Django Security

Django Security Audit

Audit Django applications including DRF (Django REST Framework) APIs.

When this skill applies

• Reviewing Django settings.py files
• Auditing views, models, and templates
• Reviewing DRF serializers and viewsets
• Checking authentication and permission classes
• Auditing Django Admin exposure

Workflow

Follow ../_shared/audit-workflow.md.

Phase 1: Stack detection

grep -E '^Django|django' requirements.txt pyproject.toml 2>/dev/null
find . -name 'manage.py' -not -path '*/.venv/*'
find . -name 'settings.py' -o -name 'settings/*.py' 2>/dev/null
python -c "import django; print(django.get_version())" 2>/dev/null

Phase 2: Inventory

# Settings files
find . -name 'settings*.py' -not -path '*/.venv/*' -not -path '*/node_modules/*'

# Views
find . -name 'views.py' -o -name 'views/' -type d 2>/dev/null

# URL configurations
find . -name 'urls.py' 2>/dev/null

# Raw SQL usage
grep -rn '\.raw(\|cursor()\|connection\.cursor' . --include='*.py' 2>/dev/null

# Template autoescape disabling
grep -rn '|safe\|autoescape off\|mark_safe\|format_html' . --include='*.py' --include='*.html' 2>/dev/null

Phase 3: Detection — the checks

settings.py audit

• DJG-SET-1 SECRET_KEY from environment variable, not committed:

  SECRET_KEY = os.environ['DJANGO_SECRET_KEY']
  

  Audit: git log -p settings.py | grep -i secret_key — if any historical commit has a real secret, rotate.
• DJG-SET-2 DEBUG = False in production. Confirmed via env-based settings split:

  DEBUG = os.environ.get('DJANGO_DEBUG', '0') == '1'
  

• DJG-SET-3 ALLOWED_HOSTS not ['*'] in production. Specific hostnames listed.
• DJG-SET-4 SECURE_* settings configured:
  • SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT = True
  • SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = True
  • CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE = True
  • SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS = 31536000 (or more)
  • SECURE_HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS = True
  • SECURE_HSTS_PRELOAD = True (if you want preload list inclusion)
  • SECURE_CONTENT_TYPE_NOSNIFF = True
  • SECURE_BROWSER_XSS_FILTER — removed in Django 4 (XSS-Protection deprecated); use CSP instead
  • X_FRAME_OPTIONS = 'DENY' (or 'SAMEORIGIN')
• DJG-SET-5 CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS lists specific origins (not *).
• DJG-SET-6 DATABASES config uses env vars for credentials.
• DJG-SET-7 EMAIL_* config doesn't have plaintext credentials.
• DJG-SET-8 MIDDLEWARE order:

  MIDDLEWARE = [
    'django.middleware.security.SecurityMiddleware',          # 1st
    'django.contrib.sessions.middleware.SessionMiddleware',
    'corsheaders.middleware.CorsMiddleware',                  # before CommonMiddleware
    'django.middleware.common.CommonMiddleware',
    'django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware',
    'django.contrib.auth.middleware.AuthenticationMiddleware',
    'django.contrib.messages.middleware.MessageMiddleware',
    'django.middleware.clickjacking.XFrameOptionsMiddleware',
  ]
  

CSRF

• DJG-CSRF-1 CsrfViewMiddleware in MIDDLEWARE.
• DJG-CSRF-2 No @csrf_exempt on state-changing views unless explicitly needed and documented (webhooks with their own signature verification are OK).
• DJG-CSRF-3 DRF views using SessionAuthentication automatically apply CSRF. Token/JWT auth doesn't (and shouldn't, for non-cookie auth).

ORM and raw SQL

• DJG-ORM-1 .raw(sql, params) uses parameterized queries (the params list). String concatenation is SQL injection.

  # BAD
  User.objects.raw(f"SELECT * FROM auth_user WHERE id = {user_id}")
  
  # GOOD
  User.objects.raw("SELECT * FROM auth_user WHERE id = %s", [user_id])
  

• DJG-ORM-2 connection.cursor() queries use parameterized queries.
• DJG-ORM-3 extra(where=[...]) with user input is injection-prone; prefer Q() filters.
• DJG-ORM-4 objects.filter(...) with field lookups is safe; the ORM parameterizes.

Mass assignment

• DJG-MA-1 Model.objects.create(**request.POST) patterns flagged. Use forms / serializers with explicit field allowlists.
• DJG-MA-2 DRF ModelSerializer with fields = '__all__' is mass-assignable. Use explicit fields = ['id', 'name', ...].
• DJG-MA-3 Form Meta.fields and Meta.exclude reviewed.

Templates

• DJG-TPL-1 Django templates auto-escape by default. {{ var|safe }} filter and {% autoescape off %} disable it — review every occurrence.
• DJG-TPL-2 mark_safe(...) and format_html(...) in Python code mark strings as safe — confirm content is trusted.
• DJG-TPL-3 SSTI: don't render user input as a template (Template(user_input).render(...)).

Authentication

• DJG-AUTH-1 AUTH_PASSWORD_VALIDATORS configured with reasonable validators.
• DJG-AUTH-2 PASSWORD_HASHERS first entry is Argon2 or BCrypt (Django default Argon2 is good).
• DJG-AUTH-3 Custom backends (subclasses of BaseBackend) review authenticate() for timing attacks.
• DJG-AUTH-4 django.contrib.auth.password_validation.validate_password called before set_password.

DRF (Django REST Framework)

• DJG-DRF-1 Global DEFAULT_PERMISSION_CLASSES set to IsAuthenticated (or stricter); not AllowAny.
• DJG-DRF-2 Per-view permission classes set; no view relying solely on URL routing for auth.
• DJG-DRF-3 ViewSet.queryset filtered to tenant/user scope, not returning all objects.
• DJG-DRF-4 Serializers define fields explicitly, exclude sensitive (password, is_superuser, user_permissions if not needed).
• DJG-DRF-5 Throttling configured (DEFAULT_THROTTLE_RATES).

# REST_FRAMEWORK settings.py snippet
REST_FRAMEWORK = {
    'DEFAULT_AUTHENTICATION_CLASSES': [
        'rest_framework_simplejwt.authentication.JWTAuthentication',
    ],
    'DEFAULT_PERMISSION_CLASSES': ['rest_framework.permissions.IsAuthenticated'],
    'DEFAULT_THROTTLE_CLASSES': [
        'rest_framework.throttling.UserRateThrottle',
        'rest_framework.throttling.AnonRateThrottle',
    ],
    'DEFAULT_THROTTLE_RATES': {
        'user': '1000/hour',
        'anon': '100/hour',
    },
}

File uploads

• DJG-UP-1 FILE_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE and DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE set.
• DJG-UP-2 FILE_UPLOAD_PERMISSIONS restrictive (0o644).
• DJG-UP-3 MEDIA_ROOT not within web-served path that could expose uploaded files without auth.
• DJG-UP-4 Uploaded file validated by content (magic bytes), not just content_type.

Django Admin

• DJG-ADM-1 Admin reachable only by staff users (is_staff=True).
• DJG-ADM-2 Admin URL changed from /admin/ to a less-discoverable path (defense in depth).
• DJG-ADM-3 Admin behind VPN / IP allowlist for production sites with regular user traffic.
• DJG-ADM-4 Custom admin actions reviewed for unintended privilege.

Static and media files

• DJG-STA-1 DEBUG = False means Django doesn't serve static files; deployed via nginx / S3 / CloudFront — confirm headers set there.
• DJG-STA-2 collectstatic output doesn't include accidentally-committed sensitive files.

Logging

• DJG-LOG-1 Logging config doesn't include 'level': 'DEBUG' for production. Don't log request bodies containing PII.
• DJG-LOG-2 Django's default email-error-to-admins (when DEBUG=False) sends tracebacks — verify recipients are correct, no broad mailing lists.

Dependencies

• DJG-DEP-1 Django version is on a current Long Term Support (LTS) line (4.2 LTS, 5.2 LTS) or current main. Old versions unpatched.
• DJG-DEP-2 pip list --outdated reviewed. safety check or pip-audit run periodically.

Phase 4: Triage

Critical: DEBUG = True in production; ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*']; raw query with string concatenation; admin publicly accessible with weak password policy.

Phase 5: Report

Use ../_shared/findings-schema.md. Prefix IDs with DJG-.

Source: hlsitechio/claude-skills-security — distributed by TomeVault.