tetherto DevOps PR Review
A DevOps-flavored PR review on top of the generic /qv-pr-review flow. Adds a deterministic GitHub Actions security audit pass grounded in the repository's GitHub and CI guidance and the checklist below, so DevOps reviewers always see the same high-risk patterns regardless of the prose style of the diff.
The skill is a wrapper, not a fork — the bulk of the review (gitflow, CI, title/body, generic correctness, security) is done by /qv-pr-review. This skill layers DevOps-specific findings into the same pending review payload.
When to use this skill
Use when:
- User asks to review a PR whose changes are dominated by DevOps-owned paths (
.github/workflows/,.github/actions/,.github/scripts/,scripts/, IaC underterraform/,ansible/,k8s/,Dockerfile*,.github/CODEOWNERS,.github/dependabot.yml) - User invokes
/qv-devops-pr-reviewwith a PR URL - Triggered as a follow-up from
/qv-devops-pr-statusafter the user picks a PR
If the PR's touched paths are dominated by a different pod, fall back to /qv-pr-review. The generic flow already auto-loads the relevant pod's rules.
Inputs
- Required: PR URL (
https://github.com/tetherto/qvac/pull/<num>) - Optional: user-provided focus notes
If the URL is missing, ask for it. Nothing else to ask up-front.
Safety rules
Inherits all safety rules from /qv-pr-review verbatim:
- Read-only with respect to the user's local working tree. No
git switch,git checkout,git reset,git restore,git stash,git pull,git merge,git rebase,git cherry-pick,git clean,gh pr checkout, or any write inside the user's working tree. - All file inspection happens in the worktree cache at
~/.cache/qvac-pr-review/pr-<num>/(managed byworktree-prepare.mjs) or viagh api .../contents/<path>?ref=<sha>to/tmp/.
Efficiency rules
Inherits the ~5–8 shell-call budget from /qv-pr-review. The DevOps audit pass adds at most 3 additional reads (Read/Grep/Glob, not shell) per touched workflow/action file. Cache: reuse /tmp/pr-<num>.json, /tmp/pr-<num>.patch, and the worktree path from the underlying /qv-pr-review run.
Workflow
1. Run the generic /qv-pr-review flow up to step 7a (overview)
Read .agents/skills/qv-pr-review/SKILL.md and follow steps 0a → 7a inclusive:
- 0a. Prepare worktree (
worktree-prepare.mjs) - Parse PR URL
- Fetch PR metadata
- Gitflow validation
- Read the applicable scoped instructions. DevOps paths use
.github/AGENTS.mdand its linked source documents. The PR-format spec lives in thedevops-pr-createskill and is invoked explicitly.
- Read the applicable scoped instructions. DevOps paths use
- Validate PR title + body against the format spec inlined below (DevOps allowed prefixes:
infra/feat/fix/chore/doc/test; tags:[bc]/[notask]/[skiplog]; title regex:^([A-Z]+-\d+ )?(infra|feat|fix|chore|doc|test)(\[(bc|notask|skiplog)\])?: \S.+$)
- Validate PR title + body against the format spec inlined below (DevOps allowed prefixes:
- Review dimensions
- 7a. Print risk overview in chat — but do not yet run step 7b (the inline-comment selection prompt). The DevOps audit pass in step 2 below contributes additional findings.
2. Run the DevOps GitHub Actions security audit
For every .github/workflows/*.yml and .github/actions/**/action.yml in the patch, perform the checks below using Read/Grep/Glob against the worktree path. Each check that fires becomes a finding with a tier per the table.
| # | Check | Basis | Finding tier |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | Every uses: <vendor>/<action>@<ref> is pinned to a 40-char SHA (regex @[0-9a-f]{40}\b) with a trailing # v<ver> comment. Tag pins (@v3, @main, branch refs) fail. First-party ./.github/actions/<name> references are exempt. |
.github/AGENTS.md |
High |
| A2 | Permissions are declared explicitly — either a top-level permissions: block, OR every job has its own permissions: block. Relying on repo-default permissions fails. |
.github/AGENTS.md |
High |
| A3 | No occurrence of permissions: write-all anywhere in the workflow. |
.github/AGENTS.md |
High |
| A4 | If the workflow uses pull_request_target, none of its jobs check out PR HEAD via actions/checkout@... ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} or ${{ github.head_ref }}. |
.github/AGENTS.md |
High |
| A5 | No direct interpolation of ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}, body, head_ref, commits[*].message, or any github.event.* user-controlled field inside run: blocks. They MUST be piped via env:. |
.github/AGENTS.md |
High |
| A6 | If the workflow has id-token: write, OIDC is consumed by an auth action (google-github-actions/auth, aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials, azure/login) — not used for token forging that reaches a long-lived credential. |
.github/AGENTS.md |
Medium |
| A7 | No ${{ secrets.X }} interpolated directly inside a run: block. Pass via env: or action with: instead. |
.github/AGENTS.md |
High |
| A8 | No set -x / bash -x in steps that touch secrets; no printenv, env, cat, or echo of a secret value, even for "debugging". |
.github/AGENTS.md |
High |
| A9 | Concurrency block is declared. Release/state-mutating workflows have cancel-in-progress: false. |
Current workflow conventions | Medium |
| A10 | Every job has timeout-minutes. Default budget 30; >30 needs a justifying comment. |
Current workflow conventions | Low |
| A11 | continue-on-error: true is NOT set on Tier-1 checks (lint, format, type-check, security scans, tests). |
docs/devops/TIER-1-SCOPE.md |
Medium |
| A12 | Outputs use $GITHUB_OUTPUT, never the deprecated ::set-output::. |
Current workflow conventions | Low |
| A13 | When actions/cache is used, cache writes are gated on non-fork triggers (push / workflow_dispatch / merge_group) — not blanket on pull_request. |
.github/AGENTS.md |
Medium |
| A14 | Workflow filename matches the existing repo conventions (on-pr-*.yml, on-merge-*.yml, on-pr-close-*.yml, release-*.yml, create-github-release-*.yml, prebuilds-*.yml, pr-test-*.yml, pr-validation-*.yml, pr-checks-*.yml, integration-*-*.yml, reusable-*.yml, trigger-reusable-*.yml). New file with a divergent name → finding. Pre-existing files keep their name unless the PR renames them. |
Active workflow names | Low |
For each finding, capture: file, line, the offending excerpt (3-8 lines), the tier, and a one-line "why" pulled from the rule. Write findings into the same chat overview structure that /qv-pr-review step 7a uses, under a new sub-heading ### GHA security audit.
3. Re-print the consolidated chat overview
After both passes, re-print the full overview (gitflow / CI / generic-high / generic-medium / GHA-audit / lows / verified) so the user sees one ranked list. Findings retain the deep-link + excerpt rules from /qv-pr-review step 7a.
4. Run /qv-pr-review steps 7b → 12
Continue with the generic flow:
- 7b. Selection prompt — the multi-select includes BOTH generic findings and GHA-audit findings. Defaults: every High pre-selected (including all GHA-audit Highs); Medium pre-selected; Low opt-in.
- Assemble inline comments from the user-confirmed set
- Pre-flight check
- Show the
gh api ... pulls/<num>/reviewscommand, wait for confirmation
- Show the
- Post on confirmation
- Output the link to the pending review
5. Audit summary in chat (after posting)
After the pending review URL is printed, append a single-line audit summary:
GHA audit: <H high> / <M medium> / <L low> findings on N workflow files. <K> filed inline; <skipped> skipped per user.
This makes audit coverage observable without reading the inline payload.
Inline comment style for GHA-audit findings
Inherit the comment style from /qv-pr-review. Add one DevOps-specific convention: every GHA-audit finding's body MUST cite the rule it traces back to, e.g.:
Untrusted input piped directly into shell. Per `.github/AGENTS.md`,
this MUST go through an `env:` block — `${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}` lands in the rendered shell verbatim and is exploitable.
```yaml
env:
PR_TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
run: |
echo "$PR_TITLE"
The cite makes the audit finding auditable: the reviewer can verify the rule still says what the comment claims.
## Quality Checklist
Before posting the pending review, verify:
- [ ] Underlying `/qv-pr-review` workflow ran through step 7a successfully (worktree prepared, gitflow checked, CI checked, scoped instructions loaded, title/body validated)
- [ ] GHA-audit pass ran on every changed `.github/workflows/*.yml` and `.github/actions/**/action.yml`
- [ ] Each GHA-audit finding has: file path, post-change line, 3-8 line excerpt at PR head SHA, deep link, tier, and source citation
- [ ] User-confirmed selection from step 7b matches the assembled payload exactly (count + IDs)
- [ ] Audit summary line is printed after step 12
## References
- Generic PR review skill (parent flow): [.agents/skills/qv-pr-review/SKILL.md](../qv-pr-review/SKILL.md)
- GitHub Actions and secrets guidance: [.github/AGENTS.md](../../../.github/AGENTS.md)
- DevOps PR-create skill (canonical home for commit / PR-title format): [`devops-pr-create`](../qv-devops-pr-create/SKILL.md)
- Pod metadata: [.github/teams/devops.json](../../../.github/teams/devops.json)
- Worktree manager: [.agents/skills/_lib/pr-skills/worktree-prepare.mjs](../_lib/pr-skills/worktree-prepare.mjs)