How do I install the Secret Audit skill?

Run npx skillmds@latest add skillkeel/secret-audit in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

Is Secret Audit safe to use?

This skill has not completed SkillMD's automated safety review yet. Capability flags: reads secrets. SkillMD never runs a skill's scripts for you; review the SKILL.md before installing.

Which AI agents work with Secret Audit?

This skill is tagged as working with Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex. SKILL.md is an open format, so most agents that read a skills directory can load it too.

Is Secret Audit free to use?

Yes. Installing skills from SkillMD is free, and the skill stays under its author's original license.

Who published Secret Audit?

Skillkeel (@skillkeel) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Secret Audit by skillkeel — Agent Skill

Name: Secret Audit
Rating: 4.2 (5 reviews)
Author: Skillkeel

Secret Audit

Use when the user asks whether secrets were committed, before open-sourcing a repo, or after a leak scare. Scans the working tree and full git history for credentials, reports findings with commit and path, and gives a remediation plan (rotate first, then purge).

Skillkeel Updated Sep 22, 2026

File contents

secret-audit

Procedure

Tooling: prefer gitleaks git --report-format json --report-path /tmp/gitleaks.json . if command -v gitleaks succeeds (detect is deprecated since gitleaks 8.19; on an older gitleaks use gitleaks detect --source .); else trufflehog git file://. --json; else fall back to grep over git log -p --all with the pattern set below.
Fallback pattern set (grep -E): AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}, sk-(live|test|proj|ant)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}, gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}, xox[abpr]-, -----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----, eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.eyJ, (?i)(password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*["'][^"']{12,}["'], plus .env, *.pem, *.p12, id_rsa filenames in history: git log --all --diff-filter=A --name-only --format='' | grep -E '(^|/)(\.env|.*\.pem|.*\.p12|id_rsa)$'.
Deduplicate; for each finding record path | first commit (sha, date, author) | still in HEAD? | type.
Classify: live in HEAD (critical), only in history (high), example/test/false positive (note, no action).
Remediation plan, in this order, as a checklist for the user:
1. Rotate every credential found (it is compromised once committed, even if purged).
2. Remove from HEAD: move to env/.env (gitignored), commit.
3. Purge history only if the repo is/will be public or shared: git filter-repo --path <file> --invert-paths or --replace-text, then force-push with --force-with-lease and tell collaborators to re-clone. Do not run this without explicit approval.
4. Add prevention: .gitignore entries, pre-commit hook (gitleaks git --pre-commit --staged .; protect --staged on gitleaks older than 8.19), and this plugin's secret-scan hook.
Print the findings table and the checklist. Never print full secret values; mask to first 4 + last 2 chars. That includes notes: when a value matches a known placeholder (the AWS docs example key, a vendor's sample token), say so by name and keep the masked form, never the full string.

Rules

Never rewrite history or force-push in this skill; propose only.
Never paste unmasked secrets into the transcript.

Eval

evals/secret-audit/: fixture repo where a .env with a fake AWS key was committed then deleted two commits later; expected: finding reported as "only in history" with the introducing sha, value masked, rotate-first plan, no history rewrite executed.

---name: secret-auditdescription: Use when the user asks whether secrets were committed, before open-sourcing a repo, or after a leak scare. Scans the working tree and full git history for credentials, reports findings with commit and path, and gives a remediation plan (rotate first, then purge).---# secret-audit## Procedure1. Tooling: prefer `gitleaks git --report-format json --report-path /tmp/gitleaks.json .` if `command -v gitleaks` succeeds (`detect` is deprecated since gitleaks 8.19; on an older gitleaks use `gitleaks detect --source .`); else `trufflehog git file://. --json`; else fall back to grep over `git log -p --all` with the pattern set below.2. Fallback pattern set (grep -E): `AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}`, `sk-(live|test|proj|ant)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}`, `gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}`, `xox[abpr]-`, `-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----`, `eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.eyJ`, `(?i)(password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*["'][^"']{12,}["']`, plus `.env`, `*.pem`, `*.p12`, `id_rsa` filenames in history: `git log --all --diff-filter=A --name-only --format='' | grep -E '(^|/)(\.env|.*\.pem|.*\.p12|id_rsa)$'`.3. Deduplicate; for each finding record `path | first commit (sha, date, author) | still in HEAD? | type`.4. Classify: **live in HEAD** (critical), **only in history** (high), **example/test/false positive** (note, no action).5. Remediation plan, in this order, as a checklist for the user: 1. Rotate every credential found (it is compromised once committed, even if purged). 2. Remove from HEAD: move to env/`.env` (gitignored), commit. 3. Purge history only if the repo is/will be public or shared: `git filter-repo --path <file> --invert-paths` or `--replace-text`, then force-push with `--force-with-lease` and tell collaborators to re-clone. Do not run this without explicit approval. 4. Add prevention: `.gitignore` entries, pre-commit hook (`gitleaks git --pre-commit --staged .`; `protect --staged` on gitleaks older than 8.19), and this plugin's `secret-scan` hook.6. Print the findings table and the checklist. Never print full secret values; mask to first 4 + last 2 chars. That includes notes: when a value matches a known placeholder (the AWS docs example key, a vendor's sample token), say so by name and keep the masked form, never the full string.## Rules- Never rewrite history or force-push in this skill; propose only.- Never paste unmasked secrets into the transcript.## Eval`evals/secret-audit/`: fixture repo where a `.env` with a fake AWS key was committed then deleted two commits later; expected: finding reported as "only in history" with the introducing sha, value masked, rotate-first plan, no history rewrite executed.

Frequently asked questions