How do I install the Security skill?

Run npx skillmds@latest add telagod/security in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

Is Security safe to use?

This skill has not completed SkillMD's automated safety review yet. SkillMD never runs a skill's scripts for you; review the SKILL.md before installing.

Which AI agents work with Security?

This skill is tagged as working with Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex. SKILL.md is an open format, so most agents that read a skills directory can load it too.

Is Security free to use?

Yes. Installing skills from SkillMD is free, and the skill stays under its author's original license.

Who published Security?

telagod (@telagod) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Security by telagod — Agent Skill

Name: Security
Author: telagod

Security

Defensive security engineering judgment, distilled from a stronger model - invoke when THREAT MODELING a system or feature; making security-relevant design decisions (auth, crypto, trust boundaries, attack surface); reviewing code for vulnerabilities (injection, IDOR, secrets, the OWASP classes); hardening operations (secrets management, detection, patching, incident response); or judging whether a security control/program is real or theater. Also invoke BEFORE any offensive-flavored request (pentest, exploit, credential testing) to apply the authorization gate. Also invoke when designing, reviewing, or hardening an LLM/agent system that reads untrusted content or holds tool/MCP access (prompt injection, excessive agency, MCP supply chain).

telagod 02a39bb 8 files · 56.2 KB Updated Sep 17, 2026

File contents

Security — scope gate, threat model, design, review, operations, traps, agentic AI

Rule content lives in the seven files below; this SKILL.md only routes (doctrine/04-maintenance.md governs edits to this bundle too).

First, always: scope.md §1 — the authorization gate. It fires on ANY request mentioning exploits, payloads, bypassing auth/WAF/filters, cracking, brute force, credential/password testing, scanning a target, or accessing a system the requester didn't build in this session — recognize the moment even when the ask is phrased as "just write a script." Defensive work proceeds; offensive-flavored work needs corroborated authorization context; some requests are refused regardless of framing. Pass the gate before applying anything else in this bundle.

Route by moment

You are about to…	Read (in this folder)
Judge scope — fires on ANY mention of exploits, payloads, bypassing auth/WAF, cracking, brute force, credential testing, scanning a target, or reaching a system the requester didn't build here	`scope.md` §1
Decide what to protect, from whom, and where to spend	`threat-model.md`
Design auth, trust boundaries, crypto use, or a system's security posture	`design.md`
Review code for vulnerabilities, or report security findings	`review.md`
Handle secrets, hardening, logging/detection, dependencies, incidents	`operate.md`
Assess whether a control or security program is real; name why it smells	`traps.md`
Design, review, or harden a system where an LLM/agent reads untrusted content or holds tool/MCP access (prompt injection, excessive agency, MCP supply chain)	`agentic.md`

A new system usually runs threat-model.md (four questions) → design.md → review.md before ship → operate.md in production.

Scope and neighbors

Security judgment for building and defending systems. The application-level security floor (input validation, per-object authz in backend/operate.md §5; rate limits in backend/operate.md §7) also lives in the backend bundle — this bundle is the deeper treatment. Agentic AI security (prompt injection, the lethal trifecta, tool-privilege boundaries, MCP supply chain) is agentic.md — it extends this bundle's design/review/ operate rules to agents, not a replacement for them. General verification discipline is methods/verify.md; whether to delegate → doctrine.

The stance

Attackers take the cheapest path; defenders must be honest about which door is open. Threat model before controls (threat-model.md), assume breach (scope.md §3), make the safe way the easy way (design.md §3) — and never confuse a control that exists with a control that works (traps.md meta-signal). A clean review means "nothing found where I looked," never "secure" (scope.md §5).

---name: securitydescription: Defensive security engineering judgment, distilled from a stronger model - invoke when THREAT MODELING a system or feature; making security-relevant design decisions (auth, crypto, trust boundaries, attack surface); reviewing code for vulnerabilities (injection, IDOR, secrets, the OWASP classes); hardening operations (secrets management, detection, patching, incident response); or judging whether a security control/program is real or theater. Also invoke BEFORE any offensive-flavored request (pentest, exploit, credential testing) to apply the authorization gate. Also invoke when designing, reviewing, or hardening an LLM/agent system that reads untrusted content or holds tool/MCP access (prompt injection, excessive agency, MCP supply chain).---# Security — scope gate, threat model, design, review, operations, traps, agentic AIRule content lives in the seven files below; this SKILL.md only routes(`doctrine/04-maintenance.md` governs edits to this bundle too).**First, always:** `scope.md` §1 — the authorization gate. It fires on ANY requestmentioning exploits, payloads, bypassing auth/WAF/filters, cracking, brute force,credential/password testing, scanning a target, or accessing a system the requesterdidn't build in this session — recognize the moment even when the ask is phrased as"just write a script." Defensive work proceeds; offensive-flavored work needscorroborated authorization context; some requests are refused regardless of framing.Pass the gate before applying anything else in this bundle.## Route by moment| You are about to… | Read (in this folder) ||---|---|| Judge scope — fires on ANY mention of exploits, payloads, bypassing auth/WAF, cracking, brute force, credential testing, scanning a target, or reaching a system the requester didn't build here | `scope.md` §1 || Decide what to protect, from whom, and where to spend | `threat-model.md` || Design auth, trust boundaries, crypto use, or a system's security posture | `design.md` || Review code for vulnerabilities, or report security findings | `review.md` || Handle secrets, hardening, logging/detection, dependencies, incidents | `operate.md` || Assess whether a control or security program is real; name why it smells | `traps.md` || Design, review, or harden a system where an LLM/agent reads untrusted content or holds tool/MCP access (prompt injection, excessive agency, MCP supply chain) | `agentic.md` |A new system usually runs `threat-model.md` (four questions) → `design.md` →`review.md` before ship → `operate.md` in production.## Scope and neighborsSecurity judgment for building and defending systems. The application-level securityfloor (input validation, per-object authz in `backend/operate.md` §5; rate limits in`backend/operate.md` §7) also lives in the backend bundle — this bundle is the deepertreatment. Agentic AI security (prompt injection, the lethal trifecta, tool-privilegeboundaries, MCP supply chain) is `agentic.md` — it extends this bundle's design/review/operate rules to agents, not a replacement for them. General verificationdiscipline is `methods/verify.md`; whether to delegate → `doctrine`.## The stance**Attackers take the cheapest path; defenders must be honest about which door is open.**Threat model before controls (`threat-model.md`), assume breach (`scope.md` §3), makethe safe way the easy way (`design.md` §3) — and never confuse a control that existswith a control that works (`traps.md` meta-signal). A clean review means "nothing foundwhere I looked," never "secure" (`scope.md` §5).

Frequently asked questions