Aep Caw Policy Create

Create AepCaw Policy

Overview

Create new AepCaw security policies from built-in templates, customized to the user's use case. Produces valid YAML policy files with correct structure, evaluation semantics, and defensive defaults for file, network, command, HTTP service, and Postgres-family database controls.

When to Use

• User asks to create/make/generate a new policy
• User describes a use case that needs a policy ("policy for my CI pipeline")
• User wants to set up AepCaw for the first time
• User wants controlled access to a declared HTTP API or Postgres-family database
• NOT for editing existing policies (use aep-caw-policy-edit)

Flow

1. Locate policy directory

   • Look for config.yml or config.yaml in the project root to find policies.dir
   • If not found, look for a configs/policies/ directory
   • Fall back to asking the user with AskUserQuestion

2. Understand the use case Use AskUserQuestion to ask: "What will this policy protect?"

   Use Case	Template
   AI agent (code tasks)	default or agent-default
   CI/CD pipeline	ci-strict
   Local development	dev-safe
   Strict agent sandbox	agent-sandbox
   Observation/profiling	agent-observe
   Declared HTTP API gateway	Start from default
   Postgres-family database access	Start from default
   Custom / other	Start from default

3. Select template

   • Read the matching template from the policy directory (e.g., configs/policies/default.yaml)
   • On Windows, prefer the -windows variant if available (e.g., default-windows.yaml, ci-strict-windows.yaml)
   • If templates are not available locally, use the schema reference to generate a baseline

4. Customize Based on the template read in Step 3, ask only about gaps - skip categories the template already handles well:

   • "Which domains does your app need to reach?" → add network rules
   • "Any paths outside the workspace it needs?" → add file rules
   • "Any commands to block or require approval?" → add command rules
   • "Should any HTTP APIs be exposed through AepCaw?" → add http_services plus providers when credential substitution is needed
   • "Should any Postgres-family databases be mediated?" → add db_services, database_connection_rules, database_rules, and policies.db

   For database policies, ask for:

   • service name, dialect (postgres, aurora_postgres, redshift, cockroachdb), upstream host:port, and tls_mode
   • connection constraints: DB user, database name, application name, replication/cancel handling
   • statement intent: read/write/admin operations, schemas/objects, catalog selectors (relations, functions) if known
   • redaction preference: policies.db.log_statements, approval_statement_preview, and approval_statement_preview_chars
   • unavoidability posture: off, observe, or enforce

5. Name & write

   • Ask for a policy name
   • Generate the YAML with descriptive section comments matching built-in policy style
   • Write to the policy directory

6. Validate Run: aep-caw policy validate <name> If validation fails, fix and re-validate. If aep-caw binary is not available, warn the user to validate manually.

7. Update config reminder If config.yml has a policies.allowed list, remind the user to add the new policy name.

Guardrails

• Always use version: 1
• Every policy must have name and description
• End rule-list categories (file_rules, network_rules, command_rules) with a default-deny catch-all
• Use descriptive rule names in verb-noun format (e.g., allow-npm, deny-ssh-keys)
• Include section comment headers matching built-in policy style
• Most specific selector wins. Exact paths beat catch-all globs regardless of listing order.
• Do not invent runtime support for non-Postgres databases. Current DB enforcement is Postgres-family only.
• For http_services, prefer path/method rules over broad network allows when the user needs audited API surface control.
• For database_rules, remember DB evaluation is not simple first-match-wins: any matching deny wins, non-deny rules must cover every object slot, and uncovered objects fail closed.
• For Postgres UPDATE/DELETE access to sensitive relations, ask whether accidental full-table mutation should be blocked. Use require_where: true only on rules whose operations expand exclusively to modify and/or delete; explain that it is syntactic, WHERE true still satisfies it, and another unguarded non-deny rule can still cover the same effect.
• For DB redirect, only author safe read-only Postgres relation replacement: one canonical source in relations, match_object_resolution: catalog_resolved, and redirect.relation.

Schema Reference

Read skills/aep-caw-policy-shared/schema-reference.md for the complete policy YAML schema before generating any policy content. If this file is not accessible, proceed using only the guardrails above plus the template file read in Step 3. Do not generate policy YAML without either the schema reference or a template.