Actions Authoring

Actions Authoring

Security first — the three that actually get exploited

1. pull_request_target with a PR-head checkout

# CRITICAL — a fork PR gets write-scoped secrets
on: pull_request_target
jobs:
  test:
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with: { ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} }
      - run: npm test        # attacker's code, your secrets

pull_request_target runs in the base repo's context with secrets. Checking out the PR head executes attacker-controlled code with those secrets in scope. Use pull_request and accept that secrets are unavailable — that is the point.

2. Script injection through ${{ }}

# wrong — issue title is attacker-controlled, interpolated into the shell
- run: echo "Title: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}"

# right — passed as an environment variable
- env:
    TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
  run: echo "Title: $TITLE"

Any github.event.* field a user can write is untrusted: title, body, branch name, commit message, label name.

3. Unpinned third-party actions

Tags are mutable. Pin to a commit SHA with the version in a trailing comment:

- uses: some-org/some-action@8f4b7c2e9a1d... # v3.1.0

First-party actions/* at a major tag is the common accepted exception — decide deliberately rather than by default.

Permissions

Declare explicitly. The default GITHUB_TOKEN scope is far wider than any single workflow needs.

permissions:
  contents: read          # workflow-level floor

jobs:
  release:
    permissions:
      contents: write     # narrowed per job
      id-token: write     # OIDC

Use OIDC for cloud auth. Long-lived cloud keys in secrets are a standing liability that no rotation policy fully fixes.

Caching

key: ${{ runner.os }}-pnpm-${{ hashFiles('**/pnpm-lock.yaml') }}
restore-keys: |
  ${{ runner.os }}-pnpm-

Two failure modes, both common:

• A key containing github.run_id, a timestamp, or the commit sha can never hit — it costs upload time every run and saves nothing.
• A key with no lockfile hash never misses when it should, restoring a stale dependency tree after an upgrade.

Check the actual hit rate in the restore step's log before tuning anything.

Concurrency

concurrency:
  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
  cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.ref != 'refs/heads/main' }}

Never cancel in progress on the default branch — that kills the run that gates deploys.

Matrices

Full OS × version matrix on every PR is usually waste. Run a representative slice on PRs and the full matrix on the default branch and on a schedule.

strategy:
  fail-fast: false        # you want all failures, not the first
  matrix:
    node: [20, 22]
    include:
      - { node: 24, os: ubuntu-latest, experimental: true }

Cost levers, ordered by typical payoff

Cache hit rate → job graph (unnecessary needs:) → matrix pruning → concurrency groups → path filters → fail-fast ordering (cheap checks first) → runner sizing → artifact retention.

Never buy speed by dropping coverage. A removed matrix entry that covers a supported platform is not an optimization.

See also

• ci-forensics — diagnosing failures
• ../commands/audit.md — repo-wide workflow security audit