Oss Harden

Harden the security posture of an open source repository

This skill audits and repairs rather than generating from scratch. Every workflow, pipeline, or setting it touches already exists; the job is to read what is there before changing anything, then close the gap between that and the SEC rules below. Read every existing workflow or pipeline file, the existing dependency update configuration, and the current branch or protected-branch settings before proposing a single edit. Do not write a fresh workflow from a template; edit the one the project already has.

The concrete syntax for reading and fixing each control differs by forge, so it lives in one reference file per forge: references/github.md for GitHub Actions and repository settings, and references/gitlab.md for GitLab CI/CD and project settings. Read the matching file before writing any configuration or giving any settings instruction; do not carry a command, an API path, or a YAML key from one forge to the other by analogy, because GitLab has no direct equivalent for several GitHub controls and the reverse is also true.

Scope

The SEC rules belong here: R-SEC-01 pinned references, R-SEC-02 least-privilege permissions, R-SEC-03 dependency updates, R-SEC-04 branch protection, R-SEC-05 signed tags, R-SEC-06 GitLab pipeline inputs, R-SEC-07 untrusted input, R-SEC-08 committed lockfiles, R-SEC-09 static analysis, R-SEC-10 secret detection, R-SEC-11 vulnerability watching, R-SEC-12 required review, R-SEC-13 immutable release tags, R-SEC-14 update cooldown, and R-SEC-15 install scripts.

When oss-audit-report.md exists at the repository root, read the group addressed to this skill and work from that. Each failing rule there carries the audit's evidence and that rule's Check: text verbatim, so reading STANDARD.md as well adds nothing. Where the file is absent, work from the request as usual.

This skill owns the security posture of the workflow and pipeline files two other skills also write into, and the boundary is the rule area, not a description of files. oss-ci decides what runs and when. oss-publish writes the publish job. Treat every mutable external reference and every overly broad or implicit token permission in those files as work for this skill. oss-community writes CODEOWNERS but does not enforce it; enforcing code owner review is a branch or merge request protection setting, which belongs here. Do not decide what a job runs, add a product feature, or choose a registry authentication flow while working from this skill; note that the project needs it and hand the work to oss-ci or oss-publish.

oss-writing is not one of those hand-offs. It owns no rule area and takes no work over, so nothing here is handed to it. Read it before writing a branch name, a commit message, a change request title or description, or an issue, which is all of what this skill leaves behind on the forge.

Principles

Verify every command, API path, and setting name against the current documentation for the platform in question before writing it down or telling the user to click it; a wrong path either does nothing or breaks the workflow. Where a control depends on the forge's plan tier, such as required merge request approvals on GitLab, say which tier it needs rather than assuming the free tier has it, and give the strongest control the project's actual tier supports.

Half of what this skill fixes is repository files, which it edits directly. The other half is settings on the forge that only a repository owner or maintainer can change: branch protection, merge request approval rules, the job token allowlist, the actions permissions policy. For that half, resolve the real owner, repository, and branch name from the repository's own data (the git remote, the manifest's repository field) and give the user a direct settings URL built from those, never a placeholder like "go to your repository settings." Present one settings block, wait for the user to confirm it is done, then verify what can be verified from the command line before moving to the next block, the same pattern oss-publish uses for trusted publisher setup.

Process

Step 1: Detect the forge

Look for .github/workflows/ or .gitlab-ci.yml, check the git remote for a github.com or gitlab host, or ask directly if neither signal is present. If the user states the forge explicitly, trust that over any signal found in the repository. This decides which reference file governs the rest of this process.

Step 2: Read the current state

Settle the credential before the first call rather than discovering the gap on a failed one. Every read and write from here on goes through the forge's API.

On GitHub, the commands assume gh is installed and authenticated; gh auth status prints the active account per host. The settings reads and writes need admin on the repository, which is also why security_and_analysis is absent rather than disabled for a caller without it.

On GitLab, an audit-only run and a repair run need different tokens, and the difference is worth keeping. The read set clears with a token carrying the read_api scope, which GitLab documents as read access to the API. The write set needs api, which GitLab documents as complete read and write access. Provision the read-only token for a sweep that only reports, so a run auditing the settings cannot rewrite them.

Scope is not the whole answer, because several project-settings reads carry a role floor of their own. GitLab documents the job-token scope reads as needing the Maintainer or Owner role, and the security-settings read as needing Security Manager, Developer, Maintainer, or Owner. Both writes, the job-token allowlist and the security settings, need Maintainer or Owner. So a read-only sweep still needs a Maintainer token; do not assume the reads clear at a lower role than the writes.

Read a refusal carefully. GitLab documents 403 as a request that is not allowed and 404 as a resource that could not be accessed, which its own wording extends to a user who is not authorized to reach it. A read denied for role reasons can therefore answer 404, which reads like a control that is off and is not. Report it as unknown.

Supply the token from an environment variable read from the operator's own secret store, and never inline it. A token pasted into a command lands in shell history and in whatever transcript the run produces, which turns one audit into a leaked credential.

With that settled, read what already exists before changing anything, using the commands the matching reference file names for each of the following:

Every workflow or pipeline file, so the uses: lines, image: and include: entries, and permissions: blocks that need fixing are known before any edit is proposed.

Every action.yml or action.yaml the repository ships, so composite action uses: entries are also known.

Every package manifest and lockfile the repository holds, including the ones under a documentation, example, or tooling directory and the ones nothing published depends on. The axis here is what is present, not what the project ships: a vulnerability arrives through any dependency the repository resolves, whether or not that dependency reaches a released artifact, and a repository that publishes nothing at all still resolves its own. Steps 5, 10, 11, and 12 all consume this list; establishing it once here is what stops each of them deriving its own. A repository with no registry dependencies has an empty list, which is an answer rather than a gap.

Read the file for each ecosystem on that list before configuring anything for it. Each one carries the updater's ecosystem key and whether security updates exist for it, the lockfile and the command that installs from it frozen, the analyzer the language has, and what watches it for known vulnerabilities:

• references/ecosystems/npm.md
• references/ecosystems/pypi.md
• references/ecosystems/rubygems.md
• references/ecosystems/crates.md
• references/ecosystems/go-modules.md
• references/ecosystems/packagist.md
• references/ecosystems/nuget.md
• references/ecosystems/maven-central.md
• references/ecosystems/hex.md
• references/ecosystems/pubdev.md
• references/ecosystems/containers.md

Container images are on that list because a pushed image carries dependencies of its own, and they are detected by a workflow pushing to a registry or an image already on the forge's registry, never by the presence of a Dockerfile. An ecosystem the repository holds with no file here is one this skill has not researched; say so rather than generalizing from a neighbouring ecosystem, because the four answers above differ per ecosystem in ways that do not follow from the language.

The existing dependency update configuration, if any: .github/dependabot.yml or a Renovate configuration on GitHub, a Renovate configuration on GitLab. Note which ecosystems it already covers and which it does not, rather than assuming none exists.

The current branch or merge request protection settings for the default branch, read from the forge's own API rather than assumed from the repository files, since a protected branch leaves no trace in the repository itself.

Whether the newest release tag is signed, if a release has shipped yet; a repository with no tags yet has nothing to check here, so say that plainly instead of treating it as a gap.

Verified 2026-08-07 against GitHub repository REST endpoints, GitLab personal access tokens, GitLab job token scope API, GitLab project security settings API, and the current sources named in references/ecosystems/.

Step 3: Pin third-party references to immutable content

On GitHub, every external uses: line in every workflow and shipped composite action should resolve to a full 40-character commit SHA, including GitHub-owned actions and reusable workflows outside the current repository. Preserve the selected version in a trailing comment so a human and the updater can still read it. On GitLab, there is no action-shaped uses: step; the same mutable-reference problem arrives through image:, services:, and external include: entries, so pin those instead, per R-SEC-06. Resolve the version the configuration already selects unless the user separately authorizes an upgrade. Check the newest compatible and newest major releases and report lag, but do not combine a security pin with a potentially breaking upgrade. The reference file for the detected forge gives the exact resolution process and the caveat that an annotated tag needs one extra step most naive lookups miss.

scripts/resolve-pin.mjs does that resolution. Pipe the workflow through it, or pass the references directly:

node skills/oss-harden/scripts/resolve-pin.mjs actions/checkout@v5 ruby/setup-ruby@v1
cat .github/workflows/ci.yml | node skills/oss-harden/scripts/resolve-pin.mjs -

It dereferences an annotated tag to the commit it points at, which is the extra step, and it says when a ref is a branch rather than a tag, which is a finding in its own right: ruby/setup-ruby@v1 and rubygems/release-gem@v1 are both branches, so a workflow naming either runs whatever was last pushed to it. Where the script is not installed, because a single skill was installed on its own, do the same work by hand, and dereference the annotated tag.

A workflow or pipeline can also invoke a package installer or a tool installer directly, such as a pip install or a uv tool install of a package or a git source. R-SEC-01 and R-SEC-06 check only uses:, image:, services:, and include:; they do not extend to an installer command run inside a step, and no rule in STANDARD.md reaches it, so do not cite a rule ID for what this paragraph produces.

Where such a command installs from a registry, R-SEC-08 already governs it through the lockfile, so read Step 10 rather than treating it here. Where it installs from a git URL or a piped script, check that the upstream project actually publishes what the command fetches: read the project's own repository or documentation and confirm the install path came from there, rather than working backward from a registry page, whose author, homepage, and repository fields are text the publisher typed. Report a command whose upstream cannot be established as a supply-chain observation in the summary, separate from the rule findings, and say plainly that it should not be installed until a maintainer decides. Do not resolve it by pinning it to a commit SHA. Pinning code whose origin is unestablished gives the same code at a known revision, and a maintainer reading a pinned line will reasonably assume someone already vouched for it.

Step 4: Set least-privilege permissions

On GitHub, every workflow needs a top-level permissions: block granting no more than contents: read, with any job that needs more declaring the extra scope at the job level instead of widening the top-level block, per R-SEC-02. This has no GitLab equivalent as a rule; GitLab's analogous control is the job token scope in Step 7. Read the reference file for the default a workflow gets when permissions: is absent entirely, since that default is not the same as writing contents: read explicitly and a workflow already at the safe default because a wider default was never in play still benefits from writing the block down.

Step 5: Configure automated dependency updates

Pinning freezes a reference until something unfreezes it; R-SEC-03 requires an updater covering both the project's application dependencies and its CI dependencies, on both forges. On GitHub, Dependabot's github-actions ecosystem is what proposes the SHA and comment update for every workflow this skill just pinned, so a dependabot.yml this skill writes or edits needs that ecosystem alongside one entry for every ecosystem the manifests read in Step 2 declare; a dependabot.yml that updates the package manager but leaves out github-actions re-freezes the actions the moment they are pinned. On GitLab, there is no equivalent of Dependabot shipped by the platform; the reference file names the documented alternative and what running it costs. Where a Renovate configuration already exists on either forge, extend its packageRules or presets rather than adding a competing Dependabot config; ask before replacing one updater with the other.

The same configuration answers R-SEC-14, which asks the updater to wait before proposing a version that was published minutes ago. Add a cooldown block with default-days to dependabot.yml, or minimumReleaseAge to a Renovate configuration, and set it in days rather than hours: the window this closes is the one between a compromised publish and somebody noticing, which the incidents it exists for have taken hours to close. The two updaters start from different places, so say which one the user is on. Renovate waits zero days until the key is set, and that repository has the window open today. Dependabot already delays a version update by three days on its own, so writing the number pins a value the platform chose and can change again, and gives the next reader a decision to audit. Write at least that three days there, because a smaller number shortens the delay. Then check what the setting reaches: a Dependabot include or exclude list and a Renovate packageRules override both leave a configuration that reads as set and covers little. The reference files carry the resolution rules for each. Neither setting delays a fix for a known vulnerability, so say that when the user asks what it costs them. Where the repository has no updater at all, R-SEC-03 is the finding and this rule is not a second one.

R-SEC-15 belongs to the same step because it is the other half of what an updater's pull request does to a runner. Read every CI step that installs registry dependencies, and check that it either declines dependency-supplied install code or that the repository commits the allowlist its package manager reads. The ecosystem reference gives the flag or the field for the manager in use, and names the ecosystems where no such control exists, which is most of them; where the rule falls outside, say so with the ecosystem named rather than reporting a gap the manager gives nobody a way to close. Where it does apply and the manager now blocks that code by default, write the flag or the allowlist anyway. A default that depends on which version of the manager the runner happens to ship is not evidence in a workflow file, which is the same reason R-SEC-08 asks for the frozen-install flag Yarn and pnpm already default to in CI.

Verified 2026-08-07 against GitHub Actions metadata syntax, GitHub secure use reference, Dependabot options, Dependabot cooldown guidance, Renovate configuration options, and the current sources named in references/ecosystems/. The two GitHub Dependabot pages conflict on the unset cooldown default.

Step 6: Branch protection and required review

R-SEC-04 requires the default branch to take changes only through a change request, require at least one CI status check to pass, and reject force pushes and deletion, on both forges. This is a forge setting, not a file, so give the user the resolved settings URL for the repository or project found in Step 1, wait for confirmation, then verify with the read command from Step 2. On GitHub, set this up as a repository ruleset; classic branch protection is the older form, still enforced where it already exists and worth reading, but not what to create today. Every control in this paragraph works without a second person, so set all of them whatever the repository's size.

scripts/ruleset.mjs is what edits an existing ruleset without losing the rest of it:

node skills/oss-harden/scripts/ruleset.mjs get <owner>/<repo> main
node skills/oss-harden/scripts/ruleset.mjs put <owner>/<repo> main patch.json
node skills/oss-harden/scripts/ruleset.mjs actor <login>

put reads the ruleset, deep-merges the patch, strips the nulls, PUTs it, and prints what the API reports afterwards rather than what was sent. The null strip is the reason it exists: GitHub reads several rule parameters back as null and rejects those same nulls on write, so a hand-rolled fetch, edit, and PUT answers 422 Invalid property /rules/N: data matches no possible input. code_coverage with max_coverage_drop: null is the case every measured run hit. actor prints the {"actor_type": "User", "actor_id": N} form a bypass entry takes; do not guess a RepositoryRole number, which is undocumented and was shipped wrong once and repaired with a second write. Where the script is not installed, do the same three things by hand: read the ruleset by id rather than from the list endpoint, which answers with a summary that omits rules, strip every null before writing, and read the result back rather than inferring it from a 200.

R-SEC-12 adds the approving review, and reaches only a repository where two or more principals hold push, maintain, or admin access. Establish that first by reading the access list the rule's check names, and report the rule as outside the repository when one principal holds every merge path. Do not report a violation there, and do not set the requirement anyway and then add a bypass entry to undo it; that trades a control the repository had for a status that blocks nobody. Where the rule does reach, set the review requirement alongside the controls above, and where oss-community has already written a CODEOWNERS file, turn on the code-owner-approval setting too; a CODEOWNERS file with nothing enforcing it is a suggestion, not a control. Where the platform's free tier does not offer enforced review, as GitLab's does not, say so plainly and give the strongest control the tier actually has; take that fallback only because the tier leaves no other option, the same spirit STANDARD.md states for the fallbacks it marks below the bar, and do not claim a paid capability is active on a free plan.

Step 7: GitLab job token scope

R-SEC-06 also covers which other projects' job tokens may access this GitLab project. The allowlist is an inbound control on the target project, not a list of projects this pipeline's token may call. Read the current inbound scope and allowlist with the commands in references/gitlab.md; where the scope is open, enable it and retain only source projects that need access. Where fine-grained job-token permissions are enabled, grant each allowlisted source only the endpoints it needs.

Step 8: Signed and protected tags

R-SEC-05 applies the same way on both forges, because the evidence comes from git itself, not from a forge API. Fetch the tags, then establish what the tag is before reaching for any key: git cat-file -t <tag> must print tag, and one git for-each-ref read returns the tagger's address and the signature format together. Only then resolve which account publishes the key and fetch it; the repository owner is that account only when the owner is a user, and neither the release publisher nor the tagged commit's author is a substitute, because either can differ from the tagger. Support OpenPGP, SSH, and X.509 signatures instead of assuming every maintainer uses GPG. Fetching a key by account proves publication and not control, so neither that fetch nor either forge's UI verification badge replaces confirming the maintainer through a channel they control. Distinguish a failed verification from an unconfigured verifier: with SSH signatures and no allowed-signers file, git exits nonzero with a configuration error, which is the check failing to run and scores unknown rather than failed. The per-forge command sequences are in references/github.md and references/gitlab.md. A repository with no release tag yet has nothing to check; say that rather than reporting a gap, and revisit at the first release.

R-SEC-13 is the other half of the same surface, and unlike R-SEC-05 it is a forge setting rather than evidence git can produce: a signature says who cut the tag, and nothing in git stops the same person or anyone else with push access repointing it afterwards. Both forges express it as a separate object from the branch protection Step 6 set, so read it separately and do not report a guarded default branch as covering tags. On GitHub it is a ruleset targeting tags; on GitLab it is protected tags. Take the settings-block pattern from the Principles section for whichever is missing, and read the result back with the command in the matching reference file. Where releases are cut by a workflow rather than a person, the principal permitted to create a tag is that workflow's identity, so establish who or what publishes before naming anyone. A repository with no release tag yet still takes this control, because setting it before the first release is what makes the first release immutable.

Verified 2026-08-07 against GitHub rules REST endpoints, GitHub ruleset rules, Git tag, Git configuration, GitLab merge request approvals, and GitLab protected tags.

Step 9: Keep untrusted input out of privileged contexts

R-SEC-07 applies to both forges through different mechanisms, so read the matching reference file rather than carrying the syntax across. On GitHub the risk is textual: a ${{ }} expression is substituted into the script before any shell sees it, so ${{ github.event.issue.title }} inside a run: block executes whatever its author wrote. Move user-controlled values into an env: block and quote the environment variable in the shell. Separately, a pull_request_target or workflow_run workflow runs with the base repository's privileges, so it must not execute or check out contributor-controlled code; where one does, that is the highest-severity finding this skill produces and it belongs at the top of the summary. On GitLab, quote every user-controlled predefined variable in script: and pass values as arguments rather than evaluating generated shell. Store secrets as masked and hidden variables, protect them when only protected refs need them, and keep variable-reference expansion disabled.

Verified 2026-08-07 against GitHub script injections, GitHub pull_request_target security, and GitLab CI/CD variables.

Step 10: Lockfile and frozen installs

R-SEC-08 requires the package manager's lockfile to be committed and CI to install from it in a mode that fails rather than re-resolves. Working from the manifests Step 2 read, confirm each lockfile is committed rather than gitignored, and verify the current frozen-install command in that package manager's official documentation before changing CI. Examples include npm ci, uv sync --locked, cargo build --locked, mix deps.get --check-locked, Bundler with local deployment and frozen configuration, and pip install --require-hashes only when every requirement, including transitive dependencies, carries a hash. Where the project pins versions in a manifest but commits no lockfile, say that a version pin still trusts the registry to serve the same bytes while a recorded hash does not. A repository with no registry dependencies has nothing to lock; report that rather than a gap.

Committing the file is the easy half, and the failures land in CI afterward rather than on the machine that generated it. Before opening the change, ask three questions of each ecosystem and answer them from that ecosystem's reference file and its package manager's own documentation.

Does the resolved set vary by runtime version? Where it does, generate the lock on the lowest runtime the matrix tests, or every job below that one fails at install rather than at test.

Does the repository hold locks the updater will not maintain? An updater finds lockfiles by exact filename inside the directories its configuration lists, so a lock outside either is invisible to it and drifts from the manifest the updater does bump. Give the project one command that regenerates every lock, and name it where a contributor merging an update will read it.

Does the lock have to cover a platform nobody develops on? A lock recording only the maintainer's platform leaves a Linux runner with no resolution to install.

Every reference file answers all three, under a heading naming what breaks after the file is committed, and several answer no with the documentation that settles it. Read that heading rather than reasoning from another ecosystem, because the answers differ: a Go module and a Cargo workspace are immune to the platform question by design, while npm and Bundler fail on it routinely.

Step 11: Static analysis on pull requests

R-SEC-09 applies only where the repository holds source in a language a static analyzer supports, so establish that first and say plainly that the rule does not reach the repository when it does not, rather than reporting a violation. Count the workflow files when you establish that set. A CI configuration is itself source in an analyzed language, so a repository whose application code no analyzer supports is still inside this rule once it has workflows, and reporting it outside on the strength of its application language is a false clean over the surface an attacker reaches first. The reference files name what analyzes those files on each forge. Where it does apply, check that an analysis workflow runs on pull requests to the default branch and that its result is a required check, since an analyzer whose failure does not block merge is advisory. On GitHub, prefer CodeQL default setup for repositories that do not receive fork pull requests. GitHub excludes fork pull requests from default setup, so use advanced setup when the rule must cover them. Give the resolved settings URL the same way Step 6 does; the reference file names the endpoint that reports whether it is already enabled. Where Step 6 set up a ruleset, add its code scanning rule too, which blocks a merge on what the analysis found rather than only on whether it reported, and so also catches the case where the analysis configuration is deleted and the required check simply stops appearing.

Step 12: Enable the detection controls this repository can actually use

R-SEC-10 and R-SEC-11 ask whether the repository receives signal: that a committed secret is caught before it reaches the default branch, and that every ecosystem the project ships is watched for known vulnerabilities. Every other rule in this area checks something the project controls. These two check whether anything is looking, which is what the pinning and locking in Steps 3, 5, and 10 assume when they freeze a dependency until somebody says it is now known-bad.

Do not work from a fixed list of switches. Derive the applicable set from three things already known: the forge from Step 1, the plan tier that forge reports for this repository or project, and the ecosystems the manifests and lockfiles read in Step 2 declare. A control the tier withholds is not a failing rule, and a control for an ecosystem the project does not ship is not a gap. Name both out loud rather than dropping them, so the reader can tell a control that does not reach this repository from one the sweep never considered.

For each control in that set, establish whether the forge exposes an API for it. Where it does, write the value and then read it back with a separate call. A write that returns success is not evidence: GitHub's repository PATCH answers 200 and silently discards a field the repository has no entitlement for, so a control can appear set and still be off. Where the forge exposes no API, which is true of several switches on the same settings page, resolve the settings URL for this repository and present it the way Step 6 does, then read back whatever the API can read and say plainly which part of the claim rests on the user's confirmation rather than on a reading.

A read can also fail to answer. On GitHub the security_and_analysis object is absent rather than disabled for a caller without admin, so a missing value means unknown, and reporting it as off would be wrong. Say which of the two readings you got.

For R-SEC-11, switching the forge's alerting on does not finish the check. Compare the package set the forge reports watching against what the project actually resolves: a forge that cannot parse the project's lockfile still parses its manifests, so the security overview looks the same whether it covers ten packages or five hundred. Where the two sets differ, that residual is the finding, and the fix is a scanner that reads the lockfile the forge cannot. Scope what blocks a merge to what the change introduces, and let the repository-wide scan report instead. An advisory published overnight against a dependency with no fix available is not something a contributor can act on, and a check that fails for that reason teaches the maintainer to dismiss alerts.

Verified 2026-08-07 against the current package-manager sources named in references/ecosystems/, GitHub code scanning setup types, GitHub repository REST endpoints, GitHub dependency graph ecosystems, GitLab SAST, GitLab secret detection, and GitLab dependency scanning, and the workflow-file paragraph on 2026-08-11 against CodeQL Actions built-in queries.

Step 13: Read OpenSSF Scorecard results

Use Scorecard as supplementary evidence after the direct checks above, never as a substitute for them. A missing or stale result is normal and must not change a directly verified rule status. Do not offer to install or run another scanner unless the user asks for that expansion.

The Scorecard section of the reference file Step 1 chose carries the rest: references/github.md for what the API returns, which checks map to which rule, and how Branch-Protection scores a repository that R-SEC-12 does not reach; references/gitlab.md for what the public dataset covers on that forge.

Step 14: Present the result

Before presenting, read each R-SEC rule's Check: line in STANDARD.md against the repository and its settings as they now stand, and fix what fails. Start the list again after each fix, since one setting can move another rule's evidence, and do not report done while any cited rule still fails.

Give every rule one of four statuses, and use no others: fixed, pending confirmation, outside the repository, or unknown. Fixed means the file is written or the setting is read back. Pending confirmation means the settings block is presented and the user has not confirmed it. Outside the repository means the rule's own precondition does not reach this repository, such as a forge it does not apply to or a tier the project does not have. Unknown means the read could not answer, which Step 2 says a 404 can produce, and it is neither a pass nor a fail.

Show what Steps 2 through 13 found and fixed, grouped by rule ID: which files this skill edited directly, which settings still need the user's confirmation with the resolved URL for each, and the supply-chain observation from Step 3 if one applies. Where a Scorecard result was read in Step 13, include its dated findings as supplementary evidence alongside this skill's direct findings. Do not mark a rule fixed until the file is written or the setting is confirmed and verified; a settings block the user has not yet confirmed stays listed as pending.

Then close with what the maintainer could still turn on that this skill could not reach itself. Give each item what it does, why the skill could not set it, and what enabling it would take. Three kinds belong here: a control the forge exposes no API for, which only a click reaches; a control the forge's tier withholds, named with the tier it needs; and a control that strengthens the repository beyond what any rule in STANDARD.md requires. Keep this list separate from the rule findings and label it as optional. A maintainer reading an unmet rule and an available extra in one list cannot tell which of the two the standard actually asks for, and the one that reads as less urgent is the one that gets skipped.

Verified 2026-08-07 against OpenSSF Scorecard checks and GitHub Scorecard guidance.