Relative Valuation (India)
Multiples are not a valuation method. They are a way of asking "what is the market assuming about this company relative to that one?" Used carelessly they smuggle in every assumption you thought you were avoiding.
Choosing the multiple
| Multiple | Use for | Breaks when |
|---|---|---|
| EV/EBITDA | Capital-intensive, differing leverage, cross-border comps | Ind AS 116 makes lease-heavy businesses look artificially cheap; ignores capex intensity |
| EV/EBIT | Comparing across different asset lives | Depreciation policy differences |
| P/E | Stable, profitable, similar leverage | Loss-making, cyclical peaks/troughs, differing tax regimes |
| P/B | Banks, NBFCs, insurance, asset-heavy | Asset-light businesses; understated legacy land at cost |
| P/ABV | Lenders — see bank-nbfc-analysis |
|
| EV/Sales | Pre-profit growth, or a full cyclical trough | Says nothing about profitability |
| PEG | Growth companies | Growth rate is an estimate; PEG is two estimates stacked |
| EV/Capacity (per tonne, per MW, per room, per subscriber) | Cement, power, hotels, telecom | Ignores utilisation and pricing |
| Mcap/AUM, P/E on core | Asset managers, holdcos |
Rule: use at least two multiples with different denominators. If P/E and EV/EBITDA disagree, the gap is leverage, other income, or tax — find out which.
Building the comp set
An Indian comp set is not "companies in the same sector on the exchange". Screen on:
- Business model, not sector label. An IT products company is not comparable to an IT services company.
- Size within roughly an order of magnitude
- Growth within a comparable band
- Return on capital — the single biggest driver of multiple dispersion in Indian equities
- Capital intensity and working capital cycle
- Governance and float quality — a promoter-pledged, thinly traded name is not comparable to an institutionally-held large cap even in the same business
Include, and label separately, the global comparables. Indian names in the same business routinely trade at 1.5–2.5× the multiple of their global peers. Do not "correct" this — explain it.
Why Indian multiples are structurally higher
When asked why an Indian company trades at 40× while its global peer trades at 18×, the honest answer has these components. Name them; do not hand-wave "India premium".
- Higher nominal growth. Indian nominal GDP growth in the high single digits versus 3–4% in developed markets mechanically supports a higher terminal multiple.
- Higher cost of equity — which works the other way. India's Ke is higher (Rf ~6.5–7% plus ~7% ERP), which should compress multiples. That it does not means growth expectations are doing heavy lifting.
- Domestic flow structure. Sustained monthly SIP inflows into domestic equity mutual funds create a price-insensitive bid, particularly in mid and small caps.
- Limited free float. High promoter holding shrinks investable float; index and fund demand chases a small supply.
- Scarcity of listed exposure to certain themes.
- Quality skew. Indian large caps that survive selection have genuinely high ROCE.
The test of whether the premium is justified: does the implied growth-and-return combination survive a reverse DCF (see dcf-india)? Usually the honest conclusion is "partly justified, partly flow-driven".
India-specific adjustments — do these every time
1. Ind AS 116 (leases)
Since Ind AS 116, operating leases sit on the balance sheet as a right-of-use asset and a lease liability. Rent leaves EBITDA and reappears as depreciation and interest.
- EBITDA is inflated for retail, QSR, aviation, hospitals, hotels and warehousing.
- EV must include the lease liability as debt, or EV/EBITDA is systematically understated.
- When comparing an Indian company to a peer on a different standard or a pre-116 history, restate one side. Say which.
2. Holding company discount
Indian conglomerates and promoter holdcos trade at large discounts to the sum of their stakes.
NAV = Σ (stake % × market cap of each listed holding)
+ fair value of unlisted businesses
+ net cash − net debt at the holdco
Holdco discount = 1 − (holdco market cap / NAV)
Observed discounts in India commonly run 40–70%, driven by: no operating control transfer, dividend leakage and double taxation, poor capital allocation history, and the absence of a catalyst. Do not model the discount closing without naming the catalyst that closes it (demerger, buyback, listing of an unlisted arm, a stated capital-return policy).
3. Cross-holdings and treasury
Strip investments in group companies out of the operating entity before computing an operating multiple, and value them separately. Otherwise a company looks expensive on EV/EBITDA because a third of its EV is a stake in something else.
4. Standalone vs consolidated
Use consolidated for both the subject and every comp. Mixing them is a silent error.
5. Other income
Indian companies frequently carry large treasury books. Compute a core P/E:
Core earnings = PAT − post-tax other income
Core P/E = (Market cap − surplus cash − investments) / Core earnings
6. Promoter and float effects
Adjust for: promoter pledge (a discount), a very low free float (a liquidity premium in bull markets that reverses violently), and pending or likely index inclusion or exclusion.
Where to anchor a "fair" multiple
Three anchors, in order of usefulness:
- The company's own history. 5-year and 10-year median forward P/E and EV/EBITDA, plus the standard deviation band. Where does it sit today, and has the business changed enough to justify a re-rating?
- The peer set median, regressed against ROCE and growth. A simple cross-sectional regression of
EV/EBITDAonROCEandrevenue CAGRacross the comps will usually explain most of the dispersion and tells you whether the subject is cheap for a reason. - The implied multiple from a DCF. If the DCF and the peer median disagree by more than ~25%, one of them contains an assumption you have not examined.
Also useful for context: Nifty 50 and Nifty Midcap 150 index-level trailing and forward P/E versus their own long-run medians, published by NSE.
Output format
# <Company> — Relative Valuation, <date>
## Comp set
| Company | Mcap ₹cr | Rev CAGR 3y | EBITDA mgn | ROCE | Net D/E | P/E (fwd) | EV/EBITDA | P/B |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| <subject> | | | | | | | | |
| peer 1 ... | | | | | | | | |
| **Median** | | | | | | | | |
| *Global comps (labelled separately)* | | | | | | | | |
## Adjustments applied
- Ind AS 116 lease liability added to EV: ₹X cr
- Cross-holdings valued separately: ₹Y cr
- Core P/E (ex-other income): ...
## Own-history band
| | 10y median | 5y median | Today | z |
| Fwd P/E | | | | |
| EV/EBITDA | | | | |
## Assessment
<Where it trades, versus peers and versus itself, and the two or three reasons for the gap>
## Implied value
| Method | Multiple | Value/share |
| Peer median EV/EBITDA | | |
| Own 5y median fwd P/E | | |
| DCF cross-check | | |
Hard rules
- Date the multiples and name the earnings basis — trailing twelve months, FY26E consensus, or your own estimate. Comparing your forward estimate to a peer's trailing multiple is not a comparison.
- Never average multiples across companies with very different leverage without moving to an EV basis.
- Exclude outliers explicitly, and say why. A loss-making peer has no P/E; dropping it silently biases the median.
- A cheap multiple is a question, not a conclusion. Run
forensic-redflags-indiabefore calling anything a bargain. - Analysis, not advice.