Fastapi Security

FastAPI Security Audit

Audit FastAPI applications. FastAPI sits on Starlette + Pydantic — secure defaults are good, but custom code often bypasses them.

When this skill applies

• Reviewing FastAPI endpoints, dependencies, Pydantic models
• Auditing OAuth2 / JWT / API key auth flows
• Reviewing CORS, middleware, exception handlers
• Checking SQLAlchemy / SQLModel usage for SQL injection
• Reviewing async patterns for race conditions

Workflow

Follow ../_shared/audit-workflow.md.

Phase 1: Stack detection

grep -E '^fastapi|"fastapi"' requirements.txt pyproject.toml 2>/dev/null
python -c "import fastapi; print(fastapi.__version__)" 2>/dev/null

Phase 2: Inventory

# Route definitions
grep -rn '@app\.\|@router\.' . --include='*.py' | head -50

# Dependencies (DI)
grep -rn 'Depends(' . --include='*.py' | head -30

# Pydantic models (schemas)
grep -rn 'class .*BaseModel\|class .*pydantic' . --include='*.py' | head

# CORS / middleware
grep -rn 'add_middleware\|CORSMiddleware\|TrustedHostMiddleware' . --include='*.py'

# Raw SQL
grep -rn 'text(\|execute(\|raw_connection' . --include='*.py'

Phase 3: Detection — the checks

Pydantic schemas — input validation

• FAP-PYD-1 Endpoints accepting request bodies declare a Pydantic model — never request: dict or request: Any.
• FAP-PYD-2 Field constraints set: Field(min_length=..., max_length=..., gt=..., lt=...).
• FAP-PYD-3 model_config = ConfigDict(extra='forbid') (Pydantic v2) or class Config: extra = 'forbid' (v1) — rejects unknown fields, preventing mass assignment.
• FAP-PYD-4 Email fields use EmailStr; URLs use HttpUrl; UUIDs use UUID4.

from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, EmailStr, Field

class CreateUserIn(BaseModel):
    model_config = ConfigDict(extra='forbid')
    
    email: EmailStr
    password: str = Field(min_length=8, max_length=128)
    display_name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=50)
    # role is intentionally NOT here; set by server

Pydantic schemas — output filtering

• FAP-PYD-5 Response model declared on endpoints to filter output:

  @app.get("/users/{user_id}", response_model=UserOut)
  

  Without response_model, the endpoint returns whatever the function returns, including hidden fields.
• FAP-PYD-6 Distinct input/output models (UserIn, UserOut, UserInternal) — don't reuse the same model for both directions; secrets leak.
• FAP-PYD-7 response_model_exclude / response_model_exclude_unset not used to "hide" sensitive fields — explicit models are safer.

Authentication

• FAP-AUTH-1 Every protected route declares an auth dependency:

  @app.get("/me")
  async def me(user: User = Depends(get_current_user)):
      return user
  

• FAP-AUTH-2 Global dependency for app-wide auth NOT mixed with per-route auth (confusing; pick one model).
• FAP-AUTH-3 OAuth2PasswordBearer configured with tokenUrl matching the actual login endpoint.
• FAP-AUTH-4 JWT validation: see saas-security-pack/saas-code-security-review/references/jwt-validation.md. Algorithm explicit, secret from env, expiry checked.
• FAP-AUTH-5 Password hashing: passlib[bcrypt] or Argon2; not plain SHA-256.

from passlib.context import CryptContext
pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["argon2"], deprecated="auto")

def verify_password(plain, hashed):
    return pwd_context.verify(plain, hashed)

Authorization

• FAP-AUTHZ-1 Per-resource authz checked in the dependency or route body. Auth dependency returns User; the route must then check ownership / role for the specific resource.
• FAP-AUTHZ-2 OAuth2 scopes (if used) checked via Security(get_current_user, scopes=[...]). Verify the dependency actually checks security_scopes.scopes.
• FAP-AUTHZ-3 Admin routes guarded by a separate dependency, not just "is authenticated".

def require_admin(user: User = Depends(get_current_user)) -> User:
    if not user.is_admin:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
    return user

@app.delete("/admin/users/{user_id}")
async def delete_user(user_id: UUID, _: User = Depends(require_admin)):
    ...

CORS

• FAP-CORS-1 CORSMiddleware with specific allow_origins, not ["*"] for credentialed APIs.
• FAP-CORS-2 allow_credentials=True ONLY with explicit origin list; with *, FastAPI/Starlette will block credentials, but ensure not bypassed via regex.
• FAP-CORS-3 allow_methods and allow_headers not blanket * if not needed.

Trusted host

• FAP-TH-1 TrustedHostMiddleware with allowed_hosts list — protects against Host header injection.

SQL injection (SQLAlchemy, SQLModel)

• FAP-SQL-1 session.execute(text("SELECT ...")) with f-strings or % formatting = injection. Use bound params:

  # BAD
  session.execute(text(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = {user_id}"))
  
  # GOOD
  session.execute(text("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = :id"), {"id": user_id})
  

• FAP-SQL-2 SQLAlchemy Core / ORM filter(User.id == user_id) is parameterized — safe.
• FAP-SQL-3 query.filter(text(...)) patterns reviewed.

NoSQL injection

If using MongoDB / Beanie / Motor:

• FAP-NOSQL-1 Don't pass dict directly from request to query: users.find_one(request.json()) — attacker controls operators ({"$gt": ""}).

Async patterns

• FAP-ASYNC-1 Endpoints declared async def use async DB clients; sync_def endpoints called via FastAPI's thread pool. Don't mix sync I/O in async endpoints (blocks event loop).
• FAP-ASYNC-2 Shared mutable state (e.g., a module-level dict) accessed without locking → race conditions. Use Redis / DB / asyncio.Lock for shared state.

Background tasks

• FAP-BG-1 BackgroundTasks for fire-and-forget; errors caught and logged, not silently swallowed.
• FAP-BG-2 For long-running or critical background work, use Celery / Arq / Dramatiq — not BackgroundTasks (which dies with the worker process).

File uploads

• FAP-UP-1 UploadFile reads streamed; size limits enforced (FastAPI doesn't enforce by default — use Starlette's request.body size limits or check size after read).
• FAP-UP-2 Content type validated by magic bytes via python-magic or similar, not just file.content_type (client-controlled).
• FAP-UP-3 File saved with sanitized filename (UUID + safe extension).

Error handling

• FAP-ERR-1 Global exception handler in production hides stack traces.
• FAP-ERR-2 HTTPException used for client errors; don't bubble Python exceptions verbatim.
• FAP-ERR-3 Validation errors (422) don't echo full schema paths if they reveal internals — Pydantic v2 errors are typically OK, but customize if exposing column names becomes a concern.

OpenAPI / docs

• FAP-DOC-1 /docs and /redoc disabled in production OR gated by auth:

  app = FastAPI(docs_url=None, redoc_url=None, openapi_url=None)
  

  Or:

  app = FastAPI(openapi_url="/api/v1/openapi.json")
  # Then protect with router-level dependency
  

• FAP-DOC-2 OpenAPI schema doesn't include example values that are real credentials.

Session and cookies

If using Starlette's SessionMiddleware:

• FAP-SES-1 secret_key from env; not the example placeholder.
• FAP-SES-2 same_site='lax', https_only=True in production.

Dependencies

• FAP-DEP-1 FastAPI, Pydantic, Starlette versions current. Pydantic v2 is significantly different from v1; verify migration was complete.
• FAP-DEP-2 pip-audit clean.

Phase 4: Triage

Critical: endpoint accepting arbitrary dict body without Pydantic; raw SQL with string formatting; CORS * with credentials; docs reachable in prod with sensitive endpoints visible.

Phase 5: Report

Use ../_shared/findings-schema.md. Prefix IDs with FAP-.

Source: hlsitechio/claude-skills-security — distributed by TomeVault.