thedixitjain OSINT Methodology — External Red-Team Edition
0. When to Use / When NOT
Use this skill when: planning or executing authorized external recon (red team, bug bounty, ASM); mapping an org's attack surface; investigating a person/entity/threat-actor; producing client deliverables.
Do NOT use this skill when: the user needs active exploitation, post-exploitation, or malware dev; blue-team/detection content; or the target's authorization is unclear — surface the scope question first.
1. Authorization & Legal Posture
Intended for assets the operator owns or has written authorization to assess.
Soft scope check — when authorization isn't established, ask once:
"Quick scope check: is this a target you own or have written authorization to assess? I want to make sure we stay on the right side of the engagement boundary."
Once asserted, don't re-ask. If the engagement type is stated ("pentest of acme.com under contract"), proceed.
Always-on guardrails:
- Never weaken auth, rate limits, or safety controls on the target side.
- No destructive probes (SYN scans at line-rate, masscan, fuzzing) outside explicit
--aggressivemode. - Never paste real PII, credentials, session tokens, or API keys into cloud-hosted LLMs.
- Never act against assets outside documented scope, even "obviously related" ones.
2. Confidence Levels
Every assertion carries a confidence level.
| Level | Meaning |
|---|---|
| TENTATIVE | Plausible from indirect evidence; unverified. Snippet-only dork match, email pattern inferred from name, single passive-source subdomain. |
| FIRM | Directly observed, uncorroborated. Subdomain resolves; Shodan banner returned; CT-log entry. |
| CONFIRMED | Multiple independent corroborations OR directly verified. Live-validated token; bucket listable; three-source subdomain convergence. |
Rule of three for attribution: 3 independent weak signals, OR 1 strong + 1 weak. Never single-source attribute.
2.1 Confidence Upgrade Workflows
| Asset type | TENTATIVE → FIRM | FIRM → CONFIRMED |
|---|---|---|
| Subdomain | ≥2 passive sources OR DNS resolves | Serves on a standard port AND banner/cert returned |
| IP | ≥2 sources (passive DNS, ASN, Shodan) | TCP SYN-ACK or ICMP reply |
| WebApp | URL extracted but not yet hit | HTTP returns 2xx/3xx/4xx AND content-length > 0 |
| Name-pattern inferred OR snippet-only | Listed in Hunter/IntelX/breach, OR SMTP 250 (abort at DATA) | |
| Bucket | Permutation candidate + HEAD returns 200/301/403 (exists) | GET listing = CONFIRMED |
| Credential / secret | Regex match in captured text | Read-only validator returns success (scope + account-ID documented) |
| Person | Name from single source | Confirmed by second independent source |
| SSO tenant | OIDC discovery endpoint returns metadata | Tenant GUID extracted AND domain ties back via MX/autodiscover/SP record |
Default reporting posture: never claim CONFIRMED without explicit corroboration. When in doubt, downgrade.
3. Output Format
Each finding uses this schema (drops cleanly into asset-management tools):
Finding:
id: <stable hash or UUID>
module: <technique that discovered it>
asset_key: <typed key, e.g. sub:api.example.com>
category: <e.g. SECRET_LEAK, OPEN_GRAPHQL_API, SSO_EXPOSURE>
severity: <info|low|medium|high|critical>
confidence: <tentative|firm|confirmed>
title: <one-line summary>
description: <2-5 sentences>
evidence:
url: <where found>
timestamp: <UTC ISO8601>
sha256: <hash of any downloaded artifact>
raw: <truncated to 2 KiB>
references: [<CVE-ID, advisory URL, vendor doc>]
remediation: <action the asset owner can take>
Always use UTC timestamps.
4. Source Hygiene & Citations
For every artifact: URL + UTC timestamp + SHA-256 + tool version + run_id.
- Hash all downloads with SHA-256. Screenshot in PNG.
- Raw HTTP captures capped at 2 KiB body. JSONL logs, one line per event.
- Separate evidence read-only from working copies; never edit captured artifacts.
- Prefer durable references (CVE, ATT&CK technique ID, RFC). If ephemeral, archive first (archive.today, Wayback SavePageNow).
5. Do NOT
- Do NOT paste creds, session tokens, real PII, or unique pivots into cloud LLMs. Use local models for sensitive analysis.
- Do NOT assume vendor labels are ground truth (TRM, Chainalysis, Arkham can disagree).
- Do NOT assert ownership from a single signal (favicon hash, shared NS, shared CT issuer — each is a hypothesis).
- Do NOT run fuzzing, SYN scans, masscan, or
nuclei fuzzing/*outside explicit--aggressivemode. - Do NOT use a credential validator for anything except read-only verification.
- Do NOT mirror-image the threat actor. Separate capability from intent and sponsorship.
- Do NOT escalate when you hit active defenses — back off and document (§6.4).
6. OpSec
6.1 Sock Puppets
Build posting history, age the account, use a separate browser profile. Persona generation: Fake Name Generator, This Person Does Not Exist. Browser isolation: Firefox Multi-Account Containers. Disposable numbers for SMS verification. Audit every extension before install. Maintain chain-of-custody: timestamp every action, hash every artifact.
6.2 Detectability Tagging
Tag every operation so you can reason about the trail you leave.
| Tag | Examples |
|---|---|
| Low | Passive Shodan InternetDB; crt.sh; Wayback CDX; SecurityTrails PDNS; Hunter.io; HTTP HEAD on public buckets; getuserrealm.srf; OIDC metadata fetch. |
| Medium | GetCredentialType user-enum; Okta /api/v1/authn user-enum; credential validation; AWS sts:GetCallerIdentity; Swagger/GraphQL probes; targeted favicon-hash + JARM fingerprinting. |
| High | Active port scans (naabu/masscan/nmap); Nuclei full runs against production; subdomain brute-force at scale; SMTP RCPT TO enum; web fuzzing. |
Defaults: passive by default. Active probes only when (a) explicitly authorized, (b) within agreed windows, (c) operator aware of log volume.
6.3 Validator Discipline
When you find a credential in the wild, confirm liveness with read-only validators only (/me, auth.test, sts:GetCallerIdentity). Never create, modify, delete, or send. Record checked_at UTC + truncated response + scope/account-ID. Concrete validator endpoints for 9 providers live in offensive-osint §23.
6.4 Detection-Aware Probing
Signs you've been detected (escalating severity): 429 / Retry-After; captcha interstitials; WAF block page; status-code drift (200→403 from your IP only); banner change; NXDOMAIN rollback; honeypot bait (credentials that don't validate); direct contact.
Back-off ladder:
- Halve concurrency; add 2–10s jitter.
- Stop hitting the triggering path; pivot to a different module.
- New User-Agent / TLS fingerprint.
- Rotate egress IP (residential proxy, different cloud region).
- Pause 1–24 hours.
- If WAF block / status drift / direct contact: stop and consult the engagement lead.
7. External Red-Team Recon Pipeline
Five sequential stages; modules within a stage can run concurrently.
| Stage | What you do |
|---|---|
| 1 — Seed Discovery | WHOIS, ASN enum (HE BGP Toolkit, RIPEstat), DNS records (A/AAAA/MX/TXT/NS/SOA/CAA), CT history (crt.sh, Censys). |
| 2 — Asset Expansion | Subdomain enum (passive first → permutations → brute); cloud bucket permutation; typosquat generation; Wayback CDX; mobile app discovery; DNS walking; LinkedIn employee enum. |
| 3 — Enrichment | Port/service (Shodan InternetDB → naabu); TLS handshakes (cert chain, JARM, favicon mmh3); WAF/CDN inference; origin discovery; security headers; email harvest; email security audit; GitHub dorking; JS deep analysis; SSO/IdP fingerprinting; API discovery; secrets sweep (Postman, Stack Exchange); vendor product fingerprinting; container/CI-CD/cloud-native exposure; job posting harvest. |
| 4 — Exposure Analysis | Nuclei always-on checks; TLS deep audit; breach × identity correlation → SSO_EXPOSURE findings; targeted misconfig probes (.git/config, .env, /actuator/env, /_cat/indices, /console); vulnerability prioritization (CVE × EPSS × KEV × POC). |
| 5 — Reporting | Risk scoring per finding; asset graph export; client-facing report (exec summary + technical detail + remediation); reproduction package; bug bounty submission if applicable. |
7.1 Pipeline Priority Order (highest signal density first)
- Breaches — HudsonRock Cavalier + HIBP + DeHashed. Highest ROI; often yields plaintext corp SSO creds.
- GitHub recon — code-search dorks. Fastest path to AWS keys, Slack tokens, JWT secrets.
- Nuclei misconfig sweep — exposed admin panels, CVEs with public POCs.
- Cloud buckets — listable = CRITICAL.
- Ports — Shodan InternetDB first. VPN concentrators, RDP, Jenkins, Elasticsearch are high-value pivots.
- Email OSINT — feeds breaches; feeds phishing list.
- Web tech / WAF / screenshots — triage thousands of hosts.
- Wayback — archived JS for hard-coded keys; removed admin/dev paths.
- DNS deep + email security — SPF/DMARC gaps enable spoofing; TXT tokens reveal SaaS tenancies.
- Certificates → TLS — CT timeline catches forgotten subdomains; weak ciphers = cheap findings.
- ASN + reverse DNS — corporate IP space hosts unadvertised infra.
- Typosquats — registered = finding; unregistered = phishing shortlist.
7.2 Time Budgeting & Engagement Profiles
| Stage | Small org (<100) | Medium (100–1K) | Large (1K+) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Seed | 30 min | 30 min | 30 min |
| 2. Asset expansion | 1–2 h | 2–4 h | 4–8 h |
| 3. Enrichment (per 100 alive webapps) | ~1 h | ~1 h | ~1 h |
| 4. Exposure analysis | 1–3 h | 3–6 h | 6–12 h |
| 5. Reporting | 2–4 h | 4–8 h | 1–2 days |
Profiles: 1-hour rapid (Stages 1–2 passive + breach + exec summary) · 4-hour focused (adds email harvest, SSO fingerprinting, typosquats) · 1-day standard (full Stages 1–4 in priority order) · 1-week deep (all of standard + JS deep, mobile, cloud-native, vendor product, package registry) · ongoing weekly diff (re-run Stages 1–3, diff against baseline).
Abort conditions: scope mismatch after Stage 1; near-zero attack surface after Stage 2; WAF/detection signs hit during any stage (§6.4).
8. Asset Graph Discipline
Every discovery is a typed asset in a graph, not a free-floating string.
8.1 Asset Taxonomy
| Category | Types |
|---|---|
| DNS / Network | domain, subdomain, ip, netblock, asn |
| Service | port, service, certificate |
| Identity | email, person, credential |
| Code / Config | repo, secret |
| Cloud / Storage | bucket, firebase_project |
| Web | webapp, wayback_endpoint, api_endpoint, api_spec, graphql_schema |
| Mobile | mobile_app, deep_link, exported_component |
| Phishing | typosquat_domain |
| SaaS | postman_collection, postman_workspace, postman_api_key, stack_post, saas_public_surface |
Every asset carries: type, key (typed dedup id), value, sources[], confidence, first_seen, last_seen, attrs{}.
Discipline: create the asset first, then attach the finding. Dedup by key. sources[] must list every source. Confidence is per-source, then aggregated.
8.2 Asset-Level Triage Rules
WebApp priority (highest first): auth (auth., login., sso.) → admin paths → dev/staging hosts → API (api., gateway.) → customer-facing (portal., app.) → marketing.
Email priority: exec (CEO/CFO/CISO) → IT/helpdesk/security → dev/engineer/DBA → sales/HR/finance → generic role accounts.
Repo priority: recently pushed (last 30 days) > stale; public with target name in description > code-only; mentions prod/internal/secret in name → HIGH priority despite being public.
9. Findings Rubric & Severity Mapping
Severity Anchors
| Severity | Anchor |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Pre-auth code execution; confirmed valid credentials; listable production data; fundamental trust violations. Examples: .env exposed, listable S3 bucket with PII, live-validated AWS admin key, open Kubernetes API with anon-auth, ≥10 employees in breach corpus + tenant identified. |
| HIGH | Significant exposure with clear escalation path; high-value info disclosure. Examples: public secret in GitHub repo, subdomain takeover possible, reflected CORS with credentials, exposed Jenkins/phpMyAdmin admin UI, open GraphQL introspection on prod, DMARC p=none. |
| MEDIUM | Info disclosure, hardening gaps, brute-force exposure. Examples: missing HSTS/CSP, Apache /server-status, internal IP/hostname in JS, schema leakage in error pages, android:allowBackup=true, wildcard CORS on user-data API, Slack webhook leaked. |
| LOW | Cosmetic or marginal gaps. Examples: missing X-Frame-Options, .DS_Store exposed, Stripe test key, cert pinning missing, outdated WordPress (no known active exploit). |
| INFO | Worth recording; no immediate action. Examples: robots.txt reveals paths, private bucket locked down, DNSSEC not enabled. |
Severity Escalation Rules
- HSTS missing on auth/login/SSO/admin path → MED → HIGH.
- Wildcard CORS + credentials header → MED → HIGH.
- Endpoint interest score ≥70 (companion skill §20) → at least HIGH.
- Domain breach ≥10 employees → CRITICAL regardless of stale-data caveats.
- Vendor product version matches CISA KEV → CRITICAL.
10. Pivot Modes & Scale Tactics
| Aspect | Investigative Mode | Offensive Recon Mode |
|---|---|---|
| Probing rate | Slow, single-threaded, blends with traffic | Bursts, parallel, rate-limited per provider |
| OpSec posture | Sock-puppet only; never reveal investigator | Engagement persona; team may notify SOC |
| Evidence handling | Court-grade chain of custody | Engagement-grade; same hash/timestamp discipline |
| Reporting format | Narrative + sourced timeline | Per-asset findings + remediation + reproduction |
Scale tactics:
- Small (<100): Individual-account focus. One exec/CFO compromise often hands you the keys. Deep on every email + every identity-fabric finding. Check founders' personal GitHub orgs.
- Medium (100–1K): Balanced enumeration. Full pipeline at standard depth. LinkedIn priority by role. Check both app stores.
- Large (1K–10K): Breadth-first; automation for asset discovery; manual triage on findings only.
- Very large / conglomerate: Scope pruning is the most important step. Brand-pivot map first. Breach corpus and systemic posture findings (DMARC gaps, SSO_EXPOSURE breadth) dominate over individual accounts.
11. Implementation: Companion Skill Pointers
The following modules have full implementation detail — probe paths, wordlists, curl one-liners, regexes, and scoring rubrics — in offensive-osint. This skill defines what to do; that skill defines how to do it.
Identity Fabric Mapping (offensive-osint §22) — Microsoft Entra (OIDC metadata, getuserrealm.srf, GetCredentialType), Okta (slug derivation, /api/v1/authn), ADFS, Google Workspace, generic OIDC (Auth0/Keycloak/Ping/OneLogin/Duo), SAML metadata (5 paths), AWS account-ID extraction, M365 deep surface (Teams federation, SharePoint, OneDrive, OAuth client_id, device-code phishing check, Power Platform).
API & Auth-Map (offensive-osint §16.1–16.2, §20) — 28-path Swagger/OpenAPI wordlist; 13-path GraphQL wordlist; introspection POST body; field-suggestion enumeration when introspection disabled; endpoint interest score 0–100 rubric.
JavaScript Deep Analysis (offensive-osint §13 pattern) — sourcemap detection; secret catalog over JS bodies and sourcesContent[]; three-tier endpoint-extraction regex; internal-host leakage patterns; Next.js manifest parsing.
Mobile Attack Surface (offensive-osint §21) — Android/iOS app discovery; ownership confidence 0–100 scoring; APK static analysis; manifest misconfig findings; Firebase canonical probe.
Cloud Attack Surface (offensive-osint §16.8) — S3/GCS/Azure bucket permutation (6 prefixes × 15 suffixes); HEAD → GET probe technique; cloud-native fingerprints (Lambda, Cloud Run, Azure Functions, Vercel, Netlify, Workers); K8s/etcd/kubelet/container registry exposure.
WAF / CDN Bypass & Origin Discovery (offensive-osint §16.15) — DNS history pivot; cert SAN pivot; favicon mmh3 + JARM clustering; direct IP probe with Host header; mail/ftp/cpanel exception; error page leakage; email-header bounce trick; confidence rules.
Vulnerability Prioritization (offensive-osint §29.2) — NVD, EPSS, CISA KEV, ExploitDB, Metasploit, InTheWild.io, Trickest CVE→POC; 9-signal scoring rubric → P0/P1/P2/P3 tiers.
Phishing Infrastructure (offensive-osint §16.14 for email security) — typosquat shortlists via dnstwist; subdomain takeover for trusted-domain phishing; email spoof feasibility matrix (SPF × DMARC); pretext development from OSINT (job titles, recent events, vendor relationships, GitHub commits).
12. Breach × Identity Correlation
Highest-ROI single technique for external red teams. Run on every engagement.
| Source | Tier | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Hudson Rock Cavalier | FREE | Infostealer-log corpus; very high signal for corp SSO creds. |
| Have I Been Pwned | Free + paid | Domain-wide existence + Pwned Passwords (k-anonymity). |
| DeHashed | Paid | Per-record searchable API. |
| IntelX | Free + paid | Aggregator; phonebook search. |
Domain-level severity: ≥10 employees compromised → CRITICAL; 1–9 → HIGH; ≥1 end-user → MEDIUM; domain seen with 0 named accounts → INFO.
SSO_EXPOSURE: after Stage 3 identity-fabric mapping AND breach lookups, intersect discovered IdP tenant domain with breach corpus. Non-empty intersection → SSO_EXPOSURE finding, severity CRITICAL. Evidence: tenant ID + product + employee count + per-account source.
Stealer log discipline: encrypt at rest; SHA-256 every artifact; never paste plaintext passwords into cloud LLMs; maintain chain of custody; redact passwords in client reports by default (offer encrypted credential bundle separately).
13. Specialty OSINT Domains
Cryptocurrency — track flows with Cielo, TRM, Arkham, MetaSleuth. L2/rollup: start at L1 bridge events; use L2 explorers for in-rollup activity. Caution: bridges mint/burn (avoid 1:1 flow assumptions); MEV paths create false direct trails.
Image / Video / Chronolocation — reverse image search (Google Lens, Yandex, TinEye); EXIF via ExifTool; forensics via Forensically/FotoForensics; geolocation via foreground+background landmark analysis, Street View, Overpass Turbo, PeakVisor. Shadow analysis: SunCalc, ShadeMap. Satellite: Google Earth Pro historical, Sentinel Hub.
Threat Actor Investigation — scoping: actor hypothesis from CERT/vendor reports → IOC harvest → infra mapping via CT log pivots, shared hosting, NS reuse, HTML fingerprints → artifact profiling (PDB paths, Rich headers, SSDEEP/YARA) → social pivots (handles, code snippets, job posts). Attribution discipline: rule of three; separate capability from intent; prefer durable pivots (code-signing certs, build path idioms) over ephemeral (resolving IPs). Russia pivots: EGRUL, Rusprofile, hh.ru, VKontakte. China pivots: gsxt.gov.cn, Tianyancha, ICP filings, Weibo, Zhihu.
People & Social Media — username enumeration: WhatsMyName, Sherlock, Maigret. Face search: PimEyes, Exposing.ai. Social graph: Maltego, SocialBlade. Bluesky: DID resolution via bsky.social/xrpc/, firehose via Firesky. Mastodon: WebFinger discovery; FediSearch cross-instance.
14. Anti-Patterns & Common Failure Modes
- Single-source attribution. Rule of three.
- Trusting vendor labels as ground truth. Labels are hypotheses.
- Favicon-hash = ownership. Shared infra, shared CMS, shared CDN all produce matches.
- Snippet-only dork as CONFIRMED. TENTATIVE until visited.
- Pasting real PII / creds into cloud LLMs. Local models only.
- Mirror-imaging the threat actor. They don't think like you.
- Attribution by IP geolocation. VPNs and residential proxies exist.
- Ignoring CT-log lag. Absence ≠ doesn't exist; lag can be minutes to hours.
- Counting Wayback as "the site at time T." Best-effort; many requests fail.
- Letting the asset graph carry untyped strings. Every discovery is an asset.
- Skipping the scope check. Ask once when in doubt.
- Forgetting UTC. Local time creates correlation bugs.
- Continuing to probe after a WAF block. Back off (§6.4).
- Skipping confidence-upgrade documentation. TENTATIVE needs a path to CONFIRMED.
- Treating exec-summary as an afterthought. Plan deliverables at engagement start.
15. Bug Bounty Submission & Responsible Disclosure
Platforms: HackerOne (CVSS-based) · Bugcrowd (VRT: P1–P5) · Intigriti · YesWeHack · HackenProof (crypto-focused) · Open Bug Bounty (XSS/SSRF only) · /.well-known/security.txt for unprogrammed targets.
Report structure:
Title: [Severity] [Component] Brief description
Summary: 2-3 sentences — what and why it matters.
Steps to Reproduce: numbered, copy-pasteable, URL + payload + expected vs actual.
Proof of Concept: screenshot or sanitized HTTP request/response.
Impact: what data/users/functions are at risk.
Severity: CVSS v3 vector + score + 1-sentence justification.
Remediation: concrete, actionable recommendation.
Unprogrammed CVD: check security.txt → security@<target> → WHOIS abuse contact → CERT/CC. Standard 90-day window before public release. Never: include others' PII, post publicly before window expires, or escalate via social media first.
16. Client Deliverable Templates
Executive summary structure: engagement metadata → top 3–5 findings (title + business impact + remediation effort) → postural observations (email security, identity fabric, cloud surface, mobile) → aggregate metrics (assets, findings by severity, live creds confirmed) → recommended next steps with timeline.
Per-finding report card: title + severity + confidence + asset key + UTC timestamp → description → evidence (URL + tool + screenshot + raw HTTP + SHA-256) → reproduction steps → business-language impact → remediation (immediate / short-term / long-term) → references + attack-path hint.
Risk translation (sample):
| Technical | Business language |
|---|---|
| Listable S3 bucket with PII | Customer records publicly downloadable. Potential GDPR/CCPA notification trigger. |
Exposed .env with DB credentials |
Full database access; pivots to backups, billing, employee PII. |
| Live AWS admin key | Complete cloud compromise; cryptominer spin-up, full data exfiltration, lateral movement. |
DMARC p=none |
Anyone on the internet can send email appearing to be from your domain. |
| ≥10 employees in breach corpus | Stolen corp SSO credentials circulating; active credential-stuffing risk. |
| Vendor appliance on CISA KEV | Attackers are actively scanning the internet for this exact issue. Patch now. |
Reporting cadence: Day 1 EOD kickoff summary → mid-engagement heads-up on first CRITICAL → end-of-engagement preliminary (top 5 findings) → final report within agreed SLA → re-test offer for CRITICAL/HIGH findings post-remediation.
Reproduction package: run-log.jsonl + assets.db + findings.db + evidence/ (screenshots, HTTP captures, downloads with .sha256) + re-test-script.sh + engagement metadata.
17. Skill Self-Test
Drop these into a fresh session to verify the skill loads correctly.
- "External recon on acme.com (in-scope BB). Where do I start?" → §0, §1, §7, §7.1.
- "Detect Entra vs Okta vs ADFS without active probing." → §11 + companion skill §22.
- "50 subdomains, 12 webapps, 23 emails — triage order?" → §8.2 + §7.1.
- "Found live AWS key in GitHub repo. Should I validate it?" → §6.3.
- "Probes getting 429s and Cloudflare interstitial. What now?" → §6.4.
- "200 emails harvested, org uses Entra. Highest-ROI next step?" → §12.
- "Target fully behind Cloudflare. How to find the origin?" → §11 (WAF/CDN pointer) + companion skill §16.15.
- "100 CVEs from a Nuclei scan. Prioritize." → §11 (vuln prioritization pointer) + companion skill §29.2.
- "Authorized engagement asks for phishing-feasibility shortlist." → §11 (phishing pointer).
- "Found unauth POST endpoint on HackerOne target. Write the report." → §15.
- "Write exec summary for 2 CRIT, 5 HIGH, 12 MED." → §16.
- "Run full subdomain enum on chase.com." → §1 (scope check; should NOT run).
18. Changelog
- v2.2 (2026-04-29) — refactor: trimmed from 1,694 to ~480 lines. Compressed implementation-detail sections (§11–§15, §27–§31 original) to pointers to
offensive-osint. Retained full framework core: confidence levels, pipeline, asset graph, severity rubric, OpSec, breach correlation, anti-patterns, deliverable templates. Removed duplicate content; combined specialty domains into single §13; merged §23–§25 into §13; collapsed §27–§29 into §11 pointer block. - v2.1 (2026-04-27) — comprehensive expansion based on 32-prompt smoke-test gap analysis. PASS rate: 31/32.
- v2.0 (2026-04-27) — major rewrite for external red-team posture.
- v1.x — original framework based on SnailSploit/offensive-checklist.
Source: elementalsouls/Claude-OSINT → skills/osint-methodology/SKILL.md