the standard's scope). Two consequences that get forgotten:
- Exposure is of the situation, not of the failure. Scoring it with the fault rate is the most
common error and artificially lowers the ASIL.
- Controllability does not credit the item's own technical countermeasures. If the argument is
"the driver can correct it because the system warns him", the argument is circular.
- Where there is justified doubt, the higher class is chosen and the reason documented. An ASIL lowered
without traceable justification is the most expensive finding of an audit.
ASIL decomposition (ISO 26262-9) allows splitting a high ASIL between redundant elements
only if independence is demonstrated; without demonstrated freedom from interference (memory,
timing, information exchange), the decomposition is not valid and the whole set inherits
the highest ASIL. The same thing, under another name, in IEC 62304: the system's class is the highest of
its items unless architectural independence is demonstrated.
4.2 Structural coverage — what each level demands
It is not a quality metric, it is a check that requirement-based testing exercised
the whole structure. It is measured on tests derived from requirements; a test written to raise
coverage invalidates the argument.
| Criterion |
What it demands |
DO-178C (secondary source, §8) |
| Statement |
Every statement executed at least once |
DAL C and above |
| Decision |
Every decision point takes both outcomes |
DAL B and above |
| MC/DC |
In addition, each condition is shown to independently affect the outcome of the decision |
DAL A |
| — |
No structural coverage requirement |
DAL D and DAL E |
MC/DC in DO-178C admits the masking and short-circuit forms, in addition to DO-178B's
unique-cause (a change with respect to DO-178B, secondary source). It is what makes MC/DC achievable
on real code: it demands n+1 cases for n conditions instead of 2^n.
In IEC 61508-3, ISO 26262-6 and EN 50716 the equivalent criterion appears as a recommended
(R) or highly recommended (HR) method per level, not as an absolute number; the level of rigour rises with
SIL/ASIL. The standard fixes the criterion, not the team — and that sentence is literally the boundary that
ada-standards delegates here.
4.3 Dead code and deactivated code — they are not the same
- Dead code: not executable and with no requirement. It is a defect: it is
removed, and whatever is touched is re-verified. It is not justified, not commented out, not left "just in
case".
- Deactivated code: exists with a requirement, and is intentionally
inactive in this configuration (a variant, a factory mode). It is justified, the mechanism that
guarantees it cannot be activated is documented, and that mechanism is verified.
Confusing the two is the classic finding of a coverage audit.
4.4 Gates that break the build, in order of increasing cost
- Compilation with no warnings, with the exact flags of the qualified environment. A binary with warnings
is not delivered.
- Static analysis of the subset (MISRA / project rules) with zero unapproved
deviations. Every deviation has a record: rule, reason, scope, impact analysis, approver.
- Static analysis of run-time errors (overflow, division by zero, out-of-range
access) or formal proof where the language allows it.
- Requirement-based testing, including robustness and error cases — out-of-range
values, corrupted inputs, redundant channel failure. In this domain error cases are not "edges":
they are the requirement.
- Structural coverage at the level's criterion, with analysis of each gap (not with a
global exception).
- Timing (WCET) and stack analysis (§6).
- Verification of full traceability as a CI job: any orphan breaks the build.
- Build reproducibility: the delivered binary is rebuilt bit for bit from the
repository in the declared environment. A binary that cannot be rebuilt cannot be
certified or patched ten years from now.
5. Stack security (where safety and security touch)
- A mandatory threat analysis, with the physical consequence as the impact. STRIDE belongs to
appsec-standards; what is specific here is that the impact is not "data leak", it is "the brake does
not act". In automotive, the ISO/SAE 21434 TARA is the artifact; in avionics, the
risk assessment of DO-326A; in industrial, the IEC 62443-3-2 assessment.
- The attack surface is a functional safety architecture decision: every
interface added (diagnostics, telemetry, OTA, shared bus) is a new path to the
critical element and its isolation has to be argued in the safety case, not just in the
security one.
- Field update: firmware signed and verified before execution, with anti-rollback
and boot to a known good image on failure. In a type-approved product, an update
can invalidate the type approval: the change process (impact on the evidence, re-verification,
notification to the authority or notified body) is defined before the first OTA, not on
the first vulnerability. UN R156 exists precisely for this.
- Debug ports: JTAG/SWD/console disabled or cryptographically locked in
production; their state is a verifiable requirement with its test, not a manufacturing task.
- Vulnerability management: the IT patching SLA cannot be applied to type-approved
equipment with years-long re-verification cycles. What is required: an SBOM of the embedded tree,
active CVE watch over it, real exploitability analysis in the product's context
(VEX) and documented compensating controls for what will not be patched.
ot-ics-security
upholds the same criteria for the plant.
- Domain segregation: the critical does not share core, memory or bus with the non-critical without
a demonstrated partitioning mechanism (§6.3). An infotainment and a traction control on the same
SoC is a functional safety decision, and it has to be defended.
6. Determinism, timing and safe state
6.1 Determinism before performance
In this domain, the worst case is the only case that matters. Design consequences, not
recommendations:
- ❌ No dynamic memory allocation after the initialisation phase. Everything there is is
reserved at start-up; the heap is not analysable and its fragmentation is not boundable.
- ❌ No unbounded recursion (and with the bound demonstrated, not assumed).
- ❌ No loops with an undemonstrable bound.
- Stack size calculated and verified, not estimated. Stack overflow is the classic silent
failure of this domain.
6.2 WCET — and its honesty
The worst-case execution time is analysed, not measured with a benchmark: measurement
gives the worst observed case, which is not the worst case. The usual methods are static analysis
of the binary, hybrid measurement on the real hardware, or both. And the warning that decides architecture:
on a multicore with shared caches and buses, a task's WCET depends on what the others do;
without interference control (cache partitioning, memory bandwidth budgeting),
a WCET analysis per isolated task is not valid. In avionics this has its own guidance
(CAST-32A / AMC 20-193, verify the status with your authority, §8).
6.3 Partitioning
If different criticalities coexist on the same processor, you must demonstrate spatial and temporal
independence: MMU/MPU for memory, budgeted scheduling for time, and control of
the shared channels (cache, DMA, bus, interrupts). ARINC 653 is the reference model
in avionics; in automotive, the freedom from interference of ISO 26262-6 annex D. Without that
demonstration, all the core's software inherits the highest level — which is usually
economically unviable, and that is why partitioning is decided at the beginning or it is not decided.
6.4 Safe state and degradation
- Every design declares its safe state and the fault tolerant time interval (FTTI in
ISO 26262): how long the system can be in a fault state before the hazard materialises. The whole
detection + reaction budget has to fit in there.
- "Shutting down" is not always safe. A train stops safely; an aircraft in flight does not; a
ventilator does not either. The safe state is domain-specific and is justified in the hazard
analysis, it is not assumed.
- Watchdog external to the processor it watches, with a window (minimum and maximum), fed by a
real progress check and not by a timer that kicks no matter what. A
watchdog fed from an interrupt independent of the application watches nothing.
- Explicit and tested degraded mode: which functions are lost, how the operator is informed, and
how it is exited. An untested degraded mode is an unknown mode.
- Logging for later investigation: what is logged, where it survives a power cut, and how it is
extracted. In an accident, evidence that does not exist cannot be reconstructed.
7. Sustainability, honesty and prohibitions
Long lifecycle: these products live 15–30 years. Consequences decided today:
freeze and archive the complete build environment (exact compiler, version, patches, operating
system, tools and their certificates) reproducibly; keep the traceability of the
evidence with the product, not on the laptop of whoever left; and budget for re-verification
per change from day one — in this domain, the cost of a change is the cost of demonstrating it
again, not of writing it.
Standard transition: EN 50716 has DoW 30-10-2026; IEC 61508 Ed. 3 is expected ~2027;
IEC 62304 Ed. 2 is in draft. A multi-year project picks its reference edition and documents
it; changing edition midway is a scope change, with its impact analysis.
The learned component (ML) is the open problem of this domain. It has no line-by-line traceable
requirements, its structural coverage means nothing, and its out-of-distribution
behaviour is not demonstrable with the methods in §4. Emerging guidance exists (ISO 21448 SOTIF for
intended-function failure, EASA and automotive industry work), but as of today there
is no universally accepted route to certify a critical function implemented with
learning. If your design depends on one, the argument has to be architectural —a
deterministic, verifiable monitor that bounds what the model can do— not statistical. The
governance of the AI system belongs to ai-governance-standards; the safety argument belongs here, and
today it is hard.
The final honesty, and it is the sentence to say to whoever signs the cheque: certification
does not prove the absence of failures. It proves that a recognised process was followed with rigour
proportional to the risk, and that there is evidence of it. Certified systems have killed people.
Treating the certificate as a guarantee of correctness is exactly the error that produces the next
accident; treating it as what it is —a disciplined reduction of the probability of systematic
error— is what makes the process worth its cost.
Prohibitions:
- ❌ FORBIDDEN to present the SIL↔ASIL↔DAL mapping as normative, or to reuse a component across
standards without a documented gap analysis (§2.1).
ada-standards forbids the same.
- ❌ FORBIDDEN to state the content of a standard you have not read. If you do not have the copy, say so and
cite the secondary source as such.
- ❌ Saying that "DO-178C assigns the DAL". ARP4754B/ARP4761A assign it (§2.2).
- ❌ Confusing "qualified for X" with "supports certification efforts towards X" in a
toolchain (§2.4). It is the most frequent citation error about Ferrocene.
- ❌ Using a tool whose output you do not verify without qualifying it — and also its inverse:
qualifying a tool whose output you do verify independently, paying for nothing.
- ❌ Writing tests to raise coverage. It invalidates the entire argument of §4.2.
- ❌ Leaving dead code justifying it as "deactivated" (§4.3).
- ❌ Dynamic memory allocation after initialisation, unbounded recursion, loops with no demonstrable
bound (§6.1).
- ❌ Declaring a WCET measured with a benchmark, or a per-isolated-task WCET on a multicore with
shared resources and no interference control (§6.2).
- ❌ Mixing criticalities on one processor without demonstrating spatial and temporal partitioning (§6.3).
- ❌ A watchdog fed by a blind timer, or internal to the element it watches.
- ❌ A degraded mode that has not been tested, or a "safe state" that was assumed without coming out of the
hazard analysis.
- ❌ Debug ports active in production.
- ❌ A deliverable binary that cannot be rebuilt bit for bit from the repository (§4.4).
- ❌ A traceability matrix maintained by hand in a spreadsheet (§3.2).
- ❌ A safety case written after the implementation.
- ❌ Applying an IT patching SLA to a type-approved product, and its inverse: using the type approval
as an excuse not to watch CVEs or maintain an SBOM (§5).
- ❌ Deploying an OTA without having first defined the change's impact on the evidence and on the
type approval (§5).
- ❌ Treating the certificate as proof that the software has no failures (§7).
8. Mandatory web verification
Before pinning anything in a real project, check on the web:
- The edition in force of your standard and its withdrawal date, in the body's catalogue:
the IEC record (accessible and reliable: that of IEC 61508-3:2010, ed. 2.0, 2010-04-30, in force,
stability 2027, is verified here), the CENELEC catalogue for EN 50716 (published
2023-11-16, DoW 30-10-2026, verified) and iso.org — warning: iso.org returns 403 to
automated fetching; use the catalogue of your national standards body (UNE/AENOR,
DIN, BSI).
- Status of the ongoing revisions: IEC 61508 Ed. 3 (at CDV, publication expected ~2027) and
IEC 62304 Ed. 2 (draft, with the change to two levels of rigour instead of three classes).
Both data points come from secondary sources and have NOT been verified against an IEC source: declared
gap. Do not plan against an unpublished edition.
- The normative content cited in §2, §4.1 and §4.2 —IEC 62304 classes, the ASIL S/E/C matrix,
structural coverage per DAL, TQL/Table 12-1 of DO-178C, T1/T2/T3 criteria— comes from secondary
sources (tool vendors and consultancies), because IEC, ISO, RTCA, SAE and CENELEC do not
publish the text. Declared gap: check it against the purchased copy of the standard before
committing to it in a certification plan.
- Which ARP4754/ARP4761 revision your authority accepts: ARP4754B and ARP4761A were published on
2023-12-20 (verified as a date; the content, not). Many live plans still cite
ARP4754A and the authority may accept both.
- Qualification status of your toolchain, read on the body's certificate,
not on the marketing site. For Ferrocene, the distinction qualified (ISO 26262
ASIL D, IEC 61508 SIL 3, IEC 62304 Class C;
core subset certified for ASIL B and SIL 2)
versus "supports customer certification efforts" (IEC 61508 SIL 4, DO-178C DAL C) is
verified verbatim on ferrocene.dev as of Aug 2026 — check it again, it changes with every
release, and coordinate it with ada-standards, which upholds the same data point.
- Your authority's multicore guidance (CAST-32A, EASA's AMC 20-193 and its FAA equivalent): its
status and what exactly it demands about interference. Not verified here: declared gap.
- Sector regulatory dates: UN R155/R156 (new types Jul 2022, all new
vehicles Jul 2024 in the EU, per a secondary source and the British agency VCA — verify it in
the UNECE text and in your jurisdiction), status of cybersecurity in avionics (EASA's AMC 20-42,
FAA rulemaking in progress), and the Cyber Resilience Act with
embedded-iot-standards.
- ECSS standards: published openly at
ecss.nl. If your domain is space, it is the only
corpus in this document you can read verbatim without paying — use it.
- CVEs of the embedded tree (RTOS, network stack, cryptography, C libraries), with
vulnerability-management-standards, and maintenance status of every third-party component
with safety evidence ("SEooC", safety element out of context) you have bought.
If the web contradicts this document, the web wins — flag the discrepancy.
1---2name: safety-critical-standards3description: Functional safety and certification evidence for software whose failure can injure or kill. Use when working to IEC 61508 (SIL 1-4, systematic capability, route 1S/2S), ISO 26262 (ASIL A-D, HARA with severity/exposure/controllability, ASIL decomposition, freedom from interference, ISO 21448 SOTIF), DO-178C/ED-12C with its supplements DO-330, DO-331, DO-332 and DO-333, DAL/FDAL/IDAL assigned by ARP4754B and ARP4761A, DO-326A/ED-202A and DO-356A airworthiness security, EN 50128 or EN 50716:2023 and EN 50126/EN 50129 railway software, IEC 62304 software safety classes A/B/C with ISO 14971 risk management, ISO/SAE 21434 and UN R155/R156, a hazard log or safety case (GSN), FMEA/FMEDA, fault tree analysis, HAZOP, requirement-to-design-to-code-to-test traceability matrices, structural coverage (statement, decision, MC/DC) and dead or deactivated code, tool qualification (TQL-1..TQL-5, tool criteria 1/2/3, TCL1-3, T1/T2/T3), MISRA C or MISRA C++ or SPARK/Ada subsets, Ferrocene qualified Rust, WCET and stack analysis, ARINC 653 or MMU-based partitioning, watchdogs and safe degraded states, or assembling evidence for an assessor, DER or notified body.4metadata:5 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/serialexperimentslainnnn/safety-critical-standards6---78# Safety-critical software standards910Criteria verified as of **August 2026**. Re-verify on the web before committing to anything (§8).1112## 1. Scope and triggers1314Applies when **a software failure can injure or kill someone**, or destroy something whose loss15kills: a car, a train, an aircraft, a ventilator, an infusion pump, a press, a turbine. The purpose16of this skill **is not writing the code**: it is **producing the evidence** that that code was17developed under a process an authority, a notified body or an independent assessor will accept.18In this domain, **code without evidence does not exist**.1920**The distinction that orders the whole document:**2122- ***Safety***: that the system **does no harm** when it fails or when the world behaves in an23 unexpected way. Adversary: chance, wear, design error, the confused operator.24 Metric: probability of dangerous failure per hour, and process rigour.25- ***Security***: that **nobody manages** to make the system do harm. Adversary: an intelligent26 person, with resources, who **chooses** the worst moment and the worst path.2728They are disciplines with different mathematics: *safety* reasons with random failure rates and29statistical independence; *security* reasons with an attacker who **deliberately breaks that30independence** —the common-cause failure mode is caused by him—. That is why a fault tree calculation31does not work for an attack, and why a 2oo3 redundancy of three channels with the same firmware32**buys nothing** against an adversary even though it buys a lot against chance.3334**And today they cannot be separated, as a matter of regulation, not opinion**: regulation itself has35welded them together. Automotive: **UN R155** requires a cybersecurity management system (CSMS) as a36condition of **type approval**, and **UN R156** a software update management system (SUMS) —37mandatory for new vehicle types since **July 2022** and for all new vehicles since **July 2024**38(verify per country, §8). Avionics: the set **DO-326A/ED-202A** + **DO-356A/ED-203A** +39**DO-355/ED-204** treats information security **as an airworthiness process**, with EASA's AMC 20-4240as an acceptable means of compliance. Industrial: the ongoing revision of **IEC 61508** incorporates41cybersecurity aligned with **IEC 62443**. Railway: **EN 50716:2023** explicitly incorporates42cybersecurity considerations that EN 50128 did not have.4344**House rule**: *a hazard analysis that does not consider the intentional cause is incomplete, and a45threat analysis that does not quantify the physical consequence is disconnected.*46Both are done, they are cross-checked, and the result goes **into the same risk register**.4748Covers: which standard applies per sector and what integrity level is assigned and how; the V49lifecycle and its artifacts; traceability as the artifact that actually gets audited; structural50coverage; safety analysis (FMEA, FTA, HAZOP, HARA); tool qualification; language and subsets;51determinism, WCET, partitioning and safe state; and how it fits with information security.5253**Verification note that conditions the whole document**: **IEC, ISO, RTCA, SAE and CENELEC sell54their standards.** Their text **could not** be read verbatim here. What this document states about the55*content* of those standards comes from secondary sources (tool vendors, notes from bodies) and56**is marked as such in §8**. What was verified in accessible primary sources —IEC catalogue records,57CENELEC dates, vendor documentation— is cited with its exact data.58**Before committing to a certification plan, you buy the standard and read it.** A misquoted objective59here costs an audit cycle.6061**Not applicable**: see `ada-standards` (**the Ada language, SPARK and its toolchain are theirs** —levels62Stone→Platinum, `gnatprove`, Ravenscar/Jorvik profiles, `gnatcov`, GNAT distributions and their63runtime exception—; **here, which coverage criterion and which evidence the standard demands for the64assigned level**, which is what that skill explicitly delegates), `rust-standards` (**Rust and its65toolchain are theirs**; here only the qualification status of the chain, §2), `c-standards` and66`cpp-standards` (**owners of MISRA C / MISRA C++ / CERT C, the sanitizers and binary hardening**;67here only *that* a subset is required and with which documented deviations),68`embedded-iot-standards` (**the physical target is theirs**: silicon, boot, device tree, memory,69power, firmware image and its field update; here the assurance process of the software that runs on70top), `kernel-drivers-standards` (supervisor-mode code and its upstream process),71`ot-ics-security-standards` (**the industrial plant and its security are theirs**:72IEC 62443, zones and conduits, Purdue model, fieldbus protocols, SIS as an operated asset —73**declared boundary: the *development* of the SIS software under IEC 61508/IEC 61511 belongs here; its74*operation*, segmentation and monitoring, theirs**), `grc-compliance-standards` (management framework,75SoA, formal acceptance of corporate risk and **general** audit evidence; here the technical functional76safety dossier, which is another artifact and goes to another auditor),77`appsec-standards` (STRIDE and application vulnerability classes),78`vulnerability-management-standards` (CVSS/EPSS/KEV triage — **and the reciprocal warning: an IT79patching SLA is not applicable to type-approved equipment**), `cryptography-pki-standards` (algorithms,80curves and key lifecycle, including firmware signing), `testing-qa-standards`81(**general test strategy and the pyramid**; here the coverage criterion **imposed by the standard**,82which is not negotiated with the team), `cicd-standards` (the pipeline that runs the gates in §4),83`healthtech-fhir-standards` (**sister skill, declared boundary**: **theirs** is health software as an84information product —FHIR, HL7 v2, terminologies, clinical record— and **the MDR/IVDR regulatory85classification of whether a piece of software is a medical device**; **from here** the IEC 6230486lifecycle process and the ISO 14971 risk management of that product once classified),87`ai-governance-standards` (AI Act, AI risk classification and accountability — **here the88problem, unsolved, that a learned component has no line-by-line traceable requirements**,89§7), `incident-management-standards` (incident governance),90`bcdr-standards`, `observability-standards`, `offensive-security-standards` (**this skill is91defensive**).9293## 2. Default decisions9495> Verify the edition in force and its withdrawal date on the web before pinning it in a real project (§8).9697### 2.1 Which standard rules, by sector9899| Sector | Software standard | Integrity scale | Verified as of Aug 2026 |100|---|---|---|---|101| Generic / industrial (E/E/PE) | **IEC 61508-3** | **SIL 1 – SIL 4** (4 = most demanding) | Edition **2.0, published 2010-04-30, in force, stability date 2027** (IEC catalogue record, verbatim). **Edition 3 at CDV**, publication expected ~2027: **do not plan against it** |102| Continuous process | **IEC 61511** (sector application of 61508) | SIL 1–3 in practice | Outside this skill's detailed scope; see `ot-ics-security` for its operation |103| Automotive | **ISO 26262-6** (software) | **ASIL A – ASIL D** (**D = most demanding**) + **QM** | 2018 series. **ISO 21448 (SOTIF)** covers what 26262 does **not**: *intended function* failures with no fault |104| Avionics | **DO-178C / ED-12C** | **DAL A – DAL E** (**A = most demanding**, E = no safety effect) | The **DALs are assigned by ARP4754B/ARP4761A**, not DO-178C (§2.2) |105| Railway | **EN 50716:2023** | SIL 0 – SIL 4 | **Verbatim title: "Railway Applications - Requirements for software development"**. Published **2023-11-16**; **supersedes EN 50128:2011 (+AC:2014, +A1:2020, +A2:2020) and EN 50657:2017 (+A1:2023)**; **DoW 30-10-2026** — the live date of this domain |106| Medical device | **IEC 62304** | **Class A / B / C** | Class A: no injury is possible; B: non-serious injury; C: death or serious injury (secondary source, §8). **Edition 2 in draft** with **two levels of rigour** instead of three classes: not verified against an IEC source (§8) |107| Medical device risk management | **ISO 14971** | — | A process, not a scale. Feeds the IEC 62304 classification |108| Space | ECSS-Q-ST-80C / ECSS-E-ST-40C | Criticality A–D | ECSS publishes its standards **openly**: use it, it is the only body of standards in this domain you can read verbatim without paying |109110**The SIL ↔ ASIL ↔ DAL cross-mapping that circulates in blog tables is NOT normative.** None of the111three standards publishes it as an equivalence, and the scales do not even measure the same thing:112**SIL is probabilistic** (dangerous failure rate per hour / probability of failure on demand), **ASIL is113qualitative** (S/E/C matrix), **DAL is a failure-condition category** assigned at system level.114Operational consequence, no exceptions: **a component certified SIL 3 is not declared115ASIL D or DAL B by analogy**; you do a documented *gap analysis*, identify the missing evidence116and produce it. Whoever sells a component as "SIL 3 / equivalent to ASIL D" is selling a117commercial argument, not evidence. `ada-standards` upholds this same prohibition.118119### 2.2 The avionics nuance that almost everybody quotes wrong120121**DO-178C does not assign the DAL.** The level comes from the safety process **at system and122aircraft level**: the functional hazard assessment and the safety analysis of **ARP4761A**123determine the severity of the failure condition, and **ARP4754B** assigns the **FDAL** (function124level) and derives the **IDAL** (item level) for the elements that implement it. **DO-178C125defines the assurance objectives to be met *given* that level**, and which ones are "with126independence".127128**ARP4754B and ARP4761A were published on the same day, 2023-12-20** (SAE; harmonised with EUROCAE's129ED-79B and ED-135), and the split between the two changed: the detail of the safety assessment130activities moved to ARP4761A. **If your certification plan cites ARP4754A, check which revision your131authority accepts** before rewriting anything.132133DO-178C supplements, and **when each one applies** (they are not optional if you use the technique):134135| Supplement | Applies if | Effect |136|---|---|---|137| **DO-330 / ED-215** | You use **any tool** whose output you do not verify by other means | Defines the qualification process (§2.3) |138| **DO-331** | Model-based development (the model *is* the requirement or the design) | Modifies objectives and what "model review" means |139| **DO-332** | Object orientation and related techniques | Adds objectives for inheritance, polymorphism, dynamic memory management |140| **DO-333** | Formal methods **as a substitute** for a verification activity | Allows replacing testing with mathematical proof **under conditions** |141142### 2.3 Tool qualification — the rule in one sentence143144**A tool whose output you do not verify by other means has to be qualified.** The corollary that145saves money is the inverse and gets forgotten: **if you verify the output independently, there is no146need to qualify it**. Qualification exists to *replace* human work, not to be added to it.147148- **DO-178C §12.2 / DO-330**: three tool **criteria** — **Criterion 1**, the tool can149 **insert** an error into the airborne software; **Criterion 2**, a verification tool that can150 **fail to detect** an error **and** is used to reduce another activity; **Criterion 3**, a151 verification tool that can fail to detect an error **and does not** reduce another activity. The152 criterion crossed with the software's DAL gives the **TQL, from TQL-5 (least demanding) to TQL-1 (rigour153 close to DAL A)** in Table 12-1 (secondary source, §8).154- **ISO 26262-8, cl. 11**: you determine **TI** (tool impact) and **TD** (confidence in its155 error detection) and from there comes the **TCL 1–3**; TCL1 requires no qualification measures.156- **IEC 61508-3 / EN 50716**: classes **T1 / T2 / T3** — T1 does not generate output that affects the executable,157 T2 may fail to detect an error, T3 generates output that forms part of the executable.158159**What this decides in practice**: the compiler is Criterion 1 / T3 / high TI. That is why a160**qualified** toolchain is a project decision with its own budget, and why161`ada-standards` insists on the exact status of Ferrocene.162163### 2.4 Language and subset164165| Option | When | Status as of Aug 2026 |166|---|---|---|167| **C with MISRA C** | What is installed, and what almost every qualified tool supports | Rules and deviations documented one by one; the subset and its tooling belong to `c-standards` |168| **C++ with MISRA C++** or an agreed subset | When the design justifies it and with **DO-332** in avionics | No exceptions, no RTTI, no dynamic allocation after initialisation |169| **Ada / SPARK** | Maximum integrity; formal proof of absence of run-time error and of properties | Mature chain, accepted by authorities for decades (`ada-standards`) |170| **Rust with Ferrocene** | New systems, when the required level falls within what is qualified | **Verified on ferrocene.dev, verbatim**: *"The compiler is TÜV SÜD-qualified for use in safety-critical development according to ISO 26262 (ASIL D)"*, and also **IEC 61508 (SIL 3)** and **IEC 62304 (Class C)**; *"A certified core subset is available for ISO 26262 (ASIL B) and IEC 61508 (SIL 2)"*. For **SIL 4** and **DO-178C (DAL C)** the text says **"supports customer certification efforts"** — **support for the customer's effort, NOT qualification at that level**. There is literature, academic included, that quotes it wrong |171172**Cross-cutting prohibition of this section**: **you do not declare a toolchain qualification level that173does not appear on the body's certificate**. You read the certificate, not the press release.174175## 3. Lifecycle, traceability and artifacts176177### 3.1 The V lifecycle, and why it survives178179The four standards describe a V lifecycle —requirements → architecture → design → code, and its180right-hand mirror verification branch— **not out of conservatism, but because the evidence that gets181audited is the correspondence between the two branches**. Agile is compatible: EN 50716:2023 explicitly182admits iterative cycles. What is **not** negotiable is that **each left-hand branch has its verification183on the right, and that both are linked**. A sprint that produces code with no traceable requirement184produces code that has to be thrown away.185186### 3.2 Traceability is the product187188What an assessor opens first is not the code: it is the **traceability matrix**. It must close189**bidirectionally** along the whole chain:190191```192Hazard (hazard log)193 → Safety requirement (with its inherited SIL/ASIL/DAL/Class)194 → High-level software requirement195 → Architecture / design (low-level requirement)196 → Source code (file, function, line)197 → Test case (requirement-based, not code-based)198 → Execution result (with build and environment version)199 → Structural coverage evidence200```201202Hard rules:2031. **No orphans upwards**: code or a test with no requirement to justify it = unrequested204 code. In avionics this is exactly the **dead code** finding (§4.3).2052. **No orphans downwards**: a requirement with no design, no code or no test = an open objective.2063. **Traceability is generated from the requirements management tool, never by hand in a207 spreadsheet.** A hand-maintained matrix is out of date the day it is delivered.2084. **Verification has to be possible**: an unverifiable requirement ("the system shall be209 robust") is a requirement defect, and it is rejected in review.2105. **Test cases are derived from the requirement**, not from the code. A test written by reading the211 implementation proves that the code does what it does.212213### 3.3 The safety case214215A structured argument for why the system is acceptably safe **in its declared context of use**,216with: claim → argument → evidence. **GSN** (Goal Structuring Notation) is the usual notation and it217is open. It is written **at the beginning**, not at the end: a safety case drafted after218implementation is a rationalisation, and the assessor can smell it.219220**And the honest corollary that closes the document (§7): a safety case proves that a process was221followed, not that there are no failures.**222223## 4. Quality, analysis and verification224225### 4.1 Hazard analysis — which one, for what226227| Technique | Direction | Use |228|---|---|---|229| **HAZOP** | Exploratory, guided by keywords (*no, more, less, reverse, other than*) | Process systems; finds hazards nobody had stated |230| **FMEA / FMEDA** | **Inductive**: from the component failure mode to the system effect | Bottom-up; FMEDA adds diagnostic data and feeds diagnostic coverage and hardware SIL |231| **FTA** (fault tree) | **Deductive**: from the hazardous event to its combinations of causes | Top-down; gives the structure to quantify and to find **common-cause failure modes** |232| **HARA** (ISO 26262-3) | Automotive risk classification | Output: safety goals, each with its ASIL |233| **STPA** | Control-theory based: hazards from **interactions**, not from component failure | What FMEA/FTA do not see: correct software that as a whole produces an accident |234235**ASIL determination** (secondary source, §8): for each *hazardous event* three parameters are236scored and their combination gives the ASIL in a matrix — **Severity S0–S3** (S0 no injuries, S3237potentially fatal), **Exposure E0–E4** (frequency of the **operational situation**, not of the238internal failure), **Controllability C0–C3** (ability of the driver or another road user to239control the situation). The extreme **S3 + E4 + C3 gives ASIL D**; any parameter at 0 degrades to240**QM** (outside the standard's scope). Two consequences that get forgotten:241- **Exposure is of the situation, not of the failure.** Scoring it with the fault rate is the most242 common error and artificially lowers the ASIL.243- **Controllability does not credit the item's own technical countermeasures.** If the argument is244 "the driver can correct it because the system warns him", the argument is circular.245- Where there is justified doubt, **the higher class is chosen** and the reason documented. An ASIL lowered246 without traceable justification is the most expensive finding of an audit.247248**ASIL decomposition** (ISO 26262-9) allows splitting a high ASIL between redundant elements249**only if independence is demonstrated**; without demonstrated *freedom from interference* (memory,250timing, information exchange), the decomposition is not valid and **the whole set inherits251the highest ASIL**. The same thing, under another name, in IEC 62304: the system's class is the highest of252its items unless architectural independence is demonstrated.253254### 4.2 Structural coverage — what each level demands255256**It is not a quality metric, it is a check that requirement-based testing exercised257the whole structure.** It is measured on tests derived from requirements; **a test written to raise258coverage invalidates the argument**.259260| Criterion | What it demands | DO-178C (secondary source, §8) |261|---|---|---|262| **Statement** | Every statement executed at least once | **DAL C** and above |263| **Decision** | Every decision point takes both outcomes | **DAL B** and above |264| **MC/DC** | In addition, **each condition is shown to independently affect the outcome** of the decision | **DAL A** |265| — | No structural coverage requirement | DAL D and DAL E |266267**MC/DC in DO-178C admits the *masking* and *short-circuit* forms, in addition to DO-178B's268*unique-cause*** (a change with respect to DO-178B, secondary source). It is what makes MC/DC achievable269on real code: it demands `n+1` cases for `n` conditions instead of `2^n`.270271In IEC 61508-3, ISO 26262-6 and EN 50716 the equivalent criterion appears as a **recommended272(R) or highly recommended (HR) method per level**, not as an absolute number; the level of rigour rises with273SIL/ASIL. **The standard fixes the criterion, not the team** — and that sentence is literally the boundary that274`ada-standards` delegates here.275276### 4.3 Dead code and deactivated code — they are not the same277278- **Dead code**: not executable and **with no requirement**. It is a **defect**: it is279 **removed**, and whatever is touched is re-verified. It is not justified, not commented out, not left "just in280 case".281- **Deactivated code**: exists **with a requirement**, and is intentionally282 inactive in this configuration (a variant, a factory mode). It is **justified**, the mechanism that283 guarantees it cannot be activated is documented, and **that mechanism** is verified.284 Confusing the two is the classic finding of a coverage audit.285286### 4.4 Gates that break the build, in order of increasing cost2872881. **Compilation with no warnings**, with the exact flags of the qualified environment. A binary with warnings289 is not delivered.2902. **Static analysis of the subset** (MISRA / project rules) with **zero unapproved291 deviations**. Every deviation has a record: rule, reason, scope, impact analysis, approver.2923. **Static analysis of run-time errors** (overflow, division by zero, out-of-range293 access) or **formal proof** where the language allows it.2944. **Requirement-based testing**, including **robustness and error cases** — out-of-range295 values, corrupted inputs, redundant channel failure. In this domain **error cases are not "edges":296 they are the requirement**.2975. **Structural coverage at the level's criterion**, with analysis of each gap (not with a298 global exception).2996. **Timing (WCET) and stack analysis** (§6).3007. **Verification of full traceability** as a CI job: any orphan breaks the build.3018. **Build reproducibility**: the delivered binary is rebuilt bit for bit from the302 repository in the declared environment. **A binary that cannot be rebuilt cannot be303 certified** or patched ten years from now.304305## 5. Stack security (where *safety* and *security* touch)306307- **A mandatory threat analysis, with the physical consequence as the impact.** STRIDE belongs to308 `appsec-standards`; what is specific here is that **the impact is not "data leak", it is "the brake does309 not act"**. In automotive, the **ISO/SAE 21434** TARA is the artifact; in avionics, the310 risk assessment of **DO-326A**; in industrial, the **IEC 62443-3-2** assessment.311- **The attack surface is a functional safety architecture decision**: every312 interface added (diagnostics, telemetry, OTA, shared bus) is a new path to the313 critical element and **its isolation has to be argued in the safety case**, not just in the314 security one.315- **Field update**: firmware **signed and verified before execution**, with anti-rollback316 and boot to a known good image on failure. In a type-approved product, **an update317 can invalidate the type approval**: the change process (impact on the evidence, re-verification,318 notification to the authority or notified body) is defined **before** the first OTA, not on319 the first vulnerability. UN R156 exists precisely for this.320- **Debug ports**: JTAG/SWD/console disabled or cryptographically locked in321 production; their state is a verifiable requirement with its test, not a manufacturing task.322- **Vulnerability management**: the IT patching SLA **cannot be applied** to type-approved323 equipment with years-long re-verification cycles. What is required: **an SBOM of the embedded tree**,324 active CVE watch over it, **real exploitability analysis in the product's context**325 (VEX) and **documented compensating controls** for what will not be patched. `ot-ics-security`326 upholds the same criteria for the plant.327- **Domain segregation**: the critical does not share core, memory or bus with the non-critical without328 a demonstrated partitioning mechanism (§6.3). An infotainment and a traction control on the same329 SoC **is a functional safety decision**, and it has to be defended.330331## 6. Determinism, timing and safe state332333### 6.1 Determinism before performance334335In this domain, **the worst case is the only case that matters**. Design consequences, not336recommendations:337338- ❌ **No dynamic memory allocation after the initialisation phase.** Everything there is is339 reserved at start-up; the *heap* is not analysable and its fragmentation is not boundable.340- ❌ **No unbounded recursion** (and with the bound demonstrated, not assumed).341- ❌ **No loops with an undemonstrable bound.**342- **Stack size calculated and verified**, not estimated. Stack overflow is the classic silent343 failure of this domain.344345### 6.2 WCET — and its honesty346347The **worst-case execution time** is **analysed**, not measured with a `benchmark`: measurement348gives the worst *observed* case, which is not the worst case. The usual methods are static analysis349of the binary, hybrid measurement on the real hardware, or both. **And the warning that decides architecture:350on a multicore with shared caches and buses, a task's WCET depends on what the others do**;351without interference control (cache partitioning, memory bandwidth budgeting),352a WCET analysis per isolated task is not valid. In avionics this has its own guidance353(CAST-32A / AMC 20-193, verify the status with your authority, §8).354355### 6.3 Partitioning356357If different criticalities coexist on the same processor, you must demonstrate **spatial and temporal358independence**: MMU/MPU for memory, budgeted scheduling for time, and control of359the shared channels (cache, DMA, bus, interrupts). **ARINC 653** is the reference model360in avionics; in automotive, the *freedom from interference* of ISO 26262-6 annex D. Without that361demonstration, **all the core's software inherits the highest level** — which is usually362economically unviable, and that is why partitioning is decided at the beginning or it is not decided.363364### 6.4 Safe state and degradation365366- **Every design declares its safe state** and the **fault tolerant time interval** (FTTI in367 ISO 26262): how long the system can be in a fault state before the hazard materialises. The whole368 detection + reaction budget has to fit in there.369- **"Shutting down" is not always safe.** A train stops safely; an aircraft in flight does not; a370 ventilator does not either. **The safe state is domain-specific and is justified in the hazard371 analysis**, it is not assumed.372- **Watchdog external to the processor it watches**, with a window (minimum and maximum), fed by a373 real progress check and not by a timer that *kicks* no matter what. A374 watchdog fed from an interrupt independent of the application watches nothing.375- **Explicit and tested degraded mode**: which functions are lost, how the operator is informed, and376 how it is exited. An untested degraded mode is an unknown mode.377- **Logging for later investigation**: what is logged, where it survives a power cut, and how it is378 extracted. In an accident, evidence that does not exist cannot be reconstructed.379380## 7. Sustainability, honesty and prohibitions381382**Long lifecycle**: these products live 15–30 years. Consequences decided today:383freeze and **archive the complete build environment** (exact compiler, version, patches, operating384system, tools and their certificates) reproducibly; keep the traceability of the385evidence with the product, not on the laptop of whoever left; and budget for **re-verification386per change** from day one — in this domain, **the cost of a change is the cost of demonstrating it387again**, not of writing it.388389**Standard transition**: EN 50716 has **DoW 30-10-2026**; IEC 61508 Ed. 3 is expected ~2027;390IEC 62304 Ed. 2 is in draft. **A multi-year project picks its reference edition and documents391it**; changing edition midway is a scope change, with its impact analysis.392393**The learned component (ML) is the open problem of this domain.** It has no line-by-line traceable394requirements, its structural coverage means nothing, and its out-of-distribution395behaviour is not demonstrable with the methods in §4. Emerging guidance exists (ISO 21448 SOTIF for396intended-function failure, EASA and automotive industry work), but **as of today there397is no universally accepted route to certify a critical function implemented with398learning**. If your design depends on one, the argument has to be **architectural** —a399deterministic, verifiable monitor that bounds what the model can do— not statistical. The400governance of the AI system belongs to `ai-governance-standards`; **the safety argument belongs here, and401today it is hard**.402403**The final honesty, and it is the sentence to say to whoever signs the cheque: certification404does not prove the absence of failures. It proves that a recognised process was followed with rigour405proportional to the risk, and that there is evidence of it.** Certified systems have killed people.406Treating the certificate as a guarantee of correctness is exactly the error that produces the next407accident; treating it as what it is —a disciplined reduction of the probability of systematic408error— is what makes the process worth its cost.409410**Prohibitions:**411412- ❌ **FORBIDDEN to present the SIL↔ASIL↔DAL mapping as normative**, or to reuse a component across413 standards without a documented *gap analysis* (§2.1). `ada-standards` forbids the same.414- ❌ **FORBIDDEN to state the content of a standard you have not read.** If you do not have the copy, say so and415 cite the secondary source as such.416- ❌ Saying that "DO-178C assigns the DAL". ARP4754B/ARP4761A assign it (§2.2).417- ❌ Confusing "qualified for X" with "supports certification efforts towards X" in a418 toolchain (§2.4). It is the most frequent citation error about Ferrocene.419- ❌ Using a tool whose output you do not verify **without qualifying it** — and also its inverse:420 qualifying a tool whose output you **do** verify independently, paying for nothing.421- ❌ Writing tests **to raise coverage**. It invalidates the entire argument of §4.2.422- ❌ Leaving **dead code** justifying it as "deactivated" (§4.3).423- ❌ Dynamic memory allocation after initialisation, unbounded recursion, loops with no demonstrable424 bound (§6.1).425- ❌ Declaring a WCET measured with a benchmark, or a per-isolated-task WCET on a multicore with426 shared resources and no interference control (§6.2).427- ❌ Mixing criticalities on one processor **without demonstrating** spatial and temporal partitioning (§6.3).428- ❌ A watchdog fed by a blind timer, or internal to the element it watches.429- ❌ A degraded mode that has not been tested, or a "safe state" that was assumed without coming out of the430 hazard analysis.431- ❌ Debug ports active in production.432- ❌ A deliverable binary that cannot be rebuilt bit for bit from the repository (§4.4).433- ❌ A traceability matrix maintained by hand in a spreadsheet (§3.2).434- ❌ A safety case written after the implementation.435- ❌ Applying an IT patching SLA to a type-approved product, and its inverse: **using the type approval436 as an excuse not to watch CVEs or maintain an SBOM** (§5).437- ❌ Deploying an OTA without having first defined the change's impact on the evidence and on the438 type approval (§5).439- ❌ Treating the certificate as proof that the software has no failures (§7).440441## 8. Mandatory web verification442443Before pinning anything in a real project, check on the web:4444451. **The edition in force of your standard and its withdrawal date**, in the body's catalogue:446 the **IEC** record (accessible and reliable: that of **IEC 61508-3:2010, ed. 2.0, 2010-04-30, in force,447 stability 2027**, is verified here), the **CENELEC** catalogue for EN 50716 (**published448 2023-11-16, DoW 30-10-2026**, verified) and **iso.org** — warning: **iso.org returns 403 to449 automated fetching**; use the catalogue of your national standards body (UNE/AENOR,450 DIN, BSI).4512. **Status of the ongoing revisions**: **IEC 61508 Ed. 3** (at CDV, publication expected ~2027) and452 **IEC 62304 Ed. 2** (draft, with the change to **two levels of rigour** instead of three classes).453 **Both data points come from secondary sources and have NOT been verified against an IEC source: declared454 gap.** Do not plan against an unpublished edition.4553. **The normative content cited in §2, §4.1 and §4.2 —IEC 62304 classes, the ASIL S/E/C matrix,456 structural coverage per DAL, TQL/Table 12-1 of DO-178C, T1/T2/T3 criteria— comes from secondary457 sources (tool vendors and consultancies), because IEC, ISO, RTCA, SAE and CENELEC do not458 publish the text. Declared gap: check it against the purchased copy of the standard before459 committing to it in a certification plan.**4604. **Which ARP4754/ARP4761 revision your authority accepts**: **ARP4754B and ARP4761A were published on461 2023-12-20** (verified as a date; the content, not). Many live plans still cite462 ARP4754A and the authority may accept both.4635. **Qualification status of your toolchain**, read **on the body's certificate**,464 not on the marketing site. For Ferrocene, the distinction **qualified** (ISO 26262465 ASIL D, IEC 61508 SIL 3, IEC 62304 Class C; `core` subset certified for ASIL B and SIL 2)466 versus **"supports customer certification efforts"** (IEC 61508 SIL 4, DO-178C DAL C) is467 verified verbatim on `ferrocene.dev` as of Aug 2026 — **check it again, it changes with every468 release**, and coordinate it with `ada-standards`, which upholds the same data point.4696. **Your authority's multicore guidance** (CAST-32A, EASA's AMC 20-193 and its FAA equivalent): its470 status and what exactly it demands about interference. **Not verified here: declared gap.**4717. **Sector regulatory dates**: UN R155/R156 (new types Jul 2022, all new472 vehicles Jul 2024 in the EU, per a secondary source and the British agency VCA — **verify it in473 the UNECE text and in your jurisdiction**), status of cybersecurity in avionics (EASA's AMC 20-42,474 FAA rulemaking in progress), and the **Cyber Resilience Act** with `embedded-iot-standards`.4758. **ECSS standards**: published openly at `ecss.nl`. If your domain is space, it is the only476 corpus in this document you can read verbatim without paying — use it.4779. **CVEs of the embedded tree** (RTOS, network stack, cryptography, C libraries), with478 `vulnerability-management-standards`, and maintenance status of every third-party component479 with safety evidence ("SEooC", *safety element out of context*) you have bought.480481If the web contradicts this document, **the web wins** — flag the discrepancy.