Single-Session Security Audit
When to Use
- Tasks related to audit-security
- User explicitly invokes
/audit-security
When NOT to Use
- When the task doesn't match this skill's scope -- check related skills
- When a more specialized skill exists for the specific task
Execution Mode Selection
| Condition | Mode | Time |
|---|---|---|
| Task tool available + no context pressure | Parallel | ~15 min |
| Task tool unavailable | Sequential | ~60 min |
| Context running low (<20% remaining) | Sequential | ~60 min |
| User requests sequential | Sequential | ~60 min |
Section A: Parallel Architecture (4 Agents)
When to use: Task tool available, sufficient context budget, no S0/S1 in scope
Agent 1: vulnerability-scanner
Focus Areas:
- Authentication & Authorization
- Input Validation & Injection Prevention
- OWASP Top 10 Coverage
Files:
app/api/**/*.ts(API routes)middleware.tslib/auth*.ts- Form handlers, input components
Agent 2: supply-chain-auditor
Focus Areas:
- Dependency Security & Supply Chain
- Package vulnerabilities (npm audit)
- License compliance
- Unpinned versions, risky postinstall scripts
Files:
package.json,package-lock.json- All import statements
functions/package.json
Agent 3: framework-security-auditor
Focus Areas:
- Firebase/Firestore Security (rules, Cloud Functions)
- Next.js/Framework-Specific Security
- Hosting & Headers Security
- Server/client boundary leaks
Files:
firestore.rules,storage.rulesfirebase.jsonfunctions/src/**/*.tsnext.config.mjs
Agent 4: ai-code-security-auditor
Focus Areas:
- AI-Generated Code & Agent Security
- Crypto & Randomness
- File Handling Security
- Product/UX Security Risks
Files:
.claude/configs- Files with
crypto,random,hashpatterns - File upload handlers
- Admin UI components
Parallel Execution Command
Invoke all 4 agents in a SINGLE Task message:
Task 1: vulnerability-scanner agent - audit auth, input validation, OWASP Task
2: supply-chain-auditor agent - audit dependencies, npm packages Task 3:
framework-security-auditor agent - audit Firebase, Next.js, headers Task 4:
ai-code-security-auditor agent - audit AI patterns, crypto, files
Each agent prompt MUST end with:
CRITICAL RETURN PROTOCOL:
- Write findings to the specified output file using Write tool or Bash
- Return ONLY: `COMPLETE: [agent-id] wrote N findings to [output-path]`
- Do NOT return full findings content — orchestrator checks completion via file
Dependency constraints: All 4 agents are independent -- no ordering required. Each writes to a separate JSONL section. S0/S1 findings trigger immediate notification but do not block other agents.
Coordination Rules
- Each agent writes findings to separate JSONL section
- S0/S1 findings trigger immediate notification
- File conflicts resolved by framework-security-auditor (highest authority)
- All agents respect rate-limiting and App Check patterns
Section B: Sequential Fallback (Single Agent)
When to use: Task tool unavailable, context limits, or user preference
Execution Order (priority-first):
- AI Security Patterns (S0 potential) - 15 min
- Auth & Authorization - 10 min
- Input Validation - 10 min
- Supply Chain (npm audit) - 5 min
- Remaining categories - 20 min
Total: ~60 min (vs ~15 min parallel)
Checkpointing: After each category, write intermediate findings to file before continuing. This protects against context loss.
Checkpoint Format
{
"started_at": "ISO timestamp",
"categories_completed": ["Auth", "Input"],
"current_category": "DataProtection",
"findings_count": 24,
"last_file_written": "stage-2-findings.jsonl"
}
Write Checkpoint After Each Category
- Update
${AUDIT_DIR}/checkpoint.json - Append findings to
.jsonlfile (not overwrite) - This enables recovery regardless of agent capability
Pre-Audit Validation
Step 0: Episodic Memory Search (Session #128)
Before running security audit, search for context from past security sessions:
// Search for past security audit findings
mcp__plugin_episodic -
memory_episodic -
memory__search({
query: ["security audit", "S0", "vulnerability"],
limit: 5,
});
// Search for specific vulnerability patterns addressed before
mcp__plugin_episodic -
memory_episodic -
memory__search({
query: ["OWASP", "injection", "auth bypass"],
limit: 5,
});
Why this matters:
- Compare against previous security findings (regression detection)
- Identify recurring vulnerabilities (may indicate architectural issue)
- Track which S0/S1 issues were resolved vs still open
- Prevent re-flagging known false positives
Step 1: Check Thresholds
Run npm run review:check and report results. Check for security-sensitive file
changes.
- Display count of security-sensitive files changed
- If none: "⚠️ No security-sensitive changes detected. Proceed anyway?"
- Continue with audit regardless (user invoked intentionally)
Step 2: Gather Current Baselines
Collect these metrics by running commands:
# Dependency vulnerabilities (extract summary without truncating JSON)
npm audit --json 2>/dev/null | node -e '
try {
const d = JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync(0,"utf8"));
console.log(JSON.stringify(d.metadata?.vulnerabilities ?? d.vulnerabilities ?? {}, null, 2));
} catch (e) {
console.log("{\"error\": \"Invalid JSON from npm audit\"}");
}
'
# Security lint warnings
npm run lint 2>&1 | grep -i "security" | head -10
# Pattern compliance (security patterns)
npm run patterns:check 2>&1
# Check for .env files (existence only - no permission/owner metadata needed)
ls .env* 2>/dev/null || echo "No .env files found"
Step 2b: Query SonarCloud Security (if MCP available)
If mcp__sonarcloud__get_security_hotspots is available:
- Query with
status: "TO_REVIEW"to get unresolved security hotspots - Note hotspot count and severity distribution
If mcp__sonarcloud__get_issues is available:
- Query with
types: "VULNERABILITY"to get security-specific issues - Cross-reference with npm audit findings for comprehensive coverage
This provides real-time security issue data from static analysis.
Step 3: Load False Positives Database
Read docs/technical-debt/FALSE_POSITIVES.jsonl and filter findings matching:
- Category:
security - Expired entries (skip if
expiresdate passed)
Note patterns to exclude from final findings.
Step 4: Check Template Currency
Read docs/audits/multi-ai/templates/SECURITY_AUDIT_PLAN.md and verify:
- FIREBASE_CHANGE_POLICY.md reference is valid
- Security-sensitive file list is current
- OWASP categories are complete
- Firestore rules path is correct
If outdated, note discrepancies but proceed with current values.
Audit Execution
Focus Areas (12 Categories):
Authentication & Authorization (auth checks, role validation, IDOR, privilege escalation)
Input Validation & Injection Prevention:
- SQL/NoSQL injection, command injection
- Template injection, eval/Function(), new Function()
- Unsafe deserialization, prototype pollution
Data Protection (encryption, PII handling, secrets, overly verbose errors)
Firebase/Firestore Security (rules, Cloud Functions, rate limiting, replay protection)
Dependency Security & Supply Chain:
- npm audit, outdated packages
- Unpinned versions, risky postinstall scripts
- Unused dependencies with known vulnerabilities
OWASP Top 10 Coverage
Hosting & Headers Security:
- CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options
- COOP, COEP, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy
Next.js/Framework-Specific:
- Server/client boundary leaks (secrets in client bundles)
- API route / middleware auth gates
- Static export vs server rendering assumptions
File Handling Security:
- Insecure file upload, path traversal
- MIME type validation, file size limits
Crypto & Randomness:
- Weak randomness (Math.random for security), broken hashing
- Unsafe JWT/session handling, homegrown crypto
Product/UX Security Risks:
- Misleading "security UI" (toggles without server enforcement)
- Dangerous defaults not clearly communicated
- Admin-only flows accessible via client routes without backend checks
AI-Generated Code & Agent Security:
- Prompt-injection surfaces in scripts/configs
- Agent config files with unsafe patterns
- Suspicious strings/comments that could manipulate AI agents
AI Security Patterns (AI-Codebase Specific):
- Prompt Injection Surfaces:
.claude/configs, agent prompts, LLM integrations with user input (S0) - Hallucinated Security APIs: Security functions that don't exist or have wrong signatures (S1)
- AI-Suggested Insecure Defaults: Default
anytypes,*CORS, overly permissive rules (S1) - Inconsistent Auth Patterns: Different auth approaches across AI sessions (S2)
- Over-Confident Comments: "This is secure because..." without actual security (S2)
- AI-Generated Crypto: Homegrown crypto patterns AI might generate (S0)
- Prompt Injection Surfaces:
For each category:
- Search relevant files using Grep/Glob
- Identify specific vulnerabilities with file:line references
- Classify severity: S0 (Critical) | S1 (High) | S2 (Medium) | S3 (Low)
- Classify OWASP category if applicable
- Estimate effort: E0 (trivial) | E1 (hours) | E2 (day) | E3 (major)
- Assign confidence level (see Evidence Requirements below)
Security-Sensitive Files to Check:
firestore.rules,storage.rulesfunctions/src/**/*.tslib/firebase*.ts,lib/auth*.tsmiddleware.ts,next.config.mjsfirebase.json(hosting headers, rewrites).env*files (environment variables)package.json,package-lock.json(supply chain).claude/configs (agent security)- Any file with "security", "auth", "token", "secret", "credential" in name
Additional Checks for Vibe-Coded Apps:
- Search for
eval(,new Function(,Function(- dynamic code execution - Search for
dangerouslySetInnerHTML- XSS vectors - Search for
NEXT_PUBLIC_env vars - ensure no secrets leaked - Search for
process.envin client components - boundary leaks - Search for
postinstall,preinstallin package.json - supply chain - Search for suspicious patterns in
.claude/that could be prompt injection
Scope:
- Include:
app/,components/,lib/,functions/,firestore.rules,firebase.json,.claude/ - Exclude:
node_modules/,.next/,docs/,tests/
Output Requirements
1. Markdown Summary (display to user):
## Security Audit - [DATE]
### Baselines
- npm audit: X vulnerabilities (Y critical, Z high)
- Security patterns: X violations
- Security-sensitive files: X changed since last audit
### Findings Summary
| Severity | Count | OWASP Category | Confidence |
| -------- | ----- | -------------- | ----------- |
| S0 | X | ... | HIGH/MEDIUM |
| S1 | X | ... | HIGH/MEDIUM |
| S2 | X | ... | ... |
| S3 | X | ... | ... |
### Critical/High Findings (Immediate Action)
1. [file:line] - Description (S0/OWASP-A01) - DUAL_PASS_CONFIRMED
2. ...
### False Positives Filtered
- X findings excluded (matched FALSE_POSITIVES.jsonl patterns)
### Dependency Vulnerabilities
- ...
### Recommendations
- ...
2. JSONL Findings (save to file):
Create file: docs/audits/single-session/security/audit-[YYYY-MM-DD].jsonl
Category field: category MUST be security. Also include owasp_category
and cvss_estimate fields.
3. Markdown Report (save to file):
Create file: docs/audits/single-session/security/audit-[YYYY-MM-DD].md
Full markdown report with all findings, baselines, and remediation plan.
Standard Audit Procedures
Read
.claude/skills/_shared/AUDIT_TEMPLATE.mdfor: Evidence Requirements, Dual-Pass Verification, Cross-Reference Validation, JSONL Output Format, Context Recovery, Post-Audit Validation, MASTER_DEBT Cross-Reference, Interactive Review, TDMS Intake & Commit, Documentation References, Agent Return Protocol, and Honesty Guardrails.
Skill-specific TDMS intake:
node scripts/debt/intake-audit.js <output.jsonl> --source "audit-security-<date>"
Security audit triggers (check AUDIT_TRACKER.md):
- ANY security-sensitive file modified, OR
- 20+ commits since last security audit
Version History
| Version | Date | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | 2026-02-25 | Initial implementation |
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