Performing Malware Persistence Investigation

Performing Malware Persistence Investigation

When to Use

• When investigating how malware maintains presence on a compromised system after reboots
• During incident response to identify all persistence mechanisms for complete remediation
• For threat hunting to discover unauthorized autostart entries across endpoints
• When analyzing malware behavior to understand its persistence strategy
• For verifying that all persistence has been removed after incident remediation

Prerequisites

• Forensic image or live system access with administrative privileges
• Autoruns (Sysinternals) for Windows persistence enumeration
• RegRipper for offline registry analysis
• Understanding of Windows and Linux persistence mechanisms
• YARA rules for scanning persistence locations
• Baseline of known-good autorun entries for comparison

Workflow

Step 1: Enumerate Windows Registry Persistence

# Extract registry hives from forensic image
mount -o ro,loop,offset=$((2048*512)) /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd /mnt/evidence

# Key registry persistence locations
python3 << 'PYEOF'
from Registry import Registry
import json

results = {'registry_persistence': []}

# SYSTEM hive analysis
system_reg = Registry.Registry("/cases/case-2024-001/registry/SYSTEM")
select = system_reg.open("Select")
current = select.value("Current").value()
cs = f"ControlSet{current:03d}"

# Services (very common persistence)
services = system_reg.open(f"{cs}\\Services")
for svc in services.subkeys():
    try:
        start_type = svc.value("Start").value()
        image_path = ""
        try:
            image_path = svc.value("ImagePath").value()
        except:
            pass
        # Start types: 0=Boot, 1=System, 2=Auto, 3=Manual, 4=Disabled
        if start_type in (0, 1, 2) and image_path:
            svc_type = svc.value("Type").value() if svc.values() else 0
            results['registry_persistence'].append({
                'location': f'HKLM\\SYSTEM\\{cs}\\Services\\{svc.name()}',
                'type': 'Service',
                'value': image_path,
                'start_type': start_type,
                'timestamp': str(svc.timestamp())
            })
    except Exception:
        pass

# SOFTWARE hive analysis
sw_reg = Registry.Registry("/cases/case-2024-001/registry/SOFTWARE")

# Machine Run keys
run_keys = [
    "Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run",
    "Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce",
    "Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices",
    "Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce",
    "Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run",
    "Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run",
    "Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce",
]

for key_path in run_keys:
    try:
        key = sw_reg.open(key_path)
        for value in key.values():
            results['registry_persistence'].append({
                'location': f'HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\{key_path}',
                'type': 'Run Key',
                'name': value.name(),
                'value': str(value.value()),
                'timestamp': str(key.timestamp())
            })
    except Exception:
        pass

# NTUSER.DAT analysis
import glob
for ntuser in glob.glob("/cases/case-2024-001/registry/NTUSER*.DAT"):
    try:
        user_reg = Registry.Registry(ntuser)
        user_run_keys = [
            "Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run",
            "Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce",
            "Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup",
        ]
        for key_path in user_run_keys:
            try:
                key = user_reg.open(key_path)
                for value in key.values():
                    results['registry_persistence'].append({
                        'location': f'HKCU\\{key_path}',
                        'type': 'User Run Key',
                        'name': value.name(),
                        'value': str(value.value()),
                        'timestamp': str(key.timestamp()),
                        'hive': ntuser
                    })
            except Exception:
                pass
    except Exception:
        pass

print(f"Total registry persistence entries: {len(results['registry_persistence'])}")
for entry in results['registry_persistence']:
    print(f"  [{entry['type']}] {entry.get('name', '')} -> {entry.get('value', '')[:100]}")

with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/registry_persistence.json', 'w') as f:
    json.dump(results, f, indent=2)
PYEOF

Step 2: Check Scheduled Tasks and WMI Persistence

# Extract scheduled tasks from forensic image
mkdir -p /cases/case-2024-001/persistence/tasks/
cp -r /mnt/evidence/Windows/System32/Tasks/* /cases/case-2024-001/persistence/tasks/ 2>/dev/null

# Parse scheduled task XML files
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import os, xml.etree.ElementTree as ET

tasks_dir = '/cases/case-2024-001/persistence/tasks/'
suspicious_tasks = []

for root_dir, dirs, files in os.walk(tasks_dir):
    for fname in files:
        fpath = os.path.join(root_dir, fname)
        try:
            tree = ET.parse(fpath)
            root = tree.getroot()
            ns = {'t': 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task'}

            actions = root.findall('.//t:Exec', ns)
            for action in actions:
                command = action.find('t:Command', ns)
                args = action.find('t:Arguments', ns)
                cmd_text = command.text if command is not None else ''
                args_text = args.text if args is not None else ''

                # Flag suspicious commands
                suspicious_indicators = [
                    'powershell', 'cmd.exe', 'wscript', 'cscript', 'mshta',
                    'regsvr32', 'rundll32', 'certutil', 'bitsadmin',
                    '/c ', '-enc', '-e ', 'hidden', 'bypass', 'downloadstring',
                    'invoke-', 'iex', '/tmp/', 'appdata', 'programdata',
                    'temp', '.ps1', '.vbs', '.hta', 'base64'
                ]

                is_suspicious = any(s in (cmd_text + ' ' + args_text).lower() for s in suspicious_indicators)

                task_info = {
                    'name': fname,
                    'path': fpath.replace(tasks_dir, ''),
                    'command': cmd_text,
                    'arguments': args_text,
                    'suspicious': is_suspicious
                }

                if is_suspicious:
                    suspicious_tasks.append(task_info)
                    print(f"SUSPICIOUS TASK: {fname}")
                    print(f"  Command: {cmd_text}")
                    print(f"  Arguments: {args_text}")
                    print()

        except Exception as e:
            pass

print(f"\nTotal suspicious scheduled tasks: {len(suspicious_tasks)}")
PYEOF

# Check WMI event subscriptions (common APT persistence)
# WMI repository: C:\Windows\System32\wbem\Repository\
cp -r /mnt/evidence/Windows/System32/wbem/Repository/ /cases/case-2024-001/persistence/wmi/ 2>/dev/null

# Parse WMI persistence using PyWMIPersistenceFinder
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import os, re

# Search WMI OBJECTS.DATA for event subscriptions
wmi_db = '/cases/case-2024-001/persistence/wmi/OBJECTS.DATA'
if os.path.exists(wmi_db):
    with open(wmi_db, 'rb') as f:
        data = f.read()

    # Search for EventFilter strings
    filters = re.findall(b'__EventFilter.*?(?=\x00\x00)', data)
    consumers = re.findall(b'CommandLineEventConsumer.*?(?=\x00\x00)', data)
    bindings = re.findall(b'__FilterToConsumerBinding.*?(?=\x00\x00)', data)

    print("=== WMI PERSISTENCE ===")
    print(f"Event Filters: {len(filters)}")
    print(f"Command Consumers: {len(consumers)}")
    print(f"Filter-Consumer Bindings: {len(bindings)}")

    for consumer in consumers:
        decoded = consumer.decode('utf-8', errors='ignore')
        print(f"  Consumer: {decoded[:200]}")
else:
    print("WMI repository not found")
PYEOF

Step 3: Check File System and Boot Persistence

# Startup folders
echo "=== STARTUP FOLDER CONTENTS ===" > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/startup_items.txt

ls -la "/mnt/evidence/ProgramData/Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/Programs/Startup/" \
   >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/startup_items.txt 2>/dev/null

for userdir in /mnt/evidence/Users/*/; do
    username=$(basename "$userdir")
    echo "--- User: $username ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/startup_items.txt
    ls -la "$userdir/AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/Programs/Startup/" \
       >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/startup_items.txt 2>/dev/null
done

# Check DLL search order hijacking locations
echo "=== DLL HIJACKING CHECK ===" > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/dll_hijack.txt
# Check for DLLs in application directories that should only be in System32
find /mnt/evidence/Program\ Files/ /mnt/evidence/Program\ Files\ \(x86\)/ \
   -name "*.dll" -newer /mnt/evidence/Windows/System32/ntdll.dll 2>/dev/null \
   >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/dll_hijack.txt

# Check for COM object hijacking
python3 << 'PYEOF'
from Registry import Registry

reg = Registry.Registry("/cases/case-2024-001/registry/SOFTWARE")

# Check for suspicious CLSID entries
try:
    clsid = reg.open("Classes\\CLSID")
    for key in clsid.subkeys():
        try:
            server = key.subkey("InprocServer32")
            dll_path = server.value("(default)").value()
            if any(s in dll_path.lower() for s in ['temp', 'appdata', 'programdata', 'downloads', 'tmp']):
                print(f"SUSPICIOUS COM: {key.name()} -> {dll_path}")
        except:
            pass
except:
    pass
PYEOF

# Check boot configuration for bootkits
# BCD (Boot Configuration Data)
ls -la /mnt/evidence/Boot/BCD 2>/dev/null
# Check for modified bootmgr or winload.exe
sha256sum /mnt/evidence/Windows/System32/winload.exe 2>/dev/null

Step 4: Check Linux Persistence Mechanisms

# If analyzing a Linux system
LINUX_ROOT="/mnt/evidence"

echo "=== LINUX PERSISTENCE CHECK ===" > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt

# Cron jobs
echo "--- Cron Jobs ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/crontab >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
ls -la $LINUX_ROOT/etc/cron.d/ >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/cron.d/* >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
cat $LINUX_ROOT/var/spool/cron/crontabs/* >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null

# Systemd services
echo "--- Custom Systemd Services ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
find $LINUX_ROOT/etc/systemd/system/ -name "*.service" -not -type l \
   >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null

# SSH authorized keys
echo "--- SSH Authorized Keys ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
find $LINUX_ROOT/home/ $LINUX_ROOT/root/ -name "authorized_keys" -exec cat {} \; \
   >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null

# Init scripts and rc.local
echo "--- RC Scripts ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/rc.local >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null

# Shell profile scripts
echo "--- Profile Scripts ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/profile.d/*.sh >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null

# LD_PRELOAD
echo "--- LD_PRELOAD ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/ld.so.preload >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
grep -r "LD_PRELOAD" $LINUX_ROOT/etc/ >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null

# Kernel modules
echo "--- Loaded Kernel Modules ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/modules-load.d/*.conf >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null

# PAM backdoors
echo "--- PAM Configuration ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
find $LINUX_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ -exec grep -l "pam_exec\|pam_script" {} \; \
   >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null

Step 5: Compile Persistence Report

# Generate comprehensive persistence report
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import json

with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/registry_persistence.json') as f:
    reg_data = json.load(f)

report = """
MALWARE PERSISTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
==========================================

PERSISTENCE MECHANISMS FOUND:

1. REGISTRY RUN KEYS:
"""

run_keys = [e for e in reg_data['registry_persistence'] if 'Run' in e.get('type', '')]
for entry in run_keys:
    report += f"   [{entry['timestamp']}] {entry.get('name', 'N/A')} -> {entry.get('value', '')[:100]}\n"

services = [e for e in reg_data['registry_persistence'] if e.get('type') == 'Service']
report += f"\n2. SERVICES ({len(services)} auto-start services):\n"
for entry in services[:20]:
    report += f"   {entry['location'].split('')[-1]}: {entry['value'][:100]}\n"

report += """
3. SCHEDULED TASKS: [See scheduled_tasks analysis]
4. WMI SUBSCRIPTIONS: [See WMI analysis]
5. STARTUP FOLDER: [See startup_items.txt]
6. COM HIJACKING: [See COM analysis]

SUSPICIOUS ENTRIES REQUIRING INVESTIGATION:
"""

# Flag suspicious entries
for entry in reg_data['registry_persistence']:
    value = str(entry.get('value', '')).lower()
    suspicious_indicators = ['powershell', 'cmd /c', 'wscript', 'certutil',
                             'programdata', 'appdata\\local\\temp', 'base64',
                             '.ps1', '.vbs', '.hta', '/tmp/', 'hidden']
    if any(s in value for s in suspicious_indicators):
        report += f"   SUSPICIOUS: {entry.get('name', 'N/A')} -> {entry.get('value', '')[:100]}\n"

with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/persistence_report.txt', 'w') as f:
    f.write(report)

print(report)
PYEOF

Key Concepts

Tools & Systems

Common Scenarios

Scenario 1: APT Persistence After Initial Compromise Check all registry Run keys, enumerate scheduled tasks for encoded PowerShell commands, examine WMI event subscriptions for event-triggered execution, check COM object registrations for hijacked CLSIDs, review services for recently installed entries with suspicious image paths.

Scenario 2: Ransomware Pre-Encryption Persistence Identify how the ransomware maintains access for re-encryption or monitoring, check for scheduled tasks that would re-launch encryption, examine services installed by the ransomware operator, verify no additional backdoor persistence exists before declaring remediation complete.

Scenario 3: Fileless Malware Persistence Focus on registry-based persistence storing payload in registry values, check WMI subscriptions executing PowerShell from event triggers, examine scheduled tasks using encoded command arguments, check for mshta/rundll32 based persistence loading remote content.

Scenario 4: Post-Remediation Verification Run Autoruns comparison against known-good baseline, verify all identified persistence mechanisms have been removed, check for additional persistence that may have been missed, confirm services, tasks, and registry entries are clean, monitor for re-infection indicators.

Output Format

Persistence Investigation Summary:
  System: DESKTOP-ABC123 (Windows 10 Pro)
  Analysis Date: 2024-01-20

  Persistence Mechanisms Found:
    Registry Run Keys (HKLM):    5 entries (1 SUSPICIOUS)
    Registry Run Keys (HKCU):    3 entries (1 SUSPICIOUS)
    Services (Auto-Start):       142 entries (2 SUSPICIOUS)
    Scheduled Tasks:             67 entries (3 SUSPICIOUS)
    WMI Subscriptions:           1 entry (SUSPICIOUS)
    Startup Folder:              4 items (1 SUSPICIOUS)
    COM Objects:                 0 hijacked entries
    DLL Hijacking:               0 detected

  Suspicious Entries:
    1. HKCU\Run\WindowsUpdate -> powershell -ep bypass -e <base64>
       Timestamp: 2024-01-15 14:35:00
       Action: Encoded PowerShell download cradle

    2. Service: WinDefenderUpdate -> C:\ProgramData\svc\update.exe
       Timestamp: 2024-01-15 14:40:00
       Action: Unknown executable in ProgramData

    3. Task: \Microsoft\Windows\Maintenance\SecurityUpdate
       Command: cmd.exe /c powershell -w hidden -e <base64>
       Trigger: On system startup

    4. WMI: __EventFilter "ProcessStart" -> CommandLineEventConsumer
       Action: Execute C:\Windows\Temp\svc.exe on WMI event

  Remediation Required: 4 persistence mechanisms to remove
  Report: /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/persistence_report.txt

Source: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills → skills/performing-malware-persistence-investigation/SKILL.md